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Abstract 
This thesis examines information imperfections in asset markets and its impact 
on economic performance through technology adoption and innovation. 
In a rational setting, where equity market participants take into account com-
mon public information in addition to their private signals about fundamentals, 
equity prices are persistently biased towards the public signals. Chapter 2 in-
vestigates the real effect of such mis-pricing, when R&D producing firms rely on 
equity finance. Relating to the recent technology stocks boom, the model shows 
how market's optimism causes more innovations. Furthermore, such optimism can 
generate gains in aggregate consumption. 
Chapter 3 analyzes equity markets' role in facilitating ownership transfer from 
entrepreneurs investing in adopting technology to managers running these firms 
once technology is adopted. Information imperfections in equity market affect 
entrepreneurs' willingness to invest in frontier technology in two ways. First, un-
certainty about equity price or lack of market liquidity discourages technology 
adoption. This can explain slow technology adoption and limited venture capi-
talists' participation in under-developed equity markets. Second, imperfectly in-
formed market participants take fast adoption as a positive signal. The resulting 
increase of expected market value encourages technology adoption. Probability 
of fast technology adoption is highest at an intermediate number of informed in-
vestors. 
Chapter 4 looks more closely into the extent of asset mis-pricing by endoge-
3 
nizing the variance of investors' private signals. Better quality of freely available 
public information reduces incentives to invest in private information and can mag-
nify the extent of asset mis-pricing. Furthermore, in a dynamic setting, investors' 
react more slowly on changes of the fundamentals because incentives to invest in 
research are low in early trading periods. The chapter also shows that availability 
of longer price history might not bring asset prices closer to the fundamentals, as 
investors choose to free-ride on other investors' research efforts. 
4 
Contents 
List of Figures 
List of Tables 
Acknowledgments 
1 Introduction 
2 Equity mis-pricing and R&D growth 
2.1 Introduction . . . . 
2.2 The general setup. 
2.2.1 Production side 
2.2.2 Consumption side . 
2.2.3 . Goods market clearing 
2.3 Three-period model . . . . . . 
2.3.1 Information structure and equilibrium equity prices 
2.3.2 Benchmark price equation 
2.3.3 Results ..... 
2.4 Infinite horizon model 
2.4.1 Information structure and equilibrium equity prices 
2.4.2 Results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
5 
9 
11 
12 
14 
23 
23 
28 
28 
31 
33 
34 
34 
36 
36 
41 
41 
43 
3 
4 
2.5 Concluding remarks ........................... 48 
The speed of technology adoption with imperfect information in 
equity markets 51 
3.1 Introduction . 51 
3.2 The model .. 58 
3.2.1 Production decisions 64 
3.2.2 Identical technology adoption decisions 66 
3.2.3 Equity market . . . 66 
3.2.4 Adoption decision . 72 
3.2.5 Local goods market clearing 80 
3.3 Endogenous number of informed investors and incentives for trans-
parency ....................... 81 
3.3.1 Equilibrium number of informed investors 81 
3.3.2 Adoption with endogenous number of informed investors 
and incentives for transparency ........... 83 
3.4 Closing the local asset market to foreign portfolio investors 86 
3.5 Concluding remarks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 
Optimal research in financial markets with heterogeneous private 
information: a rational expectations model 
4.1 Introduction. 
4.2 The model .. 
4.2.1 Assumptions. 
4.2.2 Solution method 
4.3 Results.......... 
4.3.1 One trading period example 
6 
92 
92 
95 
. . . . 95 
98 
.103 
... 103 
4.3.2 Multi-period model. 
4.4 Extensions........ 
4.4.1 Long-lived agents 
4.4.2 Public signal and policy maker 
4.5 Concluding remarks . 
.106 
· 112 
· 112 
· 116 
.118 
5 Conclusion 121 
A Appendix for Chapter 2 127 
.127 A.1 Market clearing in three-period model. 
A.2 Equilibrium equity pnce for three-period 
model ... .128 
A.3 Comparative statics for three-period model. . 129 
A.4 Welfare .................... . 134 
A.5 Equilibrium equity prices in infinite horizon model. . 138 
A.6 Benchmark price equation in infinite horizon model . 141 
A.7 Parameters used in numerical solution for infinite horizon model . 142 
B Appendix for Chapter 3 144 
B.1 Labor, stock market and institutions. .144 
B.2 Income per capita and R&D expenditure .146 
B.3 Equity market equilibrium · 150 
B.4 Proof of Proposition 1 .. .152 
B.5 Independence of adoption and trading decisions .155 
B.6 Local goods market clearing .156 
B.7 Proof of Proposition 5. .160 
B.B Proof of Proposition 6 ... 162 
B.9 Policy maker's choice of precision of public signal .162 
7 
B.10 Restrictions on foreigners portfolio equity investments ........ 163 
C Appendix for Chapter 4 
C.1 Equilibrium asset prices 
C.2 Derivation of the variance of excess returns from risky asset 
C.3 Proof of Proposition 8 .................... . 
C.4 Sensitivity of optimal precision to parameters in one trading period 
model. ...... . 
C.5 Proof of Lemma 9 . 
C.6 Proof of Proposition 10 . 
C.7 Dependence of optimal precision on the exogenous parameters of 
the model in multi-period setting ........... . 
C.8 Equilibrium prices in a model with long-lived agents. 
C.9 Proof of Proposition 11 ................ . 
C.10 Responsiveness of optimal precision and asset prices to parameters 
167 
.167 
.170 
.171 
.173 
.176 
.177 
.178 
.181 
.183 
of the long-lived agents extension ................... 186 
References 187 
8 
List of Figures 
2.1 S&P500 price earning ratio and USPTO patents granted to non-
government institutions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 
2.2 Impact of an unjustified improvement of the market sentiment in t. 44 
2.3 Impact of a positive noise trading shock in t. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 
2.4 Impact of a temporary productivity shock in t, not anticipated from 
the public signals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 
2.5 Impact of a permanent and fully anticipated increase of productivity 
in t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 
3.1 Impediments for venture capital investor (US and European respon-
dents) ....... 54 
3.2 Timeline of events. 63 
3.3 Threshold productivity for fast technology adoption. 76 
4.1 Adjustment to changes in the fundamental. . . . . . 107 
4.2 Marginal research cost and impact of price history. . 110 
4.3 Adjustment of asset prices on a change in the fundamentals; long-
lived vs. short-lived investors ............... . 115 
4.4 Precision of public signal and the extent of mis-pricing . 117 
B.1 Securities market and GDP growth in transition countries .148 
9 
B.2 Securities market and R&D expenditures in transition countries .. 148 
B.3 Equity market and R&D expenditures in high and upper middle 
income countries ............................ 149 
BA Equity markets and investments in high and upper middle income 
countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149 
B.5 Possibility of faster technology adoption when forbidding foreign 
portfolio investments .......................... 165 
C.1 Dependance of optimal precision on risk aversion at different values 
of public signal precision ........................ 175 
C.2 Sensitivity of optimal precision of private signal to changes in pre-
cision of public signal and noise trading. ............... 179 
C.3 Adjustment of prices with different precision of public signal and 
noise trading .............................. 179 
CA Sensitivity of optimal precision of private signal tochanges in infor-
mation cost.. . ............................. 180 
C.5 Sensitivity of optimal precision of private signal to changes in risk-
free interest rate. . ........................... 180 
10 
List of Tables 
B.l Labor force, stock markets and institutions. . . . . . . . . .. . 1-1-1 
C.l Impact of parameters on the model in long-lived agents· setup . 186 
11 
Acknowledgments 
This thesis has substantially benefited from discussions with a number of people. 
I would particularly like to thank Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, who has been my supervisor 
throughout my PhD studies, for his constant encouragement, numerous inspiring 
discussions and helpful comments. Special thanks go also to my current supervisor 
in LSE, Rachel Ngai, for her constructive comments, valuable discussions and 
support. Other members of faculty at LSE and FMG have offered their time 
and ideas to improve this thesis. I am especially grateful to Christian Julliard, 
Margaret Bray, Danny Quah and Francesco Caselli. 
Chapter 2 in this thesis is coauthored work with my fellow student, Evangelia 
Vourvachaki. I would like to thank her for a great coauthoring experience and 
numerous helpful comments and discussions about other chapters of this thesis. 
Chapter 3 is based on my job market paper and received several additional com-
ments from seminar participants in Stockholm School of Economics, Robert H. 
Smith School of Business in University of Maryland, Bank of England, CERGE-
EI and Queen Mary University of London. Chapter 4 is originated from my paper 
of the same title that was written during my participation in the Graduate Re-
search Programme in ECB and was published as ECB working paper No. 493. I 
would like to thank my supervisor in ECB, Lorenzo Cappiello, and an anonymous 
referee for constructive comments. 
Several fellow students in LSE have been helpful in their comments and sug-
12 
gestions. I would particularly like to thank Afonso Goncalves da Silva and Peter 
Kondor for their valuable contributions. Additionally, I would like to thank Man-
isha Shah for several insightful discussions about financial markets. 
I am grateful to FMG and LSE for providing me with facilities, excellent 
research environment and financial support. My final thanks go to my family 
and friends for emotional support. 
13 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
More developed financial systems are expected to promote entrepreneurial and 
innovative activities and thereby long-term growth. This idea is supported by a 
wide literature on the impact of credit constraints on growthl. In addition to debt, 
the development of equity markets and related instruments such as venture capi-
tal or private equity, provide firms with increasing variety of funding mechanisms. 
As equity prices are subject to uncertainty and potential mis-pricing even in the 
most developed countries, the implications of this to aggregate economy is still 
a question of an academic and policy debate. This thesis aims to contribute to 
this discussion by addressing questions in two broad areas. First, how does imper-
fect private information among equity market participants affect investments in 
technology and aggregate economic growth? Second, how is the extent of these in-
formation imperfections determined in an environment where investors can choose 
how much private information to obtain? 
Equity markets are likely to be of particular importance for innovation for the 
following set of reasons addressed in this thesis: 
1 See for example Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (1993). Also a comprehensive overview 
of the literature addressing the relationship between financial development and growth can be 
found in Levine (2005) 
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• An innovation project tends to lack assets that can be collateralized. Also, 
the success such project is uncertain, while offering high returns in the event 
of success. These characteristics makes equity likely to be a more feasible and 
desirable source for raising external funds for such projects than debt (see 
e.g. Brealey and Myers 2003, Allen and Gale 1999). Also, empirical evidence 
shows that R&D intensive firms are more likely to raise equity funds than 
other types of firms. (e.g. Aghion, Bond, Klemm, and Marinescu 2004, Carlin 
and Mayer 2003). 
• Entrepreneurs that establish firms that innovate or adopt new technologies 
are likely to have a particular talent in identifying and starting up good 
projects. If at least some of these entrepreneurs do not have a superior 
managerial talent, welfare gains arise if firms can be easily sold. Such benefits 
of ownership transfers have been analyzed in a perfect information setting by 
Holmes and Schmitz Jr. (1990). Developed equity markets provide a good 
mechanism for this. Furthermore, good exit opportunities are crucial for 
venture capitalists to be willing to provide funds for technology investments. 
While these aspects make the existence of equity markets important for firms 
that can invest in technology, equity prices can deviate from their fundamentals. 
A wide empirical literature has found that equity prices react slowly on changes 
in variables that proxy the fundamentals (e.g. Cutler, Poterba, and Summers 
1991, Jegadeesh and Titman 1993, Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok 1996), tend 
to become overpriced (underpriced) after long record of positive (negative) news 
(e.g. De Bondt and Thaler 1985, Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter 1992, La Porta 
1996) and are affected by market sentiment (e.g. Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler 1991, 
Swaminathan 1991). 
Behavioral approach attributes these patterns to some degree of irrationality 
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among investors. For example, investors could be making persistent mistakes 
in their expectations due to psychological factors (e.g. Barberis, Shleifer, and 
Vishny 1998). Even when some investors are rational, they would not necessarily 
eliminate asset mis-pricing in the presence of irrational traders, as it would be 
rational to benefit from forecasting the beliefs of irrational traders (e.g. De Long, 
Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann 1990). However, persistent mis-pricing for 
a similar reason can occur also in a fully rational setting as pointed out more 
recently by Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006) and Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006). 
This thesis adopts a noisy rational expectations approach and similar information 
structure to these two papers when modelling equity prices. 
Throughout this thesis, it is assumed that investors can obtain information 
about firms' fundamental value (or dividends) from three sources: private signals, 
public signals2 that are common for all investors and price signals. As long as none 
of these signals is perfect for an average investor, it is rational for them to take all 
these signals into account when forming their expectations. As a result, the errors 
in the public signals will affect the average beliefs and equity prices. In general, 
asset prices are a function of the true fundamental value, public signals and supply 
shocks. This has several implications for equity prices that are important for the 
mechanisms analyzed in the different chapters of this thesis: 
1. Equity is typically mis-priced and is tilted from the true fundamental value 
towards the public signals. 
2. The extent of mis-pricing is lower if the quality of private information in the 
market is high. 
3. Especially when investors have short horizons and care about future equity 
2The public signal could reflect for example "market sentiment" I announcements by policy 
makers or opinion leaders and news more generally. 
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prices, then the mis-pricing generated by the availability of public signals is 
persistent. Equity prices adjust slowly to changes in the fundamental value 
and fast to changes in the public signals. 
4. From the point of view of entrepreneurs that aim to sell their firms in the 
equity market, uncertainty about the future public signals generates further 
uncertainty about the price they can sell their firms for. 
Chapter 2 addresses the firms' ability to invest in technology. It incorporates 
equity markets with information imperfections, as described above, into a Romer 
(1990) style growth model and analyzes the impact of mis-pricing on aggregate 
output and consumption. In order to highlight the effect of the mechanism, it is 
assumed that equity is the only source of funding for R&D firms. The source of 
uncertainty is assumed to be the productivity of final goods' sector in using the 
new technology. This translates into uncertainty about the demand innovative 
firms face in the future and therefore uncertainty about their future profits and 
dividends. 
During periods when equity markets are optimistic (in the sense that public 
signal is higher than the true productivity) firms can raise more funds and produce 
more R&D. This implies that output increases faster. At the same time, investors 
with imperfect information get losses in the equity market. The main question of 
this chapter is whether such mis-pricing can lead to permanent gains or losses in 
aggregate consumption. It also analyzes how such an economy reacts to changes 
in the actual productivity compared to the case of perfect information setting. 
Chapter 2 shows that if the R&D sector is not very congested, some degree of 
market optimism is likely to be beneficial for the economy. 
In the light of the recent technology stocks boom in the United States and 
other developed countries, the mechanism suggested in this chapter contributes to 
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understanding the real effect of these events. It also suggests that policy makers 
could have an incentive to encourage some degree of market optimism. 
Chapter 3 investigates how imperfect information in equity markets can affect 
firms' willingness to invest in technology. It takes a radically opposite approach 
to Chapter 2 in assuming that entrepreneurs in a small open economy can always 
find resources to invest in profitable technology adoption (or innovation) projects. 
In reality, even if debt financing is not suitable for R&D investments, such invest-
ments could be funded from own funds or by engaging a venture capitalist. The 
crucial assumption in this chapter is that entrepreneurs, who establish firms that 
adopt technology will sell their firms after the initial phase of development has 
passed. Similarly to Chapter 2, uncertainty is assumed to arise from the demand 
side and the mechanisms are analyzed in an endogenous growth framework (in the 
spirit of Aghion and Howitt 1992). 
The chapter further assumes that entrepreneurs (alone or joining with a ven-
ture capitalist) have superior information about the fundamental value of their 
firms. As technology adoption decisions and investments are made before the 
firms are sold in the equity market, there is uncertainty about the public signals 
(or market sentiment) that affects the market value of the firms. There is also 
uncertainty about the noise trading in the period that firms will be sold3• Such 
uncertainty can discourage entrepreneurs from engaging into technology adoption 
projects that would be profitable in perfectly informed equity markets. This neg-
ative force is called "fear of unstable markets". At the same time, some degree 
of imperfect information could also increase the speed of technology adoption due 
to a second the force that is called "adoption to signal". This force emerges be-
cause technology adoption decision becomes an additional signal for imperfectly 
3This is likely to be less important in relatively liquid equity markets. 
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informed equity market participants. They would rationally infer that entrepre-
neur would not invest in an expensive technology, if the fundamental value of the 
firm is too low. As a result, investors are willing to pay more for firms that invest 
in expensive technology. This could lead initial owners to undertake technology 
projects that they would not find profitable in perfectly informed markets. Nev-
ertheless, investing in better technology still leads to higher output and wages, in 
aggregate level. 
The chapter also addresses implications that arise from the presence of such 
mechanisms. First, to analyze policy makers' incentives to pursue policies to-
wards transparency, the degree of information asymmetry between entrepreneurs 
and equity market participants is endogenized by introducing information cost. 
The chapter shows that policy makers can lack incentives to eliminate these in-
formation asymmetries due to "adoption to signal", even if they would be able to 
set equity market participants' information costs to zero. Second, assuming that 
in a small open economy context the foreign investors are relatively less informed 
than the local ones, the chapter analyzes if restricting foreign portfolio invest-
ments could be beneficial because it reduces the magnitude of "fear of unstable 
markets" force. It is shown that while such policy may increase the probabil-
ity of fast technology adoption under specific circumstances, there is a trade-off 
between higher uncertainty and lower liquidity. The model is consistent with 
empirical evidence that lack of liquidity is likely to lead to underpriced equity 
(see e.g. Sadka 2000, Pastor and Stambaugh 2003, Amihud 2002, Acharya and 
Pedersen 2005). The implied lower expected market value of the firms reduces 
entrepreneurs' incentives to invest in new technologies. 
The mechanisms analyzed in this chapter could explain the current important 
differences in aggregate performance among transition countries despite their sim-
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ilar initial share of human capital, stage of development and institution at the 
beginning of 1990's. It can also provide insights for explaining the differences in 
venture capital investments across countries. Finally, the mechanisms analyzed 
could have also been relevant during the technology stocks boom in developed 
countries, where there might have been a role for "innovation to signal" force. 
The mechanisms in Chapters 2 and 3 rely on the fact that equity market par-
ticipants have imperfect private information. While Section 3.3 in Chapter 3 ad-
dresses the fact that the average quality of private information can be endogenous, 
it is done in a simple setting with one trading period for each risky asset and two 
types of investors: informed and uninformed4 • Chapter 4 looks at endogenous 
quality of private information in a multiple trading periods partial equilibrium 
setting similar to Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006). It assumes that short-lived in-
vestors' trading decisions are based on public, price and private signals about the 
liquidation value of a single risky asset. Investors are heterogeneous in the private 
signals they observe and they choose the precision of their private signals before 
observing the signal and trading. It is shown that if higher quality public signals 
are available, it reduces incentives to acquire better quality private signals. As a 
result, policies that aim to reduce the variance of public signals have an ambigu-
ous effect on the extent of mis-pricing. While a public signal of better quality is 
expected have a smaller error, the impact of this error becomes magnifies through 
the higher weight investors put on this signal when forming their expectations. 
Furthermore, short-lived investors who care about next period's asset price 
rather than the fundamental value of the assets not willing to put a lot of re-
search effort in analyzing events that are further in the future. Therefore, the 
4The technological progress in Chapter 2 is modelled as quality improvements in the spirit 
of Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Aghion, Comin, and Howitt (2006). In that setting firms can 
sustain their monopoly power only for one period before being driven out of the market. This 
implies that firms are traded in only one period. 
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slow-reaction on the news on the fundamentals is more pronounced than in Allen, 
Morris, and Shin (2006), where short-lived investors effectively have constant qual-
ity of private information over time. 
Another interesting implication of endogenous information costs arises when 
comparing the extent of potential mis-pricing of assets that have different length 
of price history available. If the precision of private information is fixed, longer 
price history necessarily reduces the extent of mis-pricing. This is because of the 
additional information revealed in historical prices. In the case of endogenous 
information costs this might no longer be the case. Longer price history reduces 
the marginal benefit of improving the quality of private signals and encourages 
investors to free-ride on the research efforts of investors that traded in earlier 
periods. Depending on the assumptions about marginal research cost, this could 
even lead to assets with longer price history to be more mis-priced. 
Some on these results are sensitive to the assumption of short-lived agents. 
To investigate the implications of this, Chapter 4 extends to consider long-lived 
agents who have preferences over consumption on the final liquidation date as 
in Brown and Jennings (1989). In such case5 , asset prices react on the changes 
in fundamentals much faster. Chapter 4 also shows that in such case investors 
prefer to obtain a higher quality private signal as early as possible and do not 
have incentives to delay their research efforts and wait for further information to 
be revealed in prices. This is because their private signal will remain useful in 
later trading periods and they can foresee their future demand for the risky asset. 
While the price adjustment dynamics change in the case of non-myopic investors, 
the direction of impact of other variables that affect incentives to acquire private 
information remain unchanged. 
5 As also shown by Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006) for a special case of infinite variance of 
noise trading. 
21 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 analyzes the impact 
of equity mis-pricing on equity funded and R&D driven growth, when equity 
market participants are short-lived and have noisy private, public and price signals. 
Chapter 3 addresses the aggregate effects of information asymmetries between 
equity market participants and entrepreneurs adopting technology and aiming to 
sell their firms in equity markets. Chapter 4 proceeds by looking at investors' 
incentives to acquire costly private information about the fundamentals and the 
extent of asset mis-pricing that arises in a setting where public information is 
available. Finally, Chapter 5 highlights the links between the insights coming 
from the different chapters, presents the implications for economic policy and 
discusses weaknesses present in the analytical framework that give directions for 
future research. 
22 
Chapter 2 
Equity mis-pricing and R&D 
growth 
2.1 Introduction 
The recent developments in the stock market prices of the Cnited States' technol-
ogy intensive firms poses the following question. If these stocks were overpriced, 
what would be the aggregate economic impact of this? Could it be that the United 
States experienced higher output following this boom? If firms that produce R&D 
rely on equity finance, overpricing in equity markets provides them with cheaper 
funds and enables them to produce more R&D. Hence, as long as R&D is the 
driver of economic growth, there can be gains in aggregate consumption due to 
optimism in equity markets. At the same time, optimism can have an opposite 
effect, because investors get losses when they invest in overpriced equity markets. 
This chapter presents a theoretical model that investigates how equity mis-pricing 
transmits to the real economy through R&D growth. 
Figure 2.1 presents data on real price earnings ratio from the firms listed in 
S .. \"P500 over the period 1970-2002, along with a proxy for R&D output, as given 
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Figure 2.1: S&P500 pnce earning ratio and USPTO patents granted to non-
government institutions 
by number of patents granted by USPTO to the United States non-government 
institutions1 . The two series co-move along time, reflecting the pattern of produc-
tivity growth of the United States over the same period. Most rational expecta-
tions models explain this correlation by the forward looking nature of the equity 
market. However, if the market price deviates from the fundamentals, then the 
correlation can also be driven by the funds available for R&D activities through 
equity issue. The existence of such feedback becomes of particular interest in 
relation to Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) , for which the 
arne correlation pattern is present. Importantly, the ICT producing ector i 
highly intensive in R&D and patenting activity (Carlin and Mayer 2003) while 
r cent growth accounting identifies this sector as the driver of economic growth 
(Jorgen on Ho and Stiroh 2005). 
In endogenou growth model like Romer (1990), Gro man and Helpman 
1 Figur 1 pr sents th . ri . in log 1 vel ' and their r p ctive trend (Hodrick-Pr . cott filt ' r 
with ). = 100 for annual data). Data on price- clrnings ratio and patenb i ' from Rob rt J. 
chill rand Bronwyn II. Hall wcbsit !:> r sp ctiv ly. 
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(1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992), R&D is the engine of growth. This chapter 
keeps a similar setting in the production side. There are competitive final good 
producers, who use capital varieties that are produced by the monopolistic inter-
mediate goods sector. Similarly to Comin and Gertler (2004), intermediate goods 
sector produces also its own R&D, in a decentralized manner. The key difference 
to all aforementioned papers, is that this chapter considers the possibility of equity 
mis-pricing resulting from the information imperfections of consumers (investors). 
Consumers are modelled as overlapping generations, in order to emphasize on 
investors who care about the short-term movements in equity prices. 
Accounting for the potential mis-pricing of equities is important. There is 
empirical support on equity prices under-reacting on the changes in fundamentals 
(see Chapter 1 for references). Also, most fund managers find it important to 
take into account their own perception of market view about a particular asset, in 
addition to their private fundamental research (e.g. Menkhoff 1998). 
Several models in finance emphasize on irrationality (e.g. animal spirits) in the 
investors' behavior that result in the mis-pricing of asset (e.g. Barberis, Shleifer, 
and Vishny 1998). However, mis-pricing can occur in a purely rational setting, as 
shown by papers on higher order expectations by Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006) 
and Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006). In these papers, the necessary component 
for mis-pricing to occur is the existence of heterogeneous, noisy private informa-
tion together with common, noisy public information2 • Such setting results in 
a rational expectation equilibrium, where all investors end up taking both sig-
nals into account and asset prices are affected by the public signal. This chapter 
takes a similar approach on the information structure and therefore the frictions 
considered result from rational behavior. 
2 "Public information" or a "public signal" is distinct from the price signal in this chapter. 
25 
The channel through which equity prices affect R&D growth in this chapter, is 
that R&D is financed by issuing equity. The reason why equity financing is likely 
to be more important for the R&D producing than other sectors in the economy, 
is that this sector is not appealing for debt contracts, while internal finance is 
may not provide sufficient funds. R&D production activity lacks collateral and 
carries agency problems, driven by the uncertainty about the success of innova-
tions and the demand for them. As a result, debt financing may not be desirable 
or possible for the innovating firms (see discussion on bankruptcy costs in Brealey 
and Myers 2003). Empirical evidence by Aghion, Bond, Klemm, and Marinescu 
(2004) based on the United Kingdom data shows that firms that report R&D are 
more likely to raise equity than those that do not. Also, the probability of eq-
uity financing increases with R&D intensity. Carlin and Mayer (2003) investigate 
OECD countries' data and find support for Allen and Gale's (1999) hypothesis 
that equity market is more relevant for raising funds for the R&D intensive firms. 
In order to highlight the main mechanism, the chapter abstracts from the choice 
of financing for the R&D producers. It assumes that their only available source 
of financing is equity. Furthermore, the success of innovation is assumed to be 
certain, as in endogenous growth models like Romer (1990), Evans, Honkapohja, 
and Romer (1998) and Comin and Gertler (2004). This assumptions are mainly 
for simplicity of argument to emphasize on the main questions of this chapter. 
The uncertainty about the level of demand for the innovations in the model, is 
introduced through a labour augmenting productivity shock in the final good 
sector. 
The main question addressed in this chapter is the impact of pure optimism on 
aggregate economy. The chapter shows how market optimism reflected in a public 
signal above the true productivity can induce expansion of the economy. In par-
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ticular, it analyzes whether such deviation of equity prices from the fundamental 
value coincides with higher consumption, despite resulting in losses in the equity 
market for the consumers. 
Another question relates to the impact of an actual change in the fundamentals 
(transitory or not, anticipated or not). The performance of the model economy, 
where there are various sources of imperfect information, is compared to the econ-
omy, where the fundamentals are known to the financial market participants. In 
addition, the chapter addresses the impact of noise trading shocks. Finally, the 
chapter provides an insight into how changes in the quality of different sources of 
information and risk aversion would affect the response to the public signal and 
true productivity shocks. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 sets up the production and 
consumption side of the economy for the general case of infinite horizon. Section 
2.3 describes the information structure and presents the analytical solution and 
the comparative statics for the three-period horizon. In such setting there is only 
uncertainty about the liquidation value of intermediate goods firm in the second 
period. Section 2.4 presents numerical results for the infinite horizon model. It 
confirms the conclusions for the three-period model and discuss the additional 
insights provided by this framework. Section 2.5 summarizes the main findings 
and discusses the incentives of policy makers that can affect the public signal (e.g. 
central banks) to make truthful statements. 
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2.2 The general setup 
2.2.1 Production side 
Final good producers and intermediate goods production 
Competitive final good producers use all labour (L) and capital varieties (Xt(j)) 
that are available in the economy in period t (j E [0, At]; Al is given). The 
capital depreciates fully in a period. The sector rents capital varieties from the 
intermediate good's sector for a price PXt (j) and pays wage Wt to consumers. The 
final output is the numeraire and its price is normalized to one. Therefore, the 
final goods' producers solve 
(2.1) 
where ¢t f"V N(¢, l/{3cfJ is a labour augmenting productivity shock3 . This is also 
the publicly known prior distribution of productivity. At the beginning of period 
t, ¢t is known, but there is uncertainty for all future ones. 
Monopolistic intermediate goods producers use 1] units of final good in order 
to produce one unit of capital good. They maximize profits: 
max {7r,(j) = Px,(j)x,(j) - '1X,(j), s.t. Px,(j) = a a~.)} . 
PZt (j),Xt(j) Xt J 
Given the symmetry among the intermediate goods firms, the demand for 
3The normality assumption, while being unrealistic by allowing negative output, greatly 
simplifies the solution. It is also widely used assumption in the finance literature about the 
liquidation value of assets. By reasonable assumptions about the parameters the probability of 
negative output or asset prices is negligible. The main mechanism would remain valid with dif-
ferent distributional assumptions. The normality assumption is maintained in the other chapters 
of this thesis for the same reason. 
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intermediate goods is 
(2.2) 
Since the demand is linear in ¢t, the intermediate goods firms face uncertain 
future demand. Profits are also linear in ¢t and uncertain in the future, 
(2.3) 
Since all firms of the sector get exactly the same profits, consumers treat all 
equity in the economy as one asset. The total supply of equity coincides with the 
number of capital producing firms. 
The aggregate capital stock can be expressed as 
(2.4) 
R&D production 
The R&D production is modelled as in Comin and Gertler (2004). The firms 
conduct R&D to invent a new capital variety, one period in advance of producing 
and using this variety for the final good production. The input to R&D is final 
goods, which implies that R&D expenditures become procyclical. A firm that 
intends to enter the intermediate goods producing sector in period t + 1 needs to 
undertake R&D during period t. It raises its R&D expenditures by issuing equity 
worth of It(j). The R&D production function from the point of view of every 
investor is 
(2.5) 
where .At is taken as given and exogenous in every period. At the aggregate 
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level the R&D productivity is given by 
- t -1 
( 
I 
)
P-1 
At = A K
t 
Kt At· (2.6) 
This allows for congestion in R&D, implied by the aggregate It entering neg-
atively this expression, for 0 < p < 1. The parameter p measures the extent of 
congestion, with higher value implying lower congestion and higher productivity 
for R&D (p is the elasticity of R&D output with respect to R&D intensity). The 
existence of knowledge spillover over time, is captured by At. The current value 
of capital stock (Kt) acts as a proxy for the embodied knowledge stock. The 
parameter A is a pure scaling factor. 
Since the firms conducting R&D do not have alternative sources of funding, 
they invest in R&D the funds they can raise in the equity market. Free entry to 
R&D production level ensures that R&D activity gives zero profits for every firm, 
Pt (At+1 (j) - At (j)) - It (j) = 0, and the entire sector: 
(2.7) 
Despite the fact that the equity price depends on future productivities, R&D pro-
ducing firms take this price as given, while the outcome of R&D production is 
known with certainty by all agents. R&D producers do not have any superior 
information about their future profits and are forced to paying these all out as 
dividends. This chapter abstracts from any agency problems between R&D pro-
duces and investors, in order to focus on the impact of investors' information 
imperfections. 
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2.2.2 Consumption side 
The consumption side consists of overlapping generations of rational and non-
rational consumers, who work and invest in assets in the first period of their lives, 
and retire and consume in the second period. The short-lived agents assumption 
emphasizes the behavior of investors, who care about the short-term price move-
ments in addition to the fundamental value of firms. 
There is a continuum of short-lived rational consumers normalized in the in-
terval [0,1], who make their asset allocation decisions when young. A rational 
(indexed as R) consumer i, born in period t , invests his labour income (WtL) in 
stocks of the intermediate goods firms and the risk-free technology (Yt). The lat-
ter offers a certain gross return R > 1 on funds invested in it during the previous 
yt = RMt - 1 • (2.8) 
There are no short-selling or borrowing constraints. 
Rational consumers maximize the CARA utility 
U - _e-TCr,t+l(i) t- , 
where risk aversion is measured by T. Using the consumer's budget constraint, 
the consumption of a rational consumer i can be expressed as 
where hr,t(i) and Mr,t(i) represent respectively consumer i's equity and risk-free 
asset demand. Using (2.3), consumer i's optimal demand for stocks can be express 
4The risk-free asset could be another final good technology, storage or foreign assets. 
31 
as 
h (i) = E[Pt+l + f4>t+ll n t(i)] - RPt 
r,t rVar[Pt+l + f4>t+ll n t(i)] , (2.9) 
where nt(i) is the information set available for consumer i in period t and defined 
explicitly in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.4.1. 
The aggregate demand of rational consumers for stocks and the risk-free asset 
are Hr,t and Mr,t respectively. The latter is given by Mr,t = WtL - PtHr,t. The 
aggregate consumption of rational consumers in period t is equal to Gr,t = (Pt + 
'lrt)Hr,t-l + RMr,t-l. 
The non-rational (indexed as n) consumers, born in period t, differ from the 
rational consumers only in two respects: they are not endowed with labour and 
they demand a random quantity of stocks5 . The existence of non-rational con-
sumers with random equity demand is necessary to make the equity prices not 
fully revealing (a paradox first addressed by Grossman and Stiglitz 1976)6. The 
equity demand of non-rational investors in period t is 
Hn,t At+l - St, 
St ~ N(O, ;} 
where St is the noise trading shock. The mean of the non-rational consumers' 
equity demand is equal to aggregate supply of assets in period t (At+l), in order 
to ensure that the financial market do not have excess or shortage of liquidity on 
average. Equity market clearing implies At+l = Hn,t + Hr,t ===} St = Hr,t. 
As the budget constraint for the non-rational consumers is similar to that of 
the rational consumers, their investment in the risk-free technology in period t 
5The wage income does not affect the demand for stocks with CARA utility maximization 
under no short-selling or borrowing constraints. Therefore, the split of wage income between 
rational and non-rational consumers does not affect the aggregate results. 
6See also Chapter 4. 
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is Mn,t = -PtHn,t. The non-rational consumers born in t - 1 consume Cn,t = 
(Pt + 'lrt)Hn,t-l + RMn,.t-l in period t. 
The aggregate investment in the alternative technology and aggregate con-
sumption are respectively 
(2.10) 
(2.11) 
2.2.3 Goods market clearing 
The goods market clearing condition in period t is 
Using equations (2.1), (2.2), (2.4), (2.8), (2.10), (2.11) and WtL = (1 - a)Yt, one 
can simplify this to 
The LHS of this equals zero, given (2.3) and the RHS equals zero, because all 
the funds raised from the equity market are used for R&D investment, (2.7). 
Therefore, the market clears out in all interim periods. The details on the market 
clearing conditions in the initial and terminal period of the three-period economy 
are shown in Appendix A.1. 
33 
2.3 Three-period model 
2.3.1 Information structure and equilibrium equity prices 
The production of final good (described by (2.1)) takes place only in periods 1 
and 2. The productivity in the first period (4)1) the number of intermediate firms 
(AI) and the initial investment in alternative technology (Mo) are given. The 
uncertainty concerns the productivity in the second period (4)2)' Since the last 
period that intermediate goods producers operate is period 2, the dividend paid 
during this period is the liquidation value of the firm. 
The R&D production (described by (2.5),(2.6)and (2.7), where t = 1), occurs 
only in period 1, since there is no any demand for capital varieties developed in 
period 2. Hence, there is no equity market in period 2 (P2 = 0). Consumers 
born in period 2 receive labour income (W2L), and invest it all into the alternative 
technology, because it is the only available asset. This implies, C3 = RW2L. 
The information structure is similar to that of Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006) 
and Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006). In period 1, every rational consumer 
i born in that period, receives a private signal lI(i) = 4>2 + clI(i), where clI(i) '" 
N(O, 1/ (311)' The trading decisions will be based on three sources of information: 
this private signal, the public signal 4>2 '" N(4), 1/ f3qJ, and the equity price signal. 
Therefore, the information set is fh(i) = {lI(i), 4>2, PI}' The variance of the price 
signal depends on the variance of the net supply (1/ f3 s). The private signals, the 
public signal and the noise trading shock are assumed to be uncorrelated with 
each other and across consumers. 
By aggregating the demand of all rational consumers (2.9) and equating this 
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demand with net supply of stocks to rational consumers gives 
(2.12) 
where average expectations of all rational consumers in period are denoted as 
E[ .. ,Ot] = fo1 E[ .. ,Ot(i)]di for period t. The quality of information will be the 
same for all of these consumers, therefore Var [¢2' 0 1 ( i)] = Var ( ¢21 0 1), for all i. 
The equilibrium equity price is found by assuming the price function and then 
solving for the coefficients with the method of undetermined coefficients. The 
equilibrium equity price equation is 
where 
Zs,l 
(3¢ + (~)2(3s + (3// 
Tr + (~)2,Bs 
(2.13) 
(2.14) 
See Appendix A.2 for details of the derivation.7 The term ~Zl (¢2 - ¢2) in (2.13) 
captures the extent of mis-pricing. This is due the presence of the common and 
noisy public signal. If none of the signals is perfect, it is rational for each con-
sumer to take all of them into account, when forming their expectations about 
productivity in period 2. While the noise in private signals averages to the true 
productivity (4)2)' when aggregating over all rational consumers, the mean of the 
public signal (4)2) does not average out to the true productivity. 
Market optimism is defined as 4>2 > 4>2, which means that equity is overpriced, 
7 See also Chapter 4 about solving a similar problem .. 
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even if the noise trading is at its mean (81 = 0). 
2.3.2 Benchmark price equation 
If private information was perfect (1/ f3v ~ 0), or there was no public information 
(1//3¢ ~ 00), then the term (¢2 - ¢2) in (2.13) would disappear. Define the 
economy with perfect private signals as the "Benchmark economy". In this case, 
consumers do not take into account the public signals. 
By using equations (2.13) and (2.14), the equilibrium price in the Benchmark 
economy IS 
In the analysis that follows, equity is considered to be "overpriced" ("under-
priced"), if the equilibrium price in the setting described in Section 2.3.1: the 
"Model economy" exceeds (is below) in the one in the Benchmark economy. 
2.3.3 Results 
R&D and output growth 
Aggregating R&D production (2.5) and combining it with (2.6) and (2.7) for t = 1, 
R&D growth can be express as 
(2.15) 
Therefore, R&D growth during period 1 depends positively on the equity prices, 
given the profits paid as dividends in the same period. As it was established in 
Section 2.3.1, equilibrium equity price is affected by the public signal. Given 
(2.13), equation (2.15) shows that a pure improvement in the market sentiment 
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increases R&D growth. 
The magnitude of the equity mis-pricing depends on the weight on the public 
signal (Zl) in the equity pricing equation. An increase of this weight amplifies the 
positive impact of market optimism (negative impact in the case of pessimism) on 
equity prices and R&D growth. As shown in Appendix A.3, this weight increases 
in the variance of private signal and decreases in the variance of the public signal. 
These variances reflect the relative quality of the different sources of information. 
The weight on the public signal also increases in the variance of noise trading and 
risk aversion. Both of these worsen the quality of the price signal. The former is a 
direct impact of more volatile noise trading. The latter is due to the lower demand 
and participation of rational-consumers in the equity market. Finally, the prices 
can be affected by the noise trading in period 1. This is true also in the case that 
the rational consumers have prefect information. 
Output growth that comes from the productive activity of the agents can be 
expressed as 
(2.16) 
Output growth has two parts. One is coming from the exogenous productivity 
growth and the other from R&D growth. Output growth always reacts stronger 
on R&D growth, when it is accompanied with actual productivity growth. As 
in the case of R&D growth, output growth is affected by all determinants of the 
equity prices. 
Comparison with the Benchmark economy 
This section compares the reactions of the Model and the Benchmark economy to 
changes in the true productivity, market perception and noise trading. The initial 
scenario is set to be such that there is no productivity growth (4)1 = 4>2)' public 
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signal is correct (<P2 = <P2) and noise trading shock is at its mean (81 = 0). Details 
of all derivations are in Appendix A.3 and A.4. 
1. Non-justified improvement of market sentiment (increase of 4>2)' 
Public signal does not affect equity prices, nor any other variable in the Bench-
mark economy. In the Model economy, equity will be overpriced. Higher prices al-
low more funds for R&D investment and imply increase in R&D growth. Through 
R&D growth output growth increases as well. Hence, in terms of output, the 
impact of an optimistic market is clearly positive compared to the Benchmark 
economy. 
The impact on consumption is different across generations. Consumption of 
the first generation (C1 ) will be higher. This is because these agents sell their 
equity holdings at a higher price and retire before the lower liquidation value of 
firms is realized. Consumption of the generation who traded on the market (C2 ) 
will decrease. They get losses from the equity market, given that the realized 
profits of the intermediate goods firms are lower than they expected on average. 
Note that this generation does not gain from the expansion of the economy and 
higher wages, because their wages were determined from 1st period's output. Due 
to their mis-perception about the fundamentals, they invested too much in the 
equity market and too little in the risk-free technology. The consumption of the 
next generation (C3 ), will be higher, because of the expanded output. 
The overall impact on the welfare8 is likely to be positive. Welfare gains will be 
present if R&D growth rises enough to compensate for the capital losses from the 
equity market. This requires relatively low congestion (high p) in the innovating 
sector. If congestion is too high, further R&D activity is not very productive 
8We define the measure of welfare as the discounted sum of the aggregate consumption levels of 
different generations. The discount factor is based on return from the alternative technology (R). 
See Appendix A.4 for derivations. The results on welfare should be seen as purely indicative as 
there is no well-established convention for analyzing welfare in over-lapping generations setting. 
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and the extra funds invested in it, induce little gains in terms of output. In such 
case the gains of the last generation would be small, while the second generation 
gets remarkable capital losses. Also, for a given level on congestion, there is an 
upper bound in how much the public signal can exceed the true productivity for 
welfare gains to be sustained. Overall, for reasonable range of parameters, the 
gains are realized for the Model economy. All these effects would be stronger, if 
the mis-pricing is larger. 
2. Above mean demand from the noise traders (decrease of 81). 
Equity prices increase in both economies. Which economy reacts stronger de-
pends on the variances of noise trading and signals. However, unless the precision 
of public and private signals is very low (when /3<1> + /3v < rf), then prices the 
Benchmark economy will react more on the noise trading shock. This is because 
in the Model economy the agents use the equity prices also as signals of the under-
lying productivity. Therefore, the agents facing imperfect information, consider 
the chance of an actual productivity increase and take a less aggressive position 
against the non-rational traders. This is assumed to be the case in the conclusions 
that follow. 
The R&D and output growth increase more in the Benchmark economy. First 
period consumption increases because of the higher equity prices. Negative noise 
trading shock means that the noise traders cause excess demand of assets by 
borrowing from storage to invest in the equity market. The rational traders react 
to guarantee lower losses for themselves (in the Benchmark they guarantee no 
losses). However, there are large losses in the equity market at the aggregate 
level. As a result, the second period consumption falls and does so more in the 
Benchmark economy. Consumption in period 3 increases, because of the higher 
R&D growth and output. This increase is be larger in the Benchmark economy. 
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Provided that R&D congestion is relatively low and the noise trading shock is not 
too big, there are welfare gains compared to the initial scenario. The welfare gains 
in the Benchmark economy are higher. 
A discussion about the differences in the impact of the noise trading and the 
public signal changes is postponed to Section 2.4.2, since these differences are 
better understood in the infinite horizon setting. 
3. A productivity shock that is not accompanied with a change in the 
public signal (increase of 1>2). 
Prices increase in both cases, however the increase in prices is larger in the 
Benchmark economy. This is because the Model economy puts a positive weight 
on the unchanged public signal. As a result, the equity market will be underpriced. 
Therefore, R&D growth will also increase in both cases, but will increase more in 
the Benchmark economy. The same is true for the output growth. In both cases 
there is growth due to both the exogenous productivity growth (same in both 
cases) and R&D growth (higher in Benchmark economy). 
Consumption in period 1 increases in both cases, because of higher stock prices. 
Since the stock price increases more in the Benchmark economy, the consumption 
will increase more as well. The wage income of the generation consuming in the 
second period is not affected. In the Benchmark economy, these consumers price 
equity correctly and will not get any excess gains from the equity market. Hence, 
in the Benchmark economy, the consumption in the second period is the same as 
in the initial scenario. In the Model economy, consumers get "surprise" excess 
gains from the equity market. Thus, their consumption will be higher than in the 
Benchmark economy. Consumption in period 3 increases in both cases, because 
the expansion of the economy increases their wages. Since the output growth is 
smaller in the Model economy compared to the Benchmark case, so is consumption 
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in the 3rd period. Welfare will increase in both cases. The welfare in the Model 
economy will be lower than in the Benchmark economy, as long as congestion is not 
too high and the public signal is not too low compared to the actual productivity. 
Again, the magnitude of the difference between the Model and the Benchmark 
depends on the variances of different signals. 
4. A productivity shock that is accompanied with equivalent change in 
the public signal (increase of both, 4>2 = CP2). 
The stock prices increase by the same amount in both cases. Therefore, the 
R&D and output growth rates will increase to the same extent in both cases. 
Consumption will react in the same way as well, in either economy. That is C1 
and C3 are increasing (higher prices and output respectively), while C2 stays the 
same, as there are not excess losses or gains from the asset market. Welfare will 
be higher and the same in both economies. 
2.4 Infinite horizon model 
2.4.1 Information structure and equilibrium equity prices 
The production and the consumption side of the model is described in Section 
2.2. There is uncertainty about all future labour augmenting productivity shocks. 
Their prior distribution of these shocks CPt rv N(cp, 1/f3¢). Every rational consumer 
i trading in period t receives a private signal about the productivity T periods 
ahead Vt(i) = ¢t+T + clI,t{i), where clI,t(i) rv N(O,l/f3I1). He also inherits the 
private signals from his ancestors (Le. he gets a signal from a rational consumer i 
born in t-l about ¢t+T-l' from one born in t-2 about ¢t+T-2 etc.). The earliest 
private signal that remains still useful in period tis Vt-T+l(i). 
Notice that ¢ is a public signal that coincides with the long-term productivity 
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in the economy. In order to allow for the possibility of more frequent release of 
public signals and temporary optimism or pessimism in the market, assume that 
investors also receive new public signals every period. Similarly to private signals, 
investors trading in period t receive a public signal about productivity T periods 
ahead, <Pt = <PHT + C'¢,t' where C'¢,t rv N(O, 1/ f3'¢). The earliest public signal that 
will be still useful in period t is CPt-T+l. 
Finally, these consumers obtain information about the future productivities 
from current and historical prices. The earliest price that is useful in predicting 
price future dividends is Pt - T +1. Therefore, the information set available for a ra-
tional consumer i in tis nt(i) = {Vt(i), ... , Vt-T+l(i), Pt , ... , PHT+1 , ¢t, .··CPt-T+l' <p}. 
All private and public signals, as well as the noise trading are assumed to be un-
correlated over time and with each other. Private signals are also uncorrelated 
across consumers. 
Aggregating individual consumers' demand for equity and equating aggregate 
demand with aggregate supply, equity price becomes 
(2.17) 
The conditional variance of the sum of next period's price and dividend is the 
same for all investors and over time. 
The equilibrium price equation solved by the method of undetermined coeffi-
cients is 
.............. -Pt = rZ~~t + rZ'~t + iz<p, (2.18) 
where ~t = (<PHl' .. , <PHT' St-;±1, .. , ¥-)' is a vector of unknowns that includes fu-
ture productivities and unknown net noise supplies. Note that St-T is perfectly 
.............. ....... 
revealed by the prices in t - T. ~t = (<Pt-T+l' ... , <Pt)' is the vector of updated 
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public signals. It excludes the information in private signals and prices. Thus, 
- - .-.. .-.. f3 - f3_ -
¢t+TI¢t, ¢ rv N(¢t, 1/ (3,¢), where !3'¢ = {3¢ + !3¢ and ¢t = f3~ ¢ + f3~ ¢t· Finally, 
'" '" Zl = (Zb .. , ZT, -Zs,b .. , -Zs,T)' and Z = (zi, .. , Z'r)' are vectors of coefficients that 
can be solved for numerically. The solution method for the equity price equation 
is presented in Appendix A.5. It is noteworthy that in this setting equity prices 
depend not only on the true productivities and current noise trading shock, but 
also on the historical noise trading and the public signals. 
Solving the infinite horizon model is done in two stages: first, numerically 
solving for the equilibrium price equation and second, using this equation in order 
to solve for the remaining endogenous variables of the model. 
The Benchmark price equation is found under the assumption of perfect private 
signals and is presented in Appendix A.6. 
2.4.2 Results 
As in the three-period case, R&D and output growth depend on the equity price, 
which is itself affected by public signals: 
gA,t (2.19) 
gY,t 
Details on the parameters used to obtain the results below, are listed in Ap-
pendix A.7.9 Similarly to the three-period model, in the "initial scenario" noise 
trading at its mean, the productivity is constant and all public signals are correct, 
(i.e. SHk = 0 , ¢Hk = 1, ¢ = 1, ~t-T+k = 1, ¢t-T+k = 1 for all k E (-00,00)). 
9 The numerical outcome of the model should be treated with caution. Given that due com-
plications of identifying good proxies for the variables relevant for measuring the quality of 
information in equity market, the figures presented here are provided purely for the purpose of 
illustrating the direction of impact and the economy's dynamics. 
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Figure 2.2: Impact of an unjustified improvement of the market entiment in t. 
In this state, the Model and Benchmark economy behave exactly th am. Con-
sumers do not obtain any excess gains or losses from the equity market and R&D , 
output and consumption grow at the same rate. 
1. A non-justified improvement of market perception about productiv-
ity in t (increase in ¢t). 
--. 
This implies an increase in cPt-T and therefore in cPt-T o The Benchmark econ-
omy i not affected and behaves identically to the initial scenario. 
Figure 2.2 depicts the impact of this on stock prices (Pt ), exces capital gains 
(Pt + 1ft - RPt-d, R&D growth (gA,t) output growth (gY,t) alternative as t 
holding (Aft) and consumption. The latter is measured as deviation from th 
initial cenario (ct/c;ntl for the Model and CtE jCrtl for the Benchmark economy, 
where c;ntl is th consumption level corre ponding to the initial cenario). 
A in th thr -period model market optimi m increas tock price', R rD 
growth and output growth for all period from t - T to t - 1. 
All the gcn rations conslllling b hv n p riod t-T + 1 and t g t xce ~ 10" '11l 
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Figure 2.3: Impact of a positive noise trading shock in t. 
the equity market that increase over time. As opposed to the three-period model, 
generations that get excess losses in equity market, can still have higher consump-
tion compared to the initial scenario (Ct - T +k > Ct~'~+k = Cf!-T+k for k E [2 T]), 
due to the faster increase of wages. An overall loss always present only for the 
first generation, that observes a higher public signal (Ct - T +1 < Ct:::'~+l = Cf!-T+l)' 
because they do not benefit from the expansion of the economy. Generations from 
t onwards will gain in terms of consumption like the last generation in the three-
period model. The potential for welfare gains from pure market optimism is even 
tronger in the infinite horizon model. 
2. Above mean demand from the noise traders (decrease of St) 
For the parameters chosen a positive noise trading shock ( t > 0) implie 
higher prices in both economies in t. As one can see in Figure 2.3 prices increase 
more in the Benchnlark economy. In the Model economy the price remain higher 
until t + T - 1, b caus the noi e trading shock will not be fully revealed to the 
invc tor until th Il. H wev r, thi per istence i mall compar d to th impa t 
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Figure 2.4: Impact of a temporary productivity shock in t, not anticipated from 
the public signals. 
in t, when noise trading shock has a direct impact on equity prices through lower 
demand. 
Unlike the case of an optimistic public signal, the po itive impact of higher 
equity prices will be short-lived. This is because contemporaneous noise trading 
shock affects the equity prices much more than historical noise trading, since it 
has a direct impact on equity prices. Thus, equity prices return to their pre- hock 
level fast (immediately in the Benchmark case). Also, in the Model economy the 
historical noise trading affects only through the informativeness of historical price 
signals. The latter are very noisy signals of future productivity and thus have no 
remarkable persi tent impact on the equity prices. Therefore, the increase in the 
future consumption level will be smaller compared to the impact of the market 
optimi m. 
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Figure 2.5: Impact of a permanent and fully anticipated increase of productivity 
in t 
3. A temporary productivity shock that is not accompanied with a 
change in the public signal (increase of ¢t). 
An implication of temporary increase of productivity (Figure 2.4), that could 
not be analyzed in the three-period economy is the fact that in period t the price 
will return to the initial level, while the profits of intermediate firms will be higher. 
Hence, R&D growth will fall below the initial scenario for one period. While the 
acceleration of R&D growth will be lower in the Model economy during periods 
t - T to t - 1, the fall in t is exactly as high compared as in the Benchmark 
economy. The economy with information imperfections and effectively pessimistic 
public signal, will not take the full advantage of the positive productivity shock and 
this can even result in lower consumption levels compared to the initial scenario 
for the Model economy. 
In contrast to a temporary productivity shock, a permanent improvement of 
productivity would not be accompanied with a drop in R&D as shown in Figure 
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2.5. It is clear by now that any optimism (pessimism) in public signals would 
imply gains (losses) in later generations consumption. Therefore, the figure only 
shows the impact of permanent productivity shock that is fully anticipated in 
public signals. 
2.5 Concluding remarks 
This chapter analyzed the effect of information imperfection on aggregate econ-
omy through equity funded R&D. Comparing the aggregate performance of such 
Model economy with the perfect private information Benchmark one, leads to the 
following conclusions. 
First, the Model economy tends to perform worse that the Benchmark economy 
in the event of true productivity shocks and noise trading shocks that increase the 
equity prices. In the first case, it is a question of market pessimism and equity 
underpricing, if the market sentiment does not match these changes. In the second 
case, the rational investors do not take a sufficiently aggressive position against 
the noise traders. 
Second, the Model tends to perform better than the Benchmark economy in 
the incidence of market optimism. It leads to gains in consumption of all future 
generations at the expense of possible losses of the earliest generation(s). This is 
because overpricing of assets results in more R&D being produced. Even if the 
demand in the future does not justify the initial equity prices, more R&D will 
have a positive impact on future generations consumption levels through higher 
output. The positive effect of some optimism is present, when the R&D production 
market is not already highly congested. The Model also suggests that the lower 
is the congestion, the greater will be the extent of market optimism that delivers 
gains over time. 
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Regarding the improvements in ICT sector, too much congestion was unlikely 
to be the case in 1990s. For example, during the "dot-coms boom" in the United 
States, there could have been scope for market optimism. That would have had 
a positive impact by creating more firms that helped improving the ICT faster, 
even though the market value of many of these firms fell substantially later on. 
These firms were typically created with venture capital funding and involved fast 
exit of founders through an initial public offering. Considering the stage from 
development to exit as one period1o , technology investments can be interpreted as 
having been effectively equity funded. 
These dynamics pose a dilemma from a policy perspective. It is clear that if the 
public signal would coincide with the true productivity, the negative side effects 
of equity overpricing would disappear. Some policy making institutions are likely 
to have the ability to affect the public signal (e.g. the central bank's comments 
about economic conditions and outlook). However, given the possible consumption 
gains (losses) from market optimism (pessimism), there are incentives to preserve 
an asymmetric behavior from such policy maker. This is because, unless the 
mean of public signal (e.g. market sentiment) is extremely high compared to the 
fundamentals, it is unlikely that issuing a low public signal is welfare improving 
(in terms of aggregate consumption over time). Yet, in a pessimistic market the 
policy makers should clearly try to inject optimism to the market. The downside 
of this is that such asymmetric policies, are likely to reduce the credibility of policy 
maker's optimistic statements among the market participants. 
Another implication of the model is that the extent of equity market mis-pricing 
depends on the quality of information. The better is the private information 
and the more informative are the price signals compared to the public ones, the 
10 Chapter 3 looks explicitly at the issues that arise between initial development and exit stage. 
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smaller will be the bias caused by mis-pricing. l1 In order to reduce the quality of 
information in the public signal, the policy makers could avoid making statements 
about economic outlook and asset prices. However, the dilemma and trade-off 
of welfare among different generations remains. In addition to the quality of 
information, a decrease in the risk aversion, would also reduce the magnitude of 
the mis-pricing, by improving the price signals. 
The discussion about the likely implications of relaxing some restrictive as-
sumptions present in this chapter and directions for future research that arise 
from this is postponed until Chapter 5. 
11 This is purely due to the fact that investors assign lower weight on public signal in their 
expectation. See discussion in Chapter 4.4.2 about the quality of public signal and the ex-
tent of mis-pricing that considers additional effects arising from endogenous quality of private 
information and the fact that lower quality public signal is likely to have a larger error. 
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Chapter 3 
The speed of technology adoption 
with imperfect information in 
equity markets 
3.1 Introduction 
There is a growing interest in the connections between financial institutions and 
economic growth in the literature!. This chapter suggests a new mechanism how 
the development of equity markets and related institutions can determine the 
speed of technology adoption. 2 
Equity markets have an important role in transferring ownership rights from 
entrepreneurs, who establish firms to managers running these firms. This chapter 
analyzes the technology adoption or innovation decisions that are made before the 
initial public offering. If equity market participants have imperfect information 
1 See Levine (2005) for a comprehensive n'\"iew of existing thl'oretical and empirical literature 
on this topic. 
2Empirical st udies by Beck and Levine (:200-1) and HOl\sst'au and \Yachtl'l (2000) show that 
more developed equity markets have a positin' impact on economic growth. 
:>1 
about the value of a firm, an entrepreneur's incentives to invest in adopting the 
newest and most expensive technologies are affected. High uncertainty and low 
expected market value of the firm can discourage investment in the most advanced 
technologies - the "fear of unstable markets" force. At the same time, provided 
that the market accepts that an entrepreneur has better information about the 
value of his firm than the average equity market participant, his decision to invest 
in the newest accessible technology issues a positive signal to the market - the 
"adoption to signal" force. The number of informed investors determines which 
of these two forces dominates. 
When the number of informed investors is small, entrepreneurs become dis-
couraged and choose to adopt technology slowly. This can also be a reason that 
leads a country to persistently slow technology adoption. Fast technology adop-
tion is most likely with an intermediate number of informed investors. In this 
case, entrepreneurs have the highest expected gains from investing in the newest 
technology, in order to issue a positive signal to the uninformed participants in 
the market. In countries with very developed financial markets and a large num-
ber of informed investors, both the discouraging "fear of unstable markets" and 
encouraging "adopting to signal" force disappear. This implies a non-monotonic 
relationship between the level of equity market development and the speed of 
technology adoption. 
There are exogenous and endogenous factors that can affect the number of 
informed investors. For example, some countries could rely on a higher number of 
informed investors because of cultural links that allow some foreign investors to 
be informed for a lower cost (e.g. Scandinavian investors in the Baltic States or 
Austrian investors in Hungary). Furthermore, the number of informed investors 
is likely to be lower in countries with weak institutions for facilitating access to 
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information (e.g. accounting standards and laws), and therefore less developed 
equity markets3 . 
In order to analyze the link between policies that facilitate access to infor-
mation and the speed of technology adoption, the basic model is extended to 
allow for any uninformed investor to become informed at a fixed cost. Within 
this context, the policies that affect the information cost also affect the speed of 
technology adoption. The chapter demonstrates that the probability of fast tech-
nology adoption is maximized when this information cost is above zero. Because 
faster technology adoption implies faster growth in local wages and output, a local 
policy maker would choose zero information costs (Le. full transparency). Setting 
the information cost to zero eliminates the possibility that entrepreneurs would 
issue a positive signal by adopting technology fast. 
Another topic addressed in this chapter is the impact of participation of differ-
ent types of foreign agents. If foreign agents (a part of foreign direct investment) 
have access to new technology at lower costs, their participation increases the 
probability of fast technology adoption. Nevertheless, the same two forces remain 
in action; if the number of informed equity market participants is low, these for-
eigners might not participate and projects that would be profitable on perfectly 
informed equity markets are not undertaken. 
Participation of foreign portfolio equity investors increases the liquidity of the 
firms they trade. Higher liquidity has a positive impact on market prices of firms, 
and increases incentives to invest in fast technology adoption. At the same time, if 
portfolio investors are largely uninformed, their participation can increase uncer-
tainty and discourage fast technology adoption. The chapter shows the conditions 
under which forbidding foreign portfolio equity investments encourages fast tech-
3La Porta, de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2005) show that laws mandating disclosure benefit 
stock markets. 
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Figure 3.1: Impediments for venture capital investor (US and European re pon-
dents) 
nology adoption. 
The setup of the model relies on two crucial assumptions. First, an entrepre-
neur has to sell his firm before it generates profits. The need to exit would emerge 
endogenously if some agents have a comparative advantage to be entrepreneurs 
rather than managers, as in Holmes and Schmitz Jr. (1990). Also, venture capi-
talists can be seen as agents who are skilled in judging whether or not a particular 
technology adoption is worth investing in. They are generally not constrained 
in credit market and prefer to exit fast (Jovanovic and Szentes 2007). Venture 
capitalist involvement in running the firms is likely to limit the extent of poten-
tial agency problems between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur. Lack 
of good exit opportunities i a major concern for these agent while as e ing in-
ve tnlent to d veloping countrie (Lerner and Pacanin 1997). Figure 3.1 how 
that v ntur capitali ~t, perceive th concern about ucce ful exit to be a big-
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ger impediment than lack of skilled workers or weak intellectual property laws4 • 
Among the less developed countries, Asia is often considered as one of the most 
attractive locations for venture capital (Aylward 1998, Survey by Deliotte Touche 
Tochmatsu and EVCA 2006). While this region does not have more skilled labor 
than competing regions, it has more developed equity markets. Furthermore, Asia 
has better legal and regulatory environment than Latin America and transition 
countries that have not entered European Union by 2006 (Appendix B.1). Good 
exit opportunities facilitate long-term investments and allow for efficient use of 
entrepreneurial skills. 
The second crucial assumption is that the rational uninformed investors' trad-
ing decisions are based on noisy information from asset prices, the technology 
adoption decision, and a noisy public signal. The last captures the impact of 
market sentiment as in Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006) and Bacchetta and van 
Wincoop (2006) . Crises in emerging markets and transition countries at the end 
of 1990s suggest that shifts in market sentiment is an important factor in these 
countries. Empirical studies show that portfolio capital flows to these countries 
are largely unrelated to the fundamentals in these countries (e.g. Garibaldi, Mora, 
Sahay, and Zettelmeyer 2002, Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, and Wei 2004, Prasad, Rajan, 
and Subramanian 2006). 
Appendix B.2 looks at the relationship between GDP growth, R&D expendi-
tures and the level of development of the equity market. Figures B.l and B.2 show 
that in transitions countries5 where securities markets developed faster, R&D ex-
4Data source is for Figure 3.1 is Survey by Deliotte Touche Tochmatsu and EVCA (2006). 
The venture capitalists surveyed are not necessarily investing in these regions. Important im-
pediments that are excluded from the Figure 3.1 are "Lack of quality deals that fit investment 
profile" and "Lack of knowledge and expertise of business environment" that are likely to be 
specific to a particular venture capitalist. 
5This group of countries provides a good comparison group. In addition to the high and 
similar share of educated labor, transition countries were similar in terms of GDP per capita 
and institutions in 1991 after USSR dissolved. 
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penditures have been higher and income per capita has grown faster from 1991 to 
2004. At the same time, the relationship appears non-monotonic, which is consis-
tent with the predictions of this chapter. Figures B.3 shows similar patterns for 
R&D expenditures in high and upper-middle income countries.6 
The model predicts that openness to capital flows does not guarantee fast 
technology adoption, unless there are institutions that encourage enough investors 
to be informed. This is consistent with empirical findings on the effect of openness 
to capital flows on growth. This effect is found to be positive only if it coincides 
with more developed institutions, while it is ambiguous otherwise (e.g. Klein and 
Olivei 1999, Edwards 2001, Edison, Levine, Ricci, and Sl0k 2002, Prasad, Raj an, 
and Subramanian 2006). 
The chapter relates to the existing theoretical literature on the determinants of 
the speed of technology adoption. Differences in the speed of adoption could arise 
from the lack of skilled labor that make the frontier technologies inappropriate for 
countries with lack of skilled labor (e.g. Acemoglu 2002). While this argument is 
likely to be crucial in countries with the lowest shares of educated labor force, it 
is harder to explain the differences among countries where the share of educated 
labor force is similar to that of developed countries (e.g. transition countries). 
In this chapter, the productivity of the labor force in using technology adopted 
is uncertain. The speed of technology adoption depends on the interaction of 
this productivity and number of informed investors. If the productivity of labor 
force is low, fast technology adoption is less likely for a given number of informed 
6The mechanisms analyzed in this chapter can be argued to apply for investments more 
generally. The chapter focuses on investments in technology for the following three reasons: 
1) Technology sector is likely to be more dependent on entrepreneurial talent, which implies 
more potential benefits from good exit opportunities 2) This sector is an engine of aggregate 
economic growth. 3) Venture capitalists that are addressed in this chapter are largely specialised 
in technology intensive industries. Figure B.4 is Appendix B.2 also shows that the correlation 
of a proxy for equity market development with more general investments is similar, but weaker 
that in the specific case of investments in technology. 
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investors. However, the speed of technology adoption can differ in countries where 
this productivity is not significantly different. 
Obstacles for technology adoption can also be commitment problems and credit 
constraints (e.g. Gertler and Rogoff 1990, Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee 2004, 
Aghion, Comin, and Howitt 2006). In order to emphasize the role of the equity 
market in providing exit opportunities, rather than access to funding, the chapter 
abstracts from credit constraints. Credit constraints of local agents are unlikely 
to explain, for example, why foreign venture capitalists do not invest more in less 
developed countries with relatively skilled and inexpensive labor.7 Furthermore, 
the large private capital flows to some developed countries observed in the 1990s 
(see e.g. Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, and Wei 2004) could have reduced the importance 
of pure credit constraints in these countries. 
Closer to the this chapter are Bencivenga, Smith, and Starr (1995) and Levine 
(1991) that analyze the impact of liquidity of equity markets and the need for 
exit in a closed economy. Like in this chapter lack of liquidity reduces incentives 
to invest in technology adoption. However, information imperfections analyzed in 
the current chapter add further mechanisms. These papers also do not address 
the link between technology adoption and institutions facilitating the access to 
information. 
The arguments presented in this chapter are also closely related to the litera-
ture on institutions (e.g. Parente and Prescott 1994), which assumes that weaker 
institutions increase the cost of technology adoption. Therefore, worse institu-
tions should imply slower technology adoption. Marimon and Quadrini (2006) 
model the start-up cost in an environment with limited contract enforceability 
that creates incentives for new entries to innovation sector. As long as there are 
7In fact credit constraints could also arise endogenously (e.g. venture capitalists are unwilling 
to provide funding for good projects in countries with bad exit opportunities) 
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new entries accumulation of knowledge is decreasing in start-up costs. While new 
entries is assumed to be the case in this chapter focus on the need for exit, weak 
institutions that increase the cost of technology adoption (e.g. property rights, 
taxation, or other obstacles in establishing or running a firm) could be incorpo-
rated in the model. The two main forces found would still remain in action. An 
innovative result in this chapter is a non-monotonic relationship between fast tech-
nology adoption and equity market development, because of technology adoption 
decisions becomes a signal to the market. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents 
the model with a fixed number of informed agents. Section 3.3 endogenizes the 
number of informed investors, and discusses the incentives for a policy maker to 
choose policies enhancing transparency. Section 3.4 provides a brief discussion on 
the possibility of gains from forbidding foreign portfolio equity investment in the 
local asset market. Section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2 The model 
The model is a small open economy general equilibrium model with rational 
expectations. It builds on the endogenous growth literature with quality im-
provements of technology (e.g. Aghion and Howitt 1992, Aghion, Comin, and 
Howitt 2006) and rational expectations literature (e.g. Grossman 1976, Allen, 
Morris, and Shin 2006, Kodres and Pritsker 2002, Yuan 2006) 
The local economy is populated with overlapping generations of agents en-
dowed with one unit of raw labor each period. These agents work and invest in 
asset market, in the first period of their lives and consume only in the second 
period of their lives. The measure of local rational agents is J1.. These agents, 
"investors" can be informed (type i = J) or uninformed (type i = U). There are 
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similar overlapping generations of foreign agents endowed with exogenous wealth 
Wt in each period investing in the asset market. In the world economy, there are 
p,{ = J-Lf + J-L;I informed and p,f = (J-L - J-LD + J-L;u uninformed investors. 8 
Some rational local agents have also special skills to be entrepreneurs, who 
establish local monopolistic firms engaging in technology adoption. Each local 
entrepreneur can adopt technology alone or in a joint venture with one foreign 
agent. The firm is called to be established by an "initial owner" where the exact 
ownership structure is not important. 
All rational agents have mean-variance preferences 
(3.1) 
where Ct+l is consumption, Ot is the available information set in t and T is a 
measure of risk aversion. 
None of the agents is borrowing or short-sales constrained. The assets traded 
are local equity (risky asset) and a foreign risk-free bond with a gross return R > 1 
available with infinitely elastic supply. Equity market consists of the shares of local 
monopolistic firms that engage in technology adoption. 
In addition to rational investors, there are noise traders who demand a stochas-
tic quantity (St) of risky asset portfolio. All noise traders are assumed to be local 
unless specified otherwise and they do not receive wage income9 • The existence 
of noise traders is necessary for risky asset prices not to be fully revealing (the 
8 JJI and JJ;1 are the numbers of local and foreign informed investors and JJ;u is the number 
of foreign uninformed investors 
9Their location has no impact on conclusions apart from those in Section 3.4. With mean-
variance utility, the split of wage income between noise traders and local rational agents does 
not affect aggregate conditions and conclusions in the model. 
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Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) paradox). The equity market clearing condition is 
(3.2) 
where St is the supply of risky asset and h{ is the demand of risky asset by every 
informed investor and hf is the demand by every uninformed investor. 
The production side of the economy consists of a competitive final good pro-
duction sector and a monopolistic intermediate goods sector. 
The price of the final good is normalized to one. The final good producers 
use raw local labor, L, and i distinct intermediate goods that are produced by 
local monopolists. Each of these intermediate goods, Xt(j), has quality At(j) 
(j E [0,1]). For example, the intermediate good could be a computer designed 
to perform a particular task in the production line ( Xt(j)) and the vintage of 
the computer (At(j)) would determine how fast it will perform the task. The 
production function is 
(3.3) 
where 4>t measures the productivity of local labor force in using the technology. 
This productivity is uncertain before the period when actual production takes 
place (Le. uncertainty about 4>t resolves in period t) and can be decomposed into 
two parts 
(3.4) 
where Bt is the explainable part of productivity that is uncorrelated across the 
time and with any other shocks, and Ut is a residual; Ut f'V N(O, 1/ {31,J that is also 
uncorrelated across time with any other shocks.lo The explainable component 
laThe reasons behind and implication of normality assumption are the same as in Chapter 2. 
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measures factors like education, training, working culture, management practices, 
etc. The unexplainable component could be affected by factors like the health of 
the workers, natural disasters, etc. 
Final good producer buys each intermediate good, Xt(j), from a local monopo-
lists in sector j for a price Px,t (j). Intermediate good producers in each sector j use 
one unit of final good to produce one unit of intermediate good. All intermediate 
goods depreciate fully in one period. 
Section 3.2.1 shows how the uncertainty about the productivity of labor force 
in using technology ((Pt) translates in uncertainty about the future demand for 
intermediate goods and the profits of local monopolists. 
Initial owners establish firms two periods before these firms produce. They can 
adopt the frontier technology (A;) 11 that grows at an exogenous rate, 
A* -A* 
g* = H~* t for any t. 
t 
(3.5) 
For each intermediate good j there is only one initial owner, whose effort is needed 
for technology adoption in each period. In addition to this effort, technology 
adoption requires an investment in final goods. 
Initial owner in sector j born in t, decides whether to invest in fast (AH2(j) = 
A;+2) or slow (AH2(j) = A;+1) technology adoption. Growth of the world frontier 
technology (3.5) allows for new firms to produce with higher quality of technology 
each period (At+2 (j) > AH 1 (j) ) . New monopolies drive old monopolies out of the 
market and monopolistic profits can be sustained only for one period.12 
(see footnote 3 there). The mechanisms would remain valid with other distributional assum~ 
tions. 
11 The frontier can also be interpreted as the newest technology that can be accessible and 
useful for a particular country, instead of the newest available technology worldwide. 
12The strict inequality, AH2(j) > At+l (j), holds if technology is adopted fast in period t, 
because AH 2(j) = At+2 and AH1 (j) E {At+l' At}. The same is true if slow adoption is chosen 
in consecutive periods, i.e. AH 2(j) = At+l and AHI (j) = At· AH2(j) = At+l (j) only if in 
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Adopting the newest technology is more expensive than adopting an older one. 
The fixed cost of establishing a fast adopting firm is 
(3.6) 
The cost of fast technology adoption is assumed to be proportional to the gain in 
technology from fast adoption in the period the firm will be active. The cost of 
adoption per technology gain for an initial owner is 
((.) = min[((·), (*], 
where ((.) > ° is the cost for each local entrepreneur alone and (* > ° for each po-
tential foreign agent participating. The cost ((.) can be constant or an increasing 
function of the distance from the frontier. The latter would capture the assump-
tion that fast technology adoption may be harder for local agents, who are less 
familiar with the frontier technology. 
Without loss of generality, the required investment to establish a firm that 
adopts technology slowly is zero. The technology adoption decision is denoted 
with 
_ { 1, if fast adoption is chosen in t in sector j 
lIt (j) = 
0, if slow adoption is chosen in t in sector j 
(3.7) 
Initial owner born in t knows the explainable component of the productivity 
(8t+2)' Given that the initial owner has to retire before his firm produces profits, 
he sells his firm in the equity market. This assumption about the timing captures 
t initial owner chooses slow technology adoption AH2 (j) = A;+l' while initial owner born in 
t -1 adopted fast AH 1 (j) = A;+1' It is assumed that in this case In new monopoly will still drive 
the old incumbent out of the market. Implicit assumption behind this is that an intermediate 
good firm cannot sustain exactly the same quality for more than one period. 
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TIme t t+1 
• 
t+2 
• • 
Frontier technology A *t 
growing at rate go: --------+~ A*t+1 -------+~ A*t+2 
Monopoly producing 
capital variety. j: 
Speed of adoption: 
Information: 
Consumers: 
Establihed by "initial ---. 
owner" (born in t). 
i.e local entrepreneur 
alone or in a joint venture 
with a foreign participant. 
Sold in equity marKet 
to investors born in t+ 1 
---+~ Producing profits lhat 
depend on At+2<iJ and 
~t+2 = 9t+2+Ut+2 
New technology adoption firm ----+ etc. 
established. Produces in t+3 and 
will drive the monopoly established 
in t out of the marKet 
Slow (cheap) ~ Quality At+2 (j) = A 't+1 
Fast (expensive) ---------------+~ Quality At+2 (j) = A 't+2 
Initial owner. knows 9t+2 
Agents born in t-1 consume 
and retire. 
Investors (managers) born in t+1: 
Informed investors: know 9t+2 
Uniformed investors: noisy public 
signal about 9t+2' equity prices and 
speed of adoption decision in t 
Agents (initial owners and traders) 
born in t consume and retire. 
Figure 3.2: Timeline of events 
Uncertainty about 
~t+2 resolves 
Agents born in t+ 1 
consume and retire. 
the need for exit and ownership transfers. 
The firm established in t is bought by investors (local and foreign) trading 
in period t + 1 equity market. Informed investors have the same information as 
the initial owner; the information set that is relevant for their trading decision 
is n{+1 = {OH2}' Rational uninformed investors obtain information from prices 
of firms traded, PHI (j), and the technology adoption decision made one period 
earlier, lIt (j). They also receive a noisy public signal at the beginning of period 
t+ 1, 
(3.8) 
The public signal would capture the "market sentiment". Information set of un-
informed investors is nY+I = {BH2' Pt+I (0), .. , PHI (1), lIt (0), ... , lIt (1)}. 
An initial owner in sector j, who is an investor of type i E {U, J} born in 
t + 1 has information set n!,e(j) = {OH2, nu. Figure 3.2 summarizes the main 
mechanism and timing. 
The final goods are used in the local market for aggregate consumption (CHI)' 
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capital (f01 Xt(j)dj) and investments to technology adoption (f01 Ilt_t-l (j)It+1 (j)dj). 
These expenditures have to equal to aggregate production Yt+l and net inflow of 
goods from abroad (FHd. The local goods market clearing condition is 
Final good production sector employs all local labor force. Hence, the labor 
market clearing condition is 
L = J-l. (3.10) 
Solving this model for period t involves first deriving the profits of local mo-
nopolies in period t + 2 in Section 3.2.1. Using this, the equilibrium in period t + 1 
equity market and the market value of the monopolistic firms in period t + 1 will 
be derived in Section 3.2.3. After that, the technology adoption decision will be 
derived for period t in Section 3.2.4 and local goods market clearing decision will 
be proven to hold in any period in Section 3.2.5. 
3.2.1 Production decisions 
In period t + 2, a final good producer takes prices of the intermediate goods 
(Px.H1(j)) and wages (WH2) as given and solves 
where Yt+2 is given by (3.3) and L is the raw labor and XH2(j) is an intermediate 
good j. 
64 
Intermediate good firm in sector j solves 
Optimal solution implies a demand function for an intermediate good that is linear 
in the labor productivity and the quality of technology, 
(3.11) 
The equilibrium profit in sector j is 
(3.12) 
where 
Replacing the labor market clearing condition (3.10) and demand for intermediate 
capital goods, (3.11), in the production function (3.3) the aggregate final good 
production also becomes linear in the level of technology and productivity of labor 
force 
0< 
Yt+2 = (a2) 1-0< J.1-A t+2¢t+2' (3.13) 
where At+2 = f01 At+2 (j)dj is the average quality of technology. The equilibrium 
wages are proportional to the aggregate final good production: 
Yt+2 Wt+2 = (1 - a)-. 
J.1-
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(3.14) 
3.2.2 Identical technology adoption decisions 
Initial owners are not borrowing constrained and can always finance their invest-
ment in technology adoption. From (3.12) the only difference between the firms 
in different sectors is At+2(j). The productivity of labor force and information 
about this productivity (Ot+2) , the cost of technology adoption and the frontier 
technology is the same in each sector j. This implies that all initial owners make 
identical choices and all intermediate capital goods are produced with the same 
quality of technology, i.e. for any j 
(3.15) 
As a result, there is a continuum of monopolistic firms whose profits are per-
fectly correlated. Modelling all these firms and their owners is equivalent to mod-
elling one risky asset and one initial owner for all monopolists in the country. The 
price of all firms will be the same 
(3.16) 
3.2.3 Equity market 
Using results from Section 3.2.2, (3.4) and (3.12), the profits of local monopolists 
can be expressed as 
(3.17) 
Each monopolistic firm has one divisible share, so the supply of risky asset in 
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t+1 
(3.18) 
The demand of noise traders is 
(3.19) 
and SHI is uncorrelated across time and with any other shocks. The assumption 
that the variance of noise trading is proportional to the inverse of r 2 A~+2 guaran-
tees that the variance of the price signals of uninformed investors does not increase 
over time. As it will be pointed out later in the chapter, relaxing this assumption 
would strengthen the results. While noise traders do not receive wage income, 
they still invest in asset market and their consumption is 
where PHI is the equilibrium price of the risky asset. 
From (3.1) the trading decision for type i E {I, U} can be expressed as 
Ui E[Ai Ini ] T 't, (Ai Ini ) max HI = CH 2 Ht+I - 2 var Ct+2 HHI (3.20) 
st. C~+2 = (r(OH2 + UH2)AH2 - RPt+I)h~+1 + RWHb 
where c;+2 is the consumption of investor of type i in period t + 2 and T is a measure 
of risk aversion. "'HI is the wealth or wage income that can be invested on asset 
markets for agent i. H the agent is local "'HI = WHI = WHI is wage income 
given by (3.14), if he is foreign WHI = Wt~1 is exogenous wealth. It should be 
pointed out that initial owners of monopolists established in t + 1 trade in the asset 
market as well. However, under CAM type utility, with no borrowing or short-
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sales constraints and information structure assumed, the trading and adoption 
decisions are independent and can be solved for separately13. 
As is well known, type i investor's, who can be local or foreign, demand for 
risky asset is 
(3.21) 
As described at the beginning of Section 3.2, the information set that is relevant 
for informed investors is n{+l = {Bt+2 }. Therefore, if investor is informed 
E [7rH2In{+1] 
Var{7rH2I n {+1) 
rBH2At+2' 
2 2 1 
r AH2 f3
u 
(3.22) 
Uninformed investors obtain information from asset prices, public signal (3.8) and 
technology adoption decision (3.7) and (3.15). All firms traded in t + 1 have the 
same price (3.16). Replacing the optimal demand of informed investors ({3.21) 
and (3.22)) and supply of risky asset (3.18) in the asset market clearing condition 
(3.2) the information uninformed investors obtain from asset prices: the price 
signal iS14 
(3.23) 
The information set to uninformed investors can be expressed as 
n~1 = {BH2' PHIl i1t }· Given that initial owners have superior information 
(know BH2)' we can conjecture that their decjsion to invest in fast; i1t = 1 (slow; 
i1t = 0) adoption implies that BH2 > OH2 (BH2 < OH2)' This conjecture is verified 
in Section 3.2.4. Section 3.2.4 also shows that the threshold (OH2) is known to 
uninformed investors trading in t + 1. 
13Independence is first assumed to be the case. Later, Appendix B.5 will prove it formally. 
14See Appendix B.3 for further details. 
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Expected profits and variance for an uninformed investor are 
where 
E [7rt+210f+l] = 
r At+2 (Zt+l0t+2 + (1 - zt+l)A+l + v!Zv,t+1Alft (bt+d) , 
Var(7rt+210f+l) = 
r
2 A~+2Zv,'+1 (1 - >-t, (b'+1) + b'+1AjI, (b'+l)) + r2 ~+2 ;., 
(3.24) 
(3.25) 
and AlIt (bt+l) is the inverse Mills ratio15 . The derivation of these these expressions 
is presented in Appendix B.3. 
For the intuition behind the conditional expected value for an uninformed in-
vestor, assume for a moment that all investors are uninformed. In such case, 
they get information only from the public signal Ot+l (3.8) and the technology 
adoption decision (3.7) and (3.15), because asset prices do not reveal any extra 
information. Fast (slow) technology adoption implies Bt+2 > Ot+2 (Bt+2 < Ot+2) and 
the 
conditional distribution of Bt+2 becomes a truncated normal. This implies 
E [7rt+210t+2' i ft ] = rAt+2 (Ot+2 + Jl/{3lJAllt (y73e(Ot+2 - Ot+2)). The expecta-
tions differ from the perfect information (3.22) in two respect. First, there is noise 
in the public signal, 9t+2, that can increase or reduce expected value of the firm. 
IsIf iIe = I, Ai /e =1(l)&+1) = l~~~~~d. If iIe = 0, Ai/e=o(bt+l) = -:~~+~~,. where cf>(.) and 
~(.) are standard normal p.d.f. and c.d.f respectively. 
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This could reflect the "market sentiment". Second, fast (slow) technology adoption 
implies a positive (negative) Mills ratio and expectations about the fundamental 
are higher (lower) even if the public signal is correct. 
Including informed investors in the model Ot+210t+2?t+l r-v N(Zt+l 0t+2 + (1 -
Zt+l)?t+l, Zv,t+l). Incorporating the information revealed by technology adoption 
decision again results the labor productivity having a truncated normal distribu-
tion from the perspective of an uninformed investor. Expected value is closer to 
the fundamental and technology adoption decision has less effect on the expected 
value if Zv,t+l is smaller. This is the case when other signals have lower variance 
(e.g. f3'{j, /38' P,{+1 are higher). 
The equilibrium price can be derived by replacing (3.18), (3.21), (3.22) and 
(3.24) into the market clearing condition (3.2). The equilibrium risky asset price 
is a function of the expectations of informed investors, the expectations of unin-
formed investors, the liquidity premium and the risk premium. As the expression 
is lengthy, and only the relevant limiting cases are analyzed, full details are left to 
Appendix B.3. 
If the number of informed investors approaches infinity (or the variance of 
public information is zero), then the equilibrium asset prices equal the discounted 
expected profits by informed investors: 
(3.26) 
In such case, the equilibrium asset prices will be fully revealing, investors' asset 
holdings approach zero, and the risk premium and liquidity premium are pushed 
to zero. The implications of imperfect information in financial markets can be 
compared with this benchmark. 
In a more realistic environment, the number of informed investors is limited. 
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Given that this chapter analyzes a small open economy, it is reasonable to as-
sume that the number of uninformed foreign investors who can invest in the local 
risky assets is infinite compared to the size of the local market. If the number 
of uninformed investors approaches infinity, the excess returns of uninformed in-
vestors approach to zero. Using (3.23) and (3.24), equilibrium asset prices can be 
expressed as 
(3.27) 
where 
Zs,Hl = (1 - ZHl) .1 T f3 • 
J.'t+l u 
(3.28) 
In this case, asset prices are affected by the public signal, noise trading, and 
an extra term that captures the impact of the signal from the adoption decision. 
Looking at the expressions for ZHb Zs,t+l and zv,Hl ((3.25) and (3.28)), it is 
clear that the larger the number of informed investors (P,f+ 1) , the closer the 
asset price will be to the perfect financial markets benchmark (P,f+l ~ 00 :=:::} 
ZHb zv,Hl ~ 0). Both the public signal OH2 and noise trading St+l create 
uncertainty in asset prices. The latter affects asset prices through the information 
revealed to uninformed investors by price signals. 
Without infinitely many investors (whether uninformed or informed), asset 
prices would be lower ceteris paribus, because the local asset market would not be 
liquid enough. Noise trader demand would have a direct impact on asset prices, 
in addition to its impact on the uninformed investors' price signals. This question 
will be revisited in Section 3.4, when analyzing the impact of forbidding foreigners 
to invest in local asset market. Until then, the number of foreign uninformed 
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investors is assumed to be infinite. 
3.2.4 Adoption decision 
Initial owners' technology adoption decision in period t is based on their knowledge 
of the explainable part of productivity, (}t+2. There is uncertainty about the asset 
price in period t + 1, because these agents do not know the next period market 
perception (signal Ot+2) and noise trading (St+l)' 
From (3.1) and the independence of trading and technology adoption decision, 
investment in fast technology adoption is optimal if Ut(1lt = 1) > Ut(IIt = O)+Rlt , 
where the utility from fast adoption 
while the utility from slow adoption 
It can be seen from (3.27) that the selling price of firms that adopt technology fast 
is always higher. This is because asset prices are proportional to At+2 and from 
(3.5) A;+2 > A;+l' 
Explicit derivation of E [Pt+210t+2, lIt] and Var(Pt+210t+2, lIt) is complicated 
by the fact that asset prices (3.27) include the inverse Mills ratio (Ai lt (bt+l))' 
While bt+l is an observable constant for investors trading in t + 1, it depends on 
8t+2 and Pt+l, which are unknown in period t. As a result, bt+l has a normal 
distribution from the point of view of initial owner who is deciding on speed of 
technology adoption. The moments of Mills ratio with normally distributed bt+l 
are, to the best of my knowledge, impossible to derive in closed form. However, the 
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Mills ratio can be approximated with a linear or polynomial function. The results 
presented in this chapter employ the linear approximation for simplicity. This is 
sufficient because the most interesting cases for analysis occur in the neighborhood 
of Ai1t (0), where initial owners are close to being indifferent between fast and slow 
technology adoption. 16 • 
Two forces affecting the technology adoption decision 
Proposition 1 Initial owners choose to adopt the technology fast {At+2 = A;+2} 
if the observable component of productivity satisfies ()t+2 > Bt+2, where 
(3.31) 
and "'1 and "'2 are constants from the linear approximation of the inverse Mills 
ratio satisfying "'1,"'2 > 0 and "'2 < 1. 
Proof. Presented in Appendix BA .• 
It can be seen from (3.31) that the threshold depends on the variables and con-
stants that are observable by all agents. Therefore, uninformed investors trading 
in period t + 1 know the value of BH2 . 
Corollary 2 In perfect financial markets {i.e. if all investors are informed}, the 
threshold simplifies to 
Replacing lim Zv,H 1 
-I I-'t+1-00 
(3.32). 
-PI R2 A 
()H2 = r((')' (3.32) 
- lim [,89 + (jJ,:+l,8u/r ) 2 ,88]-1 
1-'1-00 
o in (3.31) yields 
16From (3.24) E[bt+118t+2] = k(ij t+2 - 8t +2), 9t+2 is the threshold above which fast 
technology adoption will be undertaken. 
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As long as some investors are uninformed, there are two opposite forces that 
affect the adoption decision: "fear of unstable markets" and "adoption to 
signal" . 
The "fear of unstable markets" force is captured by the term 
.,. r(2+g*)A* (1 )2 . (331) U . b h· . 
'2 R HI - "72 Zv,Hl In . . ncertaInty a out t e pnce on exIt can 
discourage risk averse agents from adopting the frontier technology, which they 
would find profitable in perfect asset markets (3.32). 
The "adoption to signal" term is captured by 2;( JZv,t+l"71 in (3.31). Investors 
who establish local monopolies have superior information compared to the average 
investor who determines the market value of their firm. They know that these 
investors will take fast adoption as an indication of higher profitability. As a result, 
initial owners might invest in fast adoption to gain from uninformed investors, even 
if they would not do so in perfect financial markets (3.32). The possibility of these 
gains remains despite of the fact that uninformed investors are rational and aware 
of the force. 
o. 
Both of these forces decrease with the number of informed investors: 8:~}t+1 < 
J.'t+l 
Corollary 3 If productivity of labor is such that initial oumers are indifferent 
between fast or slow adoption in perfect financial markets (OH2 = 0;:2), they will 
be discouraged from adopting due to the ''fear of unstable markets" in imperfectly 
informed financial markets if 
(3.33) 
Indifference between fast or slow adoption in perfect markets implies that 
()t+2 = 1-2 «(.) from (3.32). Applying this fact to (3.31), and using constants from 
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(3.24) and (3.27) shows (3.33). Corollary 3 has some interesting implications. 
A lower number of informed investors (fJ,;+ 1) magnifies the "fear of unstable 
markets". We can think of the number of informed investors as a measure of the 
size or development of local financial markets. Therefore, the model suggests that 
countries with underdeveloped financial markets are more likely to adopt frontier 
technology slowly, even if the productivity is high enough to justify fast technology 
adoption in perfect financial markets. 
An increase of the number of informed investors encourages "adopting to sig-
nal", but causes the resulting gains to decrease. This implies that this force is 
likely to be most important at an intermediate number of informed investors. If 
the number of informed investors is very high, potential gains are negligible. Fig-
ure 3.3 illustrates how the threshold for fast technology adoption (3.31) depends 
on the number of informed investors. It plots the relationship between productiv-
ity (Ot+2), number of informed investors (fJ,;+1) and speed of technology adoption. 
In perfect financial markets fast (slow) adoption would occur in areas A and B (C 
and D). In imperfect markets fast (slow) adoption occurs areas A and C (B and 
D). In B slow technology adoption is due the "fear of unstable markets" force and 
in C fast technology adoption is due to the "adoption to signal" force. 
Higher risk aversion (T) pushes initial owners towards the "fear of unstable 
markets". One reason for this is the direct impact of higher risk aversion, making 
initial owners care more about uncertainty in the following period. There is also a 
secondary effect, since higher risk aversion reduces the quality of price information 
through lower demand for the risky asset from informed investors. A higher vari-
ance for the unexplainable component of productivity (1/ f3tJ.) has similar effect on 
the quality of price signal. With an infinite number of traders, the unexplainable 
component of productivity affects initial owners only through its' impact on price 
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productivity 
A 
- -- --- - -- - -- --- - - ------ - --- - - - - --- -
o 
number of informed investors 
- - threshold in perfect markets - threshold in imperfect markets 
Figure 3.3: Threshold productivity for fast technology adoption 
signals. 
Similarly, higher variance of the public signal (1/ f3e) and noise trading (1 / f3. ) 
increase the uncertainty investors are facing, increasing the "fear of unstable mar-
kets". In these cases, there is another secondary effect at play as these move the 
equilibrium equity price closer to fundamentals (see (3.27)). However this force i 
not strong enough to eliminate the negative direct impact from higher uncertainty. 
An increase of the risk-free rate has a dual effect on incentives to invest in 
fast technology adoption. First, there is a direct effect, by which the threshold 
productivity has to be higher to make investment in fast adoption worthwhile 
(3.31). This effect is present also in perfect financial markets. Second, (3.33) 
implies that a higher risk-free rate reduces the impact of "fear of unstable market 
force" because it implies a lower variance of equity prices. This suggests that an 
increase of risk-free rate (R) reduces the probability of fast technology adoption 
I s in imper£ ct equity markets. 
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The impact of evolution of the frontier - tendency towards persistently 
slow technology adoption 
Claim 4 Improvements in the frontier technology have a negative impact on a 
country's ability to adopt the world frontier technology (A;+2)' due to information 
imperfections. 
Assume that the cost of adoption for a given change in technology is constant, 
((.) = (. In this case, it is clear from (3.32) that if productivity would stay 
constant at some level () > ~2 (, a country can always keep up with adopting the 
newest technology under perfect financial markets. 
In imperfect financial markets, the impact of "fear of unstable markets" will 
increase with the level of technology. Keeping up with the adoption of newest tech-
nology with imperfectly informed investors, has to imply an increase in the number 
of informed investors (or other variables that would lower the threshold or an in-
crease of productivity). Furthermore, a higher growth rate of frontier technology 
reduces the gains from "adopting to signal" while increasing the negative impact 
of "fear of unstable markets". If, for example, pure "fear of unstable markets" 
discourages initial owners from adopting fast in period t, the next generations will 
also not adopt fast, ceteris paribus. 
The intuition for this is the following. By (3.17), monopolistic profits increase 
with the evolution of frontier technology. Uninformed investors do not know how 
well local labor is able to use any technology, and therefore uncertainty about 
profits is higher at higher technology levels. This result is driven by the assumption 
that uncertainty regarding the productivity of using any level of technology is the 
same. 17 
17If, this uncertainty is higher for the more advanced technology adopted, evolution of the 
frontier technology makes it even harder to sustain fast technology adoption. 
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If in addition, we assume that the cost of adoption is an increasing function 
of the distance to the frontier (for example, (( A~+2) = (( (A IMf{ ), (' (.) > 0) and 
t t t+l 
similarly to Aghion, Comin, and Howitt (2006), the improvements in the frontier 
would be even more discouraging. Failing to adopt fast in some period would in 
such case make it also more costly to adopt fast in the following period and the 
threshold (3.31) increases 1 8 • 
Assuming that the variance of price signal has constant quality over time (3.19) 
eliminated another mechanism that would imply further impact of "fear of unstable 
markets" with the growth of technology. If the variance of noise trading would 
not fall with r 2 A~+2' the price signals would become worse over time, because 
a limited number of informed investors holds a relatively smaller proportion of 
firms. In such case the tendency towards persistently slow technology adoption 
would also be stronger. 
Countries that have big and well developed financial markets (the number of 
either local or foreign informed investors is large) are less affected by both forces 
analyzed. This is consistent with developed countries having less volatile capital 
markets, and high technology level. The model suggests that this outcome does 
not require developed countries to have either more skilled labor force (higher Ot) 
or lower technology adoption costs. 
Impact of the participation of a foreign investor 
It can be seen from Proposition 1 that, even with foreign initial owners capable of 
cheaper adoption technology (( = (* < ((.)), the impact of the two forces analyzed 
would be also present and the dominating force does not depend on the adoption 
cost (Corollary 3). Nevertheless, the threshold OH2 is lower than the threshold if 
18This argument is more relevant if firms are established by local entrepreneurs alone. 
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the local entrepreneurs operates alone: 
It is clear that if the fast technology adoption is more costly for a foreigner 
((* > ((.)), he would never participate. This is due to the assumption that the 
adoption of any technology requires effort by a local entrepreneur, who is the only 
agent with the relevant skills to adopt in local intermediate goods' sector j. With 
a similar argument, there is no foreign participation, if slow technology adoption 
would be optimal for the possible joint venture with the local entrepreneur and 
foreign investor that can adopt technology fast for a cost ( = (* < ((.). Therefore, 
- - -loe 
the relevant cases to analyze are when (}H2 > (}H2, (}t+2 < (}t+2 and (* < ((.). It 
is assumed that in a joint venture, foreigner has all the bargaining power. 
First, the local entrepreneur alone might choose slow technology adoption, 
while fast adoption would be undertaken in a joint venture (OH2 < (}H2 < O!~2)' 
If the local entrepreneur's reward in the joint venture (received in period t + 1) 
is qsl,Hb his participation constraint is qsl,t+1 < ut(i1t = 0). With the foreigner 
having the bargaining power, this holds with equality. The foreigner will bear all 
costs of fast adoption (*(A;+2-A;+1) and receives the gains from higher firm value 
q:',t+1 = Ut(lIt = 1) - ut(i1t = 0) in t + 1. The foreign agent can be seen acting 
as a venture capitalist, by providing funding and receiving a risky return. 
Second, the local entrepreneur might be able to adopt fast technology alone, 
but it is cheaper in the joint venture ((}t+2 > O!~2)' In such case the local entre-
preneur's utility from the joint venture equals to his opportunity cost Q/o,t+1 = 
Ue(llt = 0) - R«(·)(.4;+2 - .4;+1) and foreigner pays for adoption cost '·(.4;+2 -
79 
A;+l) and extracts qja,t+l = R((·)(A;+2 - A;+1) from local entrepreneur. This 
essentially means that the local entrepreneur will hire the services of the foreigner 
to reduce his costs. It requires highly productive labor, little negative impact 
from uncertainty related to imperfect information and low cost of fast technology 
adoption for locals. This case is less realistic in developing countries. 
3.2.5 Local goods market clearing 
The local goods market condition is given by (3.9). Appendix B.6 proves that it 
holds. The net inflow of goods from abroad (Ft+1) is determined as follows. In 
period t + 1, there is an inflow of returns from risk-free asset (the investment local 
investors / consumers made in period t) and of foreigners investment to the local 
risky asset (monopolistic firms established in t). There is an outflow of period 
t + 1 investment in the risk-free asset by locals, and period t + 1 profits claimed by 
foreign investors. If in addition to local entrepreneur, foreign investors participate 
in technology adoption, there are additional capital inflows and outflows from their 
investment to the technology and exit. 
The predictions from goods market clearing are standard. If domestic invest-
ment is higher, because fast technology adoption in undertaken, net foreign asset 
position will be lower. In such case agents need to borrow more or invest less in 
the risk-free asset. 
Given that the foreign partner always compensates the opportunity cost to the 
local entrepreneur (Section 3.2.4), foreign participation in technology adoption 
projects does not affect aggregate consumption of the generation that forms a 
joint venture with foreign agents (see Appendix B.6)19. If foreign investors are 
19Relaxing the assumption that technology adoption requires the unique skills of a local entre-
preneur could allow for welfare losses from foreign investors' participation in technology adoption. 
Especially if optimal speed of adoption is slow. 
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capable of adopting fast technology that locals are not, consumption of future 
generation is higher because of higher wages ((3.14) and (3.13)). 
3.3 Endogenous number of informed investors 
and incentives for transparency 
3.3.1 Equilibrium number of informed investors 
Section 3.2.4 highlighted the fact that the number of informed investors (fJ,{+1) is 
one of the crucial determinants for the speed of adoption in a small open economy. 
So far, this number is taken as exogenous. This section assumes that uninformed 
investors can become informed for a fixed cost (Dt+l) during the trading period. 
When an uninformed investor decides whether to become informed, he does not 
know what value of ()t+2 he will observe after paying the information cost. He 
will compare his expected utility as an informed investor with his expected utility 
from staying uninformed, conditional on his available information set, nf-...l. He 
will decide to become informed if 
The information cost function is assumed to be given by a known time specific 
constant in t + 1, Dt+l = 6t+1'l9t+b where 6t+1 is a constant that measures how 
expensive becoming informed is at any level of technology, and 'l9t+l is a constant 
that allows uninformed investors to discover more easily if technology adoption 
decision issues a false signal. 20 
20The cost being proportional to 17Hl = 1 - A-1·
2 (bt+l) - bt+lA-1 (bH1 ) affects the It It 
Var [9H 2 lOy'" 1)' It assumes that information cost is lower if according to other signals, unin-
formed investors would expect the productivity to be low (high), and the country nevertheless 
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The number of informed investors cannot be negative;/ > 0 and"I > 0 
, I""t+l - I""t+l _ • 
Assuming the existence of some local investors who become informed at zero cost , 
i.e. J-l{+1 > 0, could be justified since at least some local investors are likely to 
be able to understand local information better. They could also have more direct 
contact with managers of firms, superior knowledge of the local labor force and 
business environment and better access to "inside information". 
Proposition 5 An investor will choose to become informed if Ot+l < 8t+1. In 
equilibrium, the cost of information will equal to the gains from becoming informed 
and the equilibrium number of informed investors 
AI 
J-lt+l= 
Proof. See Appendix B.7 .• 
(3.34) 
Intuitively, becoming informed is profitable as long as the cost is not too high 
compared to the freely available information. As investors do not know what sig-
nal they get, the gain from information is the opportunity to reduce the variance 
of their returns. The more investors become informed, the more informative asset 
prices will be. More informative prices limit the gains from better private infor-
mation. If any uninformed investor finds it profitable to become informed, the 
equilibrium number of informed investors equalizes the gains of better informa-
tion with its costs. If information cost is high and no uninformed investor finds 
it profitable to become informed, the equilibrium number of informed investors is 
given by the number of investors, who are informed for zero cost. 
As can be seen from (3.34), the number of informed investors is higher if 
adopted fast (slow). Therefore, this assumption works against the distortions analyzed by lim-
iting the initial owner's potential gains from "adopting to signal". It simplifies the analysis, 
because "HI is unknown in period t. 
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either the risk-free return (R) or information costs (8t+l) are low. If the public 
signal is more informative (high /38)' less investors decide to become informed. 
Similarly, lower variance of noise trading (1/(3 s) reduces the number of uninformed 
investors who find it profitable to become informed, because price signals are more 
informative. Higher risk aversion (r) and (1/ f3u) affect the incentives to acquire 
costly information in two opposite ways. First, they reduce the willingness of the 
investors to invest in the risky asset and pay the information costs. Second, they 
increase the incentives to bear information costs, because lower participation of 
informed investors reduces the informativeness of price signals. The second effect 
dominates as long as it is optimal for any investor to pay the information cost 
(8t+l < l5t+l)21. 
It can be seen from (3.34) that the equilibrium number of informed investors 
does not depend on the level or growth rate of the technology. Even though tech-
nology improvements imply higher profits, the adoption decision is made before 
the trading period and is known to all participants of financial markets. The 
risky asset price adjusts to take this improvement into account for any number of 
informed investors. 22 
3.3.2 Adoption with endogenous number of informed in-
vestors and incentives for transparency 
This section assumes that 8t+l < l5t+b which implies that at least some unin-
formed investors will decide to become informed. Replacing (3.34) in (3.31) and 
21These results are consistent with findings in Chapter 4. 
22 This result relies on the assumption that variance on noise trading decreases over time (3.19). 
If this is not the case, less informative asset prices at higher technology level would give more 
incentives to paying the information costs. However, this would only offset the extra negative 
impact from "fear of unstable markets" that is eliminated in the current setup. 
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simplifying the threshold gives 
(3.35) 
The forces of "fear of unstable markets" and "adopting to signal," and the fac-
tors influencing these, are still present with an endogenous number of informed 
investors. The technology adoption decision becomes a function of the cost of in-
formation 0HI. Policies towards transparency by local policy makers could affect 
this cost. This creates a link between technology adoption and institutions that 
affect financial markets' development. 
In order to investigate the policy maker's incentives for transparency, consider 
an extreme case where it has full control over 0HI. Suppose the policy maker's 
objective is to maximize the chances for the country to adopt fast. This objective 
can be justified, because it allows for output and wages ({3.13) and (3.14)) to 
increase earlier and therefore increases the consumption of agents benefiting from 
this. Maximizing the probability of fast technology adoption is equivalent to 
minimizing the threshold, i.e. 
where OH2 is given by (3.35).23 
Proposition 6 If a policy maker has a full control over the cost of information, 
23 Appendix B.9 shows that the results are similar, if the local policy maker chooses the pr~ 
cision of the public signal, for the same policy objective. 
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he will set the cost to be 
Proof. See Appendix B.8. • 
This proposition suggests that the local policy maker does not choose full 
transparency (t5~~1 = 0). The reason comes from the "adopting to signal" force. 
As long as some investors are uninformed, initial owners would find it optimal 
to adopt fast at a lower level of productivity than would be possible in perfectly 
informed equity markets. It is important to point out that the counter-intuitive 
policy encouraging "too fast" technology adoption is justified because the policy 
maker is local. The extra opportunities of fast technology come at the expense 
of losses of foreign uninformed investors. Given that the local market is limited 
in size, asset holdings of local uninformed investors are marginal. In equilibrium 
RPt+l = E [7rt+210f-t.l], and from (3.21) each of the local uninformed investors 
holds in equilibrium hf-t.l = hf+l = O. At the same time, local informed investors 
are expected to get excess gains from asset market as long as there are not infinitely 
many informed investors. 24 
Both the higher level and growth rate of frontier technology imply more incen-
tives towards transparency. As discussed in the Section 3.2.4, evolution of frontier 
technology implies higher uncertainty. Therefore, countries that try to keep up 
with improvements in the frontier technology are expected to aim to become more 
24policy makers' objective could also be maximizing the utility of local agents. This is more 
cumbersome mainly because it is hard to identify what is the reasonable information set the 
local policy maker has. However, it would not alter the optimal information cost being above 
zero in this setup. Agents affected by the choice of 8tH are 1) local entrepreneurs born in t, 2) 
local investors born in t + 1 and 3) workers born in t + 2. Higher probability of fast technology 
adoption is beneficial for agents 1) and 3). Lower transparency is beneficial for an average local 
investor. Therefore, the local policy with such objective function is likely to set information cost 
higher and not lower compared to the one analyzed. 
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transparent over time, 
t+2 .L"t+l 60pt (..1*) 2 ( 1 ) 2 
6~1 = A;+2 = 1 + g* 
Other variables that increase the optimal transparency are higher risk aver-
sion (7), variance of unexplainable component of productivity (1/ i3
u
) and lower 
risk-free interest rate (R). AB it can be seen from (3.35), these changes tilt to-
wards the dominance of "fear of unstable markets" force. Section 3.3.1 showed 
that for a given information cost, the same variables give incentives to more un-
informed investors to become informed. However, this is not sufficient and policy 
maker would give further incentives to acquire costly information through higher 
transparency. 
Finally, the policies towards transparency could alternatively be modelled as 
the policy maker choosing the variance of public signal. Appendix B.9 shows that 
the implications of this are the same as in the case of fixed information costs. 
3.4 Closing the local asset market to foreign port-
folio investors 
One of the reasons why countries restrict the foreign portfolio investments is the 
potential instability of these flows. This section analyzes if preventing foreigners 
to trade in the local equity market can make fast technology adoption more likely. 
Since the justification for capital restrictions implies that foreign capital is less 
informed than local, assume that all potential foreign investors are uninformed 
and all local investors are informed but limited in number (J.L = 1-'[+1 is finite). 
Assume that the restrictions of foreign investors imply that none of the foreign 
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investors can invest in the country (J..l:!tl = J..l:il = 0). This section analyzes two 
cases in this framework, where the location of noise traders is different. 
In the first case, assume that all noise traders are local. Using (3.18), the 
optimal demand (3.21), (3.22), and the equity market clearing condition (3.2), the 
equilibrium price can be expressed as 
(3.36) 
Because the size of local market is limited, equity prices contain a liquidity pre-
mium and a risk premium. Both premiums are decreasing in the number of local 
informed investors (J..l). A liquidity premium is introduced because the limited 
number of local investors cause excess supply of risky asset. As a result, asset 
prices will be lower and excess gains of local rational investors higher. This has a 
new discouraging impact on the incentives to adopt fast. There is still uncertainty 
in the local market from noise traders and the "fear of unstable markets" has an 
impact. Absence of uninformed investors, who take fast adoption as a signal of 
high productivity, eliminates any potential gains from "adopting to signal". If all 
noise traders are local, there is more uncertainty regarding the asset price despite 
less uncertainty from the impact of sentiment in international markets. In such 
case it is never optimal for a country to forbid uninformed, but rational foreigners 
from investing in the country, if the goal of the local policy maker is to encourage 
fast technology adoption. Appendix B.lO proves it formally. 
In the second case, it is assumed that all noise traders are foreign. Then 
On one hand, initial owners deciding the speed of technology adoption, face no un-
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certainty and the "fear of unstable markets" force disappears. On the other hand, 
absence of "adoption to signal" force and liquidity premium reduce the incentives 
to invest in fast adoption. In this case there exists a possibility that restricting 
foreign portfolio investments can encourage faster technology adoption (see Ap-
pendix B.lO). However this possibility exists only under specific conditions. First, 
the number of local informed investors has to be low enough such the "fear on 
unstable markets" force would dominate if the country was open to foreign port-
folio investments (Section 3.2.4). Otherwise, participation of uninformed foreign 
investors would eliminate the liquidity premium and allow "adopting to signal". 
Second, the variance of foreign noise trading or unexplainable component of labor 
productivity has to be high. This implies that price signals are not sufficiently 
informative. Third, the number of local informed investors cannot be very low, 
i.e. the local market is very small. In such case, the need for liquidity is pressing. 
Hence, the model suggests that countries that could benefit from fast technol-
ogy adoption by restricting foreign uninformed capital are those with small, but 
not the smallest local equity markets. In this case, potential benefits would arise 
only if the uncertainty in the purely domestic market is very low compared to 
uncertainty associated with the behavior of foreign investors. 
3.5 Concluding remarks 
This chapter presented an alternative answer to the question, why is the speed of 
technology adoption different across countries? It argues that if ownership trans-
fers of firms that engage in technology adoption have to be made in impedectly 
informed equity markets, two opposite forces arise: a negative "fear of unstable 
markets" force and a positive "adopting to signal" force. These forces affect the 
incentives for developers to adopt the accessible frontier technology. 
88 
The relative importance of these forces depends on the size of financial mar-
kets. "Adopting to signal" is likely to be most influential in countries where 
equity markets are at an intermediate level of development, while "fear of unsta-
ble markets" should dominate in underdeveloped markets. The less precise are 
the signals uninformed traders base their decisions on, the stronger these forces 
are. The importance of both forces falls with the number of informed investors' it , 
follows that countries with well informed (developed and large) financial markets 
are less affected. Nevertheless, if the recent developments in the United States' 
and other developed countries' technology sector assets were a bubble, it suggests 
that there would be room for "adoption to signal" (in this case it should be seen 
as "innovation to signal") even in developed countries. 
Fast technology adoption tends to be more difficult to sustain because of the 
participation of uninformed traders. Provided that the number of informed in-
vestors and cost of technology adoption does not change, the evolution of the 
frontier technology implies an increasing importance of the "fear of unstable mar-
kets". This is because uncertainty about the ability of labor in using any technol-
ogy creates higher uncertainty about profits if the technology is more advanced 
and therefore profits are higher. 
The mechanisms analyzed in this chapter affect both local agents and foreign 
investors (such as venture capitalists) intending to invest in establishing new firms. 
Lack of informed investors in the equity market, can discourage foreign investors 
from participating in projects where they could reduce the costs associated with 
adopting the frontier technology. The limited presence of venture capitalists in 
most developing countries is likely to be affected by the weakness and instability 
of local asset markets. 
When the number of informed investors is made endogenous, by letting the 
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local policy maker to determine the magnitude of information costs, it is shown 
that countries would not choose to be completely transparent. This situation arises 
from the "adopting to signal" force. Nevertheless, a policy maker has incentives 
to enhance more transparency over time to keep up with adopting the frontier 
technology. 
The model considered two extremes cases generating information asymmetries: 
the number of informed investors being exogenous, and the local policy maker 
having full control over information costs. In the more realistic case, where the 
local policy maker has some, but not full, control over the information costs, both 
policies and exogenous factors will determine the number of informed investors. 
The better performance of transition countries that joined the European Union 
in 2004, when compared with those that did not, could be explained by their ability 
to attract informed investors from neighboring developed countries more easily. 
Estonia is a stark example of a country that has been very active in adopting 
Internet and Communication Technologies in 1990s, and attracted venture capital 
funded Skype, arguably due to the impact of the "adopting to signal" force. At 
the same time, Romania or Ukraine, which have similar shares of educated labor, 
have lower rates of technology adoption, and may have been more affected by the 
"fear of unstable markets" force. 
The model assumed that openness to international portfolio capital flows guar-
antees sufficient liquidity in the local equity market. In reality, less developed 
equity markets can also lack liquidity, even if they are open, because the number 
of foreign investors who are interested in investing in these countries is low. The 
liquidity premium has a further negative impact on the incentives to adopt costly 
frontier technology in less developed equity markets, and forbidding foreign port-
folio equity flows would increase it. In countries where the local equity markets are 
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smallest, the need for attracting foreign portfolio equity flows to generate liquidity 
is pressing, and entry of foreign traders is likely to encourage investments in fast 
technology adoption. Gains from preventing foreign portfolio equity flows are only 
possible under very specific conditions in this setup. First, local equity markets 
have to be small, such that the "fear of unstable markets" would dominate in open 
equity capital markets. Second, policies should enable only local investors to be 
well informed, while the foreign investors are largely uninformed and their behav-
ior is highly uncertain. Only in such case, the benefits from lower uncertainty 
could potentially offset the losses due to a higher liquidity premium. In countries 
with intermediate and big equity markets, the "fear of unstable markets" has little 
negative effect and even a small additional liquidity provided by the participation 
of foreign traders would justify openness to foreign portfolio equity investments. 
The model does not specify whether firms are listed in the local or foreign stock 
market. Listing in a well established stock exchange (e.g. NASDAQ) can allow a 
firm to access a larger number of informed potential buyers. Also, the regulations 
of well developed stock exchange should reduce information costs. However, for 
most of the firms from developing countries, fixed costs associated with an initial 
public offering in NASDAQ are likely too high and they have to rely on the local 
equity market. Therefore, this possibility is available only for the most successful 
and innovative firms. Moreover, the most successful and innovative local firms 
can be more easily sold to a strategic foreign owner. As long as the price the 
strategic owner pays for a firm reflects its market value, the mechanism suggested 
in this chapter remains valid. If the local equity market is very underdeveloped 
and most firms are transferred directly between local agents, both potentially the 
low number of informed buyers and lack of liquidity are likely to discourage fast 
technology adoption. 
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Chapter 4 
Optimal research in financial 
markets with heterogeneous 
private information: a rational 
expectations model 
4.1 Introduction 
Empirical evidence shows that asset prices adjust slowly to changes in the fun-
damentals (see Chapter 1 for references) and investors appear to put relatiyely 
low weight on their private signals when making their trading decisions l . Further-
more, when investment decisions are made by financial institutions, rather than 
individual agents, they have to hire researchers in order to obtain private signals. 
1 For example, Menkhoff (1998) presents results of a survey among participants of foreign 
exchange market in Germany, who w('re asked to evaluate the relative importance of fundanlen-
tab, technical allalysis and monitoring order flows in their trading decisions. The importance of 
fundamental research was {'\'aluated to be only around ..15 per C(,Ilt. The sun'ey also sho\\':-. that 
investors consider that psychological factors and opinion leaders' vi{'wpoints are relevant to the 
market. 
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They can choose both, the size of their research department and the research effort 
that is put into a particular asset.2 
The aim of this chapter is to analyze the extent of asset mis-pricing and the 
dynamics of asset prices in a setting where the choice of private information is 
explicitly modelled. Research cost is modelled as the real resources that investors 
commit to pay in order to obtain a private signal of a particular precision. In order 
to address to extent of asset mis-pricing in a rational setting, research costs are 
incorporated into the setting of Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006), where the asset 
prices dynamics are affected by the existence of common public information. 
In their setting, the availability of public information generates slow adjust-
ment to changes in the fundamentals because of higher order beliefs. Rational 
and short-lived investors take the public signal into account not only because it 
reveals information about the fundamental, but also because it helps to predict 
future asset prices. The further away is the liquidation date, the higher is the 
importance of public signal in predicting future asset prices. 3 
The derived dynamics in Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006) rely on constant pre-
cision of private signals over time. There are two opposite forces that affect the 
dynamics of asset prices when research effort is made endogenous. First, over 
time the fundamental affects asset prices more, and therefore private signals be-
come better predictors of next period's price. This gives investors the incentives 
to acquire more precise private signals over time. Second, because investors ob-
tain more information from historical prices over time, they become less willing to 
2 Although not directly compatible with the modelling strategy in this chapter, research costs 
can also arise from the opportunity cost of fundamental research in terms of the speed of reaction 
fast on the developments in the market. 
3It is worth pointing out that the liquidation date should not be interpreted only as the 
maturity of a bond or the liquidation of a firm. It could be any future event that affects the 
value of an asset (e.g. the success of an particular investment project that affects the future 
value of equity prices). 
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spend resources on better private information in later periods, because the benefit 
of better private information are lower, when more information from other sources 
is available. 
This chapter shows that with endogenous precision of private information, 
the first force dominates in determining the time path of research costs and slow 
reaction to changes in the fundamentals becomes even more pronounced compared 
to Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006). 
The second force is important when comparing two assets that have the same 
number of trading periods left until the liquidation date, but different length of 
price history. Under specific assumptions about the research costs, the asset with 
longer price history becomes even more mis-priced. This is in contrast with a 
setting that does not incorporate endogenous research decision, where the extent 
of mis-pricing would be always lower for an asset with longer price history. 
The chapter also addresses the dependence of optimal precision on the other 
parameters of model (e.g. precision of public information, risk aversion, risk-free 
rates etc.) and the importance of the assumption that investors are myopic. The 
latter is addressed by incorporating research costs and public signal in a two-period 
model with long-lived agents in the spirit of Brown and Jennings (1989). 
Finally, the chapter discusses the effectiveness of policy makers' efforts to re-
duce the extent of mis-pricing by increasing the precision of public information 
( e.g. through making truthful statements about the developments in the asset 
markets or encouraging development of independent research institutes that pro-
vide publicly available information). This is also important in understanding the 
impact of developments in technologies that facilitates access to information. 
Information costs and their impact on asset prices has been addressed by Calvo 
and Mendoza (1999), who focus on portfolio choice and herding behavior due to 
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information costs. Closer to this chapter are rational expectations models with 
information costs starting from Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) and more recently 
Veldkamp (2006), Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2006), Peress (2006) and Dow, 
Goldstein, and Guembel (2007). All these papers focus on impact of information 
costs in one trading period setting. 
The chapter also relates to Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006) that similarly to 
Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006) emphasize on the importance of higher order expec-
tation and to rational expectations literature more generally (e.g. Grossman and 
Stiglitz 1976, Hellwig 1980, Diamond and Verrecchia 1981, Kyle 1985, Singleton 
1986, Brown and Jennings 1989, Grundy and McNichols 1989, He and Wang 1995). 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 sets up the model 
and shows how research and trading decisions are determined. Section 4.3 dis-
cusses the results. It solves the model in a simple one-period setting and proceeds 
with analyzing the multi-period setting. Section 4.4 presents extensions of the 
baseline model. It analyzes its dynamics, when investors are long-lived and dis-
cusses the impact of higher precision of public information on asset prices. Section 
4.5 summarizes the results. 
4.2 The model 
4.2.1 Assumptions 
Assume that there are overlapping generations of short-lived investors, who can 
invest in a risky asset and an alternative asset providing a known risk-free return 
Tt > 1, on each trading period t. The risky asset has liquidation value e at date 
T + 1, and is traded in periods 1 to T. Investors do not know the liquidation value, 
but they can obtain information about it from public signals, private signals and 
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prices. The characteristics of these signals will be described later in this section. 
Every period, there is a continuum of rational investors normalized in the 
interval [0, 1], endowed with W units of funds. They buy assets at date t and 
consume at date t + 1. A risk averse investor i, who is trading at date t, has the 
mean-variance utility function 
(4.1) 
where the risk aversion is measured by the constant T and Oi,t the information set 
available for investor i in period t, which will be specified shortly. 
The budget constraint for investor i trading in period t is 
where Ci,t+l is his consumption in t + 1, hi,t is his demand for the risky asset, W 
is the endowment and K((3i t) is the research cost function, which will be specified , 
shortly. The price of the risky asset at time t is denoted by Pt. Notice also that 
PT+1 = 8. 
In addition to rational traders, there are noise traders in each period, mod-
elled as a noisy net supply of the risky asset Bt rv N (0,1/8). Supply shocks are 
assumed to be uncorrelated along time and across both public and private signals 
of investors in every time period. The market clearing condition is H t = Bt for 
every period t, where Ht is the aggregate demand. 
There is some initial public information about the risky assets. The liquidation 
value is drawn from the prior distribution that is the public signal e rv N (y, 1/0). 
Investors trading in period t can obtain a costly and noisy private signal about 
the fundamental value of the asset, Vi,t = e + ci,h Ci,t rv N (0,1/ f3i,t). It is 
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assumed that Ci,t is uncorrelated across investors, time, supply shocks and the 
noise in public signal. 
Investors can choose the variance of their private signal (1/ f3 i ,t) , if they spend 
K(f3i,t) on research. The research cost function should capture the idea that having 
a more precise view about the fundamental value must be more expensive, and 
knowing the true value with certainty is too expensive. This implies the following 
conditions: K'(f3) > 0, KI/(f3) > 0, K(f3) ---+ 00 as f3 ---+ 00 and K(O) = 0. Further 
analysis of the importance of the functional form of cost function is presented in 
the Section 4.3.2. 
The sequence of events is the following: 
1) The fundamental value e is drawn by nature at date 0. 
2) The first generation of investors simultaneously choose their research cost 
for the risky asset, before observing private signals and the price. The information 
set about fundamentals available to each of them is the same: fLl = {y}. 
3) These investors trade and period 1 market clears. The information available 
for their trading decision also contains private signals and the price signal. So 
ni,1 = {y, Vi,I, PI}. In the following period, they will receive income corresponding 
to the price of each asset, consume and retire without revealing their private signals 
to the following generations.4 
4) The generations 2 to T will make their research and trading decisions in 
a similar manner. The only difference is that they will obtain information about 
the fundamental also from historical prices. So the information set available for 
their research decision is n_ t = {y, PI, ... ,Pt- I }. Their trading decisions will be 
based on information set ~,t = {n_t, Vi,t, Pt }. Apart from the generation trading 
4 Relaxing this assumption and allowing investors to inherit the private signals from previ-
ous generations, would make investors heterogeneous in their research. See Section 4.5 for a 
discussion about the likely implications of this. 
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at T, the consumption of investors will depend on prices in t + 1 rather than the 
fundamental value 8. 
5) At T + 1 the risky asset will be liquidated and generation T will obtain 9. 
This setting implies that investors are heterogeneous in their trading decisions, 
while being homogeneous in their research decision. 
4.2.2 Solution method 
Investors of each generation face a two stage decision problem. The model is solved 
by first deriving investors' demand and equilibrium prices, taking the research 
decisions as given. Given the solution from that stage, the optimal research costs 
can be derived conditional on the available information. 
From the utility function (4.1), we can find the demand for the risky asset of 
investor i, 
hi t = E[Pt+llni,t] - TtPt. 
, TVar(PH1Ini,t) (4.2) 
Equilibrium prices 
Assume that the asset price follows a linear rule on each period, Pt = 'T/t (AtYt + 
J..£t8 - St). The term Yt is a public signal about asset in period t. It includes the 
initial public signal Y and information from prices in trading periods 1 to t - 1. 
The coefficients 'TJt, At, J..£t can be found by the method of undetermined coefficients 
from the market clearing condition. (See Appendix C.1 for the derivation.) 
Rearranging the pricing equation, investors can observe a price signal Pt in 
period t, such that Pt = (Pt!'TJt-AtYt)/J..£t = 9-st!J..£t, and Ptl9 rvN (9,J..£t28-1). 
The updated distribution of 9 conditional on prices will also be normal. It will be 
the public signal for the investors trading in period t + 1: 91Pt rv N (YHb at';l). 
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The public signal evolves over time as 
(4.3) 
(4.4) 
The first generation investors cannot observe historical prices, so 
a1 = a and Y1 = y. (4.5) 
As investors trading in period t will also obtain a private signal Vi,t, they will 
believe that the fundamental to be drawn from 
where Vi,e,t 
rv N ((Ytat + J.l~8Pt + ,Bi,tVi,t)Vi,e,t, Vi,e,t) , 
1 
What follows focuses on a symmetric equilibrium. By assumption, investors 
are identical in their preferences and have the same information O-t in the research 
decision stage. Furthermore, all investors face the same continuous research cost 
technology. These assumptions ensure the existence of a symmetric equilibrium, 
where all investors choose the same optimal research cost; ,Bi,t = ,Bt for all i. This 
implies also the same variance Ve,t = (at + J.l~8 + ,Bt) -1. 
Aggregating the demand of all investors averages out the noise in the private 
signals, however it does not average out the noise in the public signal. 
Lemma 7 The prices in period t will be determined by coefficients Zt and Zs,t, so 
that 
(4.6) 
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where 
(4.7) 
(4.8) 
T+l 
Rt = II Tk 
k=t 
Proof. See Appendix C.1. • 
Using (4.3), (4.4), (4.5) and Pt = e - stl J.Lt an alternative way to represent the 
equilibrium asset price is in term of the initial public signal y and historical noise 
trading as 
where the weight on initial public signal 
( 4.10) 
This is similar to Proposition 2 in Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006). Integrating 
out the noisy supply, asset prices will be a weighted average of the true value and 
the initial public signal public signal (y). It is clear that assets will be closer to 
the fundamentals if Zt is closer to 1 (equivalently Wy,t is closer to zero). 
In period T + 1 the risky asset will be liquidated at the fundamental value. 
Also, there will be no more opportunities to invest in the risk-free asset. So, the 
terminal conditions will be 
ZT+l = 1, Zs,T+l = 0 and TT+l = 1. (4.11) 
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Finally, comparing the pricing equation (4.6) with the linear pricing rule assumed 
initially, it is clear that 
Zt 
J.lt = -. 
Zs,t 
(4.12) 
The dynamic system (4.3)-(4.5) and (4.7)-(4.12) solves for the values of Zt and Zs,t, 
given the values of f31 to f3T . 
The research decision 
The optimal research cost decision is equivalent to choosing f3 i,t taking other in-
vestor's f3j ,t, j -=1= i as given. Replacing the optimal demand into the utility func-
tion, simplifying and taking expectations implies that the optimal research decision 
solves 
(4.13) 
By doing research, investors can gain a reduction in the variance of their es-
timated next period price. They can also gain a better view about risky return 
opportunities. Given that investors are not short-sales constrained, they can gain 
equally from either an increase or a decrease in the next period price. 
From the pricing equation (4.6) the variance of the following period price is 
where Vi,p,t 
1 
--¥OPt p2 ~" , 
.£ "t+l 
2 
2 TT Zs,t+l 
Zt+l Vi,a,t + -fJ-· 
(4.14) 
It is clear from the equation above that the conditional variance of expected 
price should be lower if investor i decides to research a lot (f3i,t is high and Vs,a,t is 
low) and if the weight on the fundamental value (Zt+l) in the next period pricing 
equation is high. 
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Investors face additional sources of uncertainty about the expected return of 
the risky asset at the research decision stage, compared to the trading stage. They 
do not know the realization of their private signal, as well as the price signal they 
can observe in t. By doing research, they can influence the variance of the private 
signal. The only information they have about the fundamental value is the public 
signal Yt. Noting that E[Vi,tln-t] = E[Ptln-tl = E[8In-t] = Yt, it is easy to show 
that E[E[Pt+llni,t] - Ttptln-t] = O. Thus, the expected squared return from the 
risky asset equals its variance (see Appendix C.2 for derivation) 
(4.15) 
where Zi,t and Zi,s,t are the weights an individual investor puts on true value and 
current noise trading respectively.5 
The benefits of research for an individual investor come from the reduction 
of the conditional variance of prices (Var(Pt+llni ,t)), the difference in the weight 
he puts on true value in his expectations compared to market price (Zi,t - Zt), 
difference in the weight on noise trading (Zi,s,t - Zs,t) and a better private signal. 
The latter is captured by Z;+li3i,t V:~e,t and has a bigger impact when expected next 
period prices are closer to the true value of the fundamental (Zt+l is high). 
It should be pointed out that in symmetric equilibrium the benefits of different 
weight on true value disappear (Zi,t = Zt), while different weight on noise trading 
does not (z"s,t =f. Zs,t). The latter is because noise trading shock affects individual 
investors' expectations only through price signals, while equilibrium prices are in 
addition directly affected by the noise traders' demand. 
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Proposition 8 In a symmetric equilibrium, all investors equate the marginal cost 
of research with marginal benefit of it (M Bt) and {,BI" .. ,,BT, J1I' ... ,J1r} solve 
( 4.16) 
where MBt 
2 TT2 (2 TT2 ) ZHI Ve,t 7 2 Ve,t 1 
27 8R2 + zHI,Bt V2 + v;-
HI P,t P,t 
simultaneously with (4.12),(4.4), (4.5), (4.7),(4.8) and (4.11)).6 
Proof. See Appendix C.3. • 
Equation (4.16) shows that the marginal benefit of research is zero if Ve,t ---+ O. 
Therefore, investors have no incentives to invest in private research if either public 
signal is perfect (a ---+ 00 or at ---+ 00 ) or variance of noise trading is zero (8 ---+ 00) 
making price signals fully informative. The latter is consistent with Grossman 
and Stiglitz (1976), that shows that in markets with no noise trading no investor 
has incentive to acquire costly information and the asset prices cannot reveal 
information about the fundamental. 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 One trading period example 
As in Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006) and Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006) a 
multi-period pricing equation with higher order beliefs can only be solved numer-
ically. Therefore, to establish some basic relationships, consider at first a one 
trading period example. 
For T = 1 the solution of the model simplifies as Z2 = 1, Zs,2 = O. The value 
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of J.t1 can be found from (4.7), (4.8) and (4.12) to be J.t1 = (31/7; the variance of 
the private signals is higher, prices will be more informative, for a given level of 
noise in supply. Prices will also be more informative if risk aversion (7) is lower, 
since rational investors will invest more in risky assets. Finally, because the asset 
will be liquidated in period 2, Vp ,l = Va ,1 = (Q + (31 + ~8) -1 and there is no 
historical prices implying Q2 = a1 + J.t~8, with a1 = Q. 
For the analysis of the impact of availability of price history, let us drop time 
indexes and denote the variables in a one trading period model with "*". Simpli-
fying (4.16) the marginal benefit of research M B* can be now expressed as 
( 4.17) 
Appendix C.4 shows that marginal benefit of research is decreasing in (3* 
(8M B* /8(3* < Or. 
The same appendix also reports the sensitivity of optimal precision to para-
meters of the model. It is straightforward from (4.17) that the lower the variance 
of the fundamental (Va) investors perceive, the lower is their marginal benefit 
from obtaining better private signals. Therefore, exogenous parameters, such as 
existence of public signal that is freely available and of higher quality, reduces 
incentives to acquire better private information. The same applies to the effect of 
lower variance in noise trading that increases the quality of price signals. 
The dependence of the research decision on risk aversion is ambiguous. There 
are three forces affecting it in different directions. First, a higher risk aversion 
makes the investors to care more about the possibility of reduction of variance 
that can be achieved by investing in better private signals. Second, more risk 
7 This together with constant or increasing marginal cost of research guarantees the uniqueness 
of the equilibrium. 
104 
averse investors are less willing to invest in risky assets in the first place, and 
therefore have less incentives to research instead of investing in the risk- free 
asset. Finally, higher risk aversion makes the demand of other rational investors 
in the risky assets lower, making prices less informative, which again increases 
the incentives to research. If the level of risk aversion is very high, the optimal 
research cost is increasing in risk aversion. In low and intermediate values of risk 
aversion, optimal research cost could be increasing or decreasing in risk aversion. 
(See Appendix CA. and Figure C.1 in the same appendix) 
A higher risk-free return reduces the optimal research cost by increasing the 
opportunity cost of research as compared to investing in the risk-free asset. This 
implies that the perceived variance of risky asset increases and the demand for 
risky asset falls more than the direct reallocation effect suggests. 
The weight on the true value in the pricing equation, Zl, simplifies to 
f3*2 
-8 +f3* 
7 2 z* = -....!----:---f3*2 ' 
a+ -28 +f3* 
7 
(4.18) 
which is clearly increasing in f3*. This means that prices are expected to be closer 
to the common public signal, if less research is chosen. Hence, if investors choose 
to research less, a "good" risky asset is likely to be under- priced and a "bad" 
asset overpriced. An asset being "good" ("bad") in this context is an asset with 
true value above (below) y. 
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that if there is no public signal (0 ---. 0), 
investors incentives to acquire private information still depend on the other para-
meters of the model (e.g. variance of noise trading, risk aversion), however this 
would only affect the variance of asset prices, but not the expected dynamics due 
mis-pricing, as z· = o. 
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4.3.2 Multi-period model 
Development of research costs over time. 
In a multi-period setting, investors can choose their research effort in every period. 
Different generations of investors differ in the information that is available to them 
and the number of trading periods left until the fundamental is realized. For 
example, if there are T trading periods, investors that trade in period T base their 
research decisions of information set {y, PI, .. , PT-d compared to investors that 
trade in period 1 and observe only {y}. From (4.13), it is also clear that their 
objectives differ. Considering the same example, their returns from investing in 
the risky asset depend on 8-rTPT and P2 -rIPI respectively. As a result, different 
generations of investors have different incentives to invest in private information. 
Lemma 9 Incentives to invest in private signals increase monotonically over time, 
z.e. 
f3t > f3t- 1 for any t. 
Proof. See Appendix C.5 .• 
This result is driven by two forces that reduce earlier periods' investors mar-
ginal benefit from research. First, the weight on the true value (Zt) in the pricing 
equation (4.6) increases over time. As fundamental research can only reduce the 
uncertainty regarding the true value of the asset, the marginal benefit of research 
is lower in earlier periods. Second, earlier periods' investors face higher uncer-
tainty due to noise trading, which they cannot reduce by conducting fundamental 
research. These two forces reduce earlier periods investors' marginal benefit from 
research. 
There is also a third force that has an opposite impact in terms of generating 
incentives to invest in private information; the availability of price history. As 
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Figure 4.1: Adjustment to changes in the fundamental 
long as at least some research is done in earlier periods the variance of the public 
signals (evolving according to (4.4) and (4.5)) decrease over time. As in the 
one-period model, the lower is the variance of freely available signals, the lower i 
investors' willingness to research. Therefore, this force lowers investors' incentives 
to research over time. Nevertheless, this force is not strong enough to offset the 
lower marginal benefit of research in earlier trading periods. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates Proposition 9 and compare risky expected asset prices 
(integrating out the supply shocks) in three settings: 
• The model in this chapter with endogenous precision of private signal' 
• Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006) setting where precision of private signal are 
constant over time and set equal to the endogenous precision in the last 
trading period; 
• a model without public signal. 
xp cted price adjutrn nl would b exactly the arne with or without endogenou choic 
of privat ignal. 
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In this model, slow reaction of asset prices on the changes of the fundamental 
has two important drivers. First, is not rational to "go against the market" follow-
ing internal fundamental research only. This would imply that investors overlook 
their expectations about other investors' expectations. Second, it is also not opti-
mal to spend a lot of research resources on events that affect asset prices further 
in the future. As a result, the slow adjustment to changes in the fundamentals 
becomes more pronounced than in a setting with constant precision.9 
Asset prices, price history and marginal research cost. 
In a setting where the quality of private information is fixed longer price history 
necessarily implies less mis-pricing, because historical prices reveal additional in-
formation about the fundamentals and reduce the weight on the initial public 
signal. However, if precision of private signals is endogenous, longer price his-
tory offers additional freely available information that reduces incentives to pay 
information costs. 
This section analyzes these effects and compares the prices of two assets in 
the last trading period. One of the assets is a one-period asset (as analyzed in 
Section 4.3.1 and denoted with "*") and the other is a T-period asset. Taking 
expectations with respect the supply shock, the extent of mis-pricing of these two 
assets will be the same if the weight on initial public signal y is the same for both 
assets, i.e. from (4.9) 
9 An alternative and equivalent way to interpret Lemma 9 would be that adjustment is faster 
because investors have incentives to acquire better private signals over time or that adjustment 
is slower at first and faster when the liquidation date is closer. The interpretation chosen in 
this chapter puts emphasis on the factors that potentially increase mis-pricing. Notice also that 
in the absence of public signal, investors would not acquire perfect private signals, but their 
incentives would not be affected by the expected low weight on public signal in future asset 
prices. The precision that would be chosen in such setting is closer to the one in last trading 
period in current setup. 
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Using then (4.7) and (4.10), the same extent of mis-pricing would imply that 
the variance of the risky asset in the last trading period is the same for both assets 
Ve,T = Va 
For this condition to be satisfied, it must hold that .BT+#8+J.L}_18+ ... +J.L~8 = 
[3* + ~*22 8. Given that the precision of information revealed in historical prices 
J.L}-1 8 + ... + J.L~8 > 0, the marginal benefit of research and optimal research effort 
must be lower for the asset with longer price history (i.e . .BT < [3*). 
Proposition 10 If research cost function takes the form K(.Bi,t) = K1.B~,t + K2.Bi .t, 
there exist a relationship between parameters K1 and K2 
(4.19) 
such that the extent of expected asset mis-pricing on one-period asset and multi-
period asset during the last tmding period is exactly the same (\fe,T = Va and 
Wy,T = w;J. 
If Kl > Kl and K2 < K2, then Wy,T < w;. 
If Kl < Kl and K2 > K2, then Wy,T > w;. 
Proof. See Appendix C.6. • 
Figure 4.2 illustrates Proposition 10. The intuition behind the proof of Propo-
sition 10 is the following. For a given variance of the fundamental, marginal benefit 
increases with the precision of private information. This arises from the fact that 
if investors have more precise private signal, they expect to gain more from it 
in terms of predicting the returns from trading. IT marginal research cost in is 
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constant, investment in assets with different price history must give exactly the 
same marginal benefit. At the same time, the marginal benefit from obtaining a 
better private signal is always higher for assets about which les information i 
freely available and therefore (3* > (3T' Hence, it must hold that Ve < Ve,T and 
there is less mis-pricing if no price history is available. 
When marginal research cost depends also on the precision of private signals, 
(3* > (3T also implies that marginal cost of research is higher for an asset with not 
price history. When there is no fixed component in the marginal cost of research 
(K2 = 0), increasing the precision up to the point where Ve = Ve,T is alway too 
expensive and assets with longer price history are less mis-priced. 
Finally, while intuitively there is no reason why K2 cannot be po itive it 
should be pointed out that K2 > 0 can lead to a corner solution. In the case of 
one trading period model, if K2 > (T /2ba2 + 1/2Ta) then (3* = O. 
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Numerical results 
Given that the sensitivity of optimal private signals' precision to changes in the 
exogenous parameters of the model are too complicated to derive analytically, this 
section presents numerical results for T = 5. In order to the possibility of a corner 
solutions, assume that research cost takes the form K(f3i ,t) = Kd3~,t. 
Numerical results lO are presented in Appendix C.7 and are consistent with the 
sensitivity analysis discussed in Section 4.3.1. Higher precision of public signal 
and noise trading reduce the optimal precision in all periods (Figure C.2). The 
pattern indicates also that in the case of less variable noise trading, the incentives 
to acquire better private signals could be lower in later trading periods, where a lot 
of information is already revealed by the history of asset prices. At the same time, 
lower variance of public signal could be more influential in reducing incentives to 
research in earlier periods, when public signal is a good predictor of future asset 
prices. Figure C.3 shows the impact of this for the dynamics of asset prices, when 
integrating of the supply shocks.ll 
The negative effect of higher research costs is straightforward (Figure C.4) and 
the effect to expected prices is similar to the impact of lower noise trading. The 
impact of risk aversion is not reported, as it is ambiguous for the reasons already 
discussed in Section 4.3.1. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that in dynamic 
setting higher risk aversion has an additional positive effect on the incentives to 
invest in private signals, since it reduces the quality of historical price signals. 
Permanent increase of interest rates in period 3 reduces the incentives to re-
search in all periods. The incentives to research are lower also in trading periods 
lONumerical results not reported in this thesis suggest that the direction of the effects described 
does not depend on specific assumptions about the parameters. The choice of parameters is 
arbitrary and aims to show the direction of effects rather than their magnitude. 
11 In the case of higher precision of public signal the asset price dynamics shown does not take 
into account the fact that more precise signal also implies higher probability that y is close to 
8. This issue is explicitly addressed in Section 4.4.2. 
111 
1 and 2, because investors can forecast future interest rates. Thy know that this 
implies lower weight on the fundamentals in the future asset prices12 . In the case 
of a temporary increase of the interest rate, incentives to obtain better private 
signals increase after the shock is over. While not very obvious from the graph, 
the optimal precision is slightly higher immediately after interest risk-free rates 
have decreased back (period 4), because lower demand for risky asset in earlier 
periods implies worse historical price signals. This creates incentives to research 
more in order to compensate this (Figure C.5). 
4.4 Extensions 
4.4.1 Long-lived agents 
This section relaxes the assumption that the agents are short-lived and investigates 
the research cost decision and resulting asset prices in a two trading period setting 
in the spirit of Brown and Jennings (1989). For simplicity, assume also that the 
return on alternative asset is rl = r2 = 1, and research cost is given by K.({3i,t) = 
K d3~,t. Long-lived agents have preferences over their last period consumption that 
is given by 
This section assumes that investors can choose to receive i.i.d. private signals 
in both trading periods and select the precision of these signals ({3i,1 and f3i,2) 
before the first trading period. Therefore, the information set in the research 
decision stage is n_1 = {y}, in the first trading period ni ,1 = {y, Vi,b PI} and in 
12This is due to the perfectly forecastable risk-free rates. If the change would be truly unex-
pected, incentives to research would only decrease on the period that the shock happens. 
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the second trading period ni ,2 = {y, Vi,2, Vi,l, PI, P2 }. The rest of the assumptions 
and notation remains unchanged. 
Following the method of Brown and Jennings (1989)13 the demand in the 
second trading period is 
and in the first period 
(4.20) 
which are defined in Appendix C.8. 
Equilibrium asset prices are given by 
(4.21) 
where 
, 
Zl - G - Q [(1 - Z2) J-I}5 28 + Z2((31 + J.L~8)Ve'1] +Q G ((31 + J.L~8)Ve!t4.22) G a + J.L1 
, 
Z8,1 -
, J.L18 T (1 - Zl)-;- + G' 
, 
Z2 (J.L~8 + (31 + /12) Ve,2, 
Z8,2 - (T + J.L~8) Ve,2. 
Given that in equilibrium /1,,1 = /11 and /1,,2 = /12' then it follows also that Gi = G 
13 Also in Brunnermeier (2001), pp. 107-110 
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and Qi = Q for every i. Similar to the case of short-lived agents'; J..ll and J..l2 solve 
See Appendix C.8 for the derivations. 
In the case that /32 = 0, this setting can be compared with the tw<rperiod 
model with myopic investors and identical and constant quality private signal. In 
this case, the weight on the fundamental in the second trading period is the same 
in both settings (Z2 = Z2) and closer to the higher in the first trading period 1 4 • 
Long-lived investors foresee their expected demand in the second trading period. 
If the risk from the second period prices is high (Q is relatively high compared 
to G), they demand higher quantity already in the first period. This implies that 
there is less scope for higher-order expectations; investors are less influenced by 
the value of public signal in predicting next period's prices. As a result, the weight 
on the fundamental in the equilibrium asset price equation is higher. 
Research cost decision follows the same logic as in the short-lived agents case 
and gives the following proposition. 
Proposition 11 Provided that long-lived investors commit to pay research costs 
before the first trading period, they will have incentives to choose to research only 
in the first trading period. 
/32 = 0 and /31 > 0 
Proof. See Appendix C.9. • 
The intuition behind Proposition 11 is that before first trading period higher 
private signal in the second period brings no additional benefits, because investors 
14With /32 = 0, from (4.7) and (4.22) i1 = GCQZ1 + g(/31 + J'~6)V9,1 = %1 + ~ ((/31 + J'¥6)V9,1 - %1) = ZI + ~(l- %2) (o+I'fcStJj(O+I'fcS») ~ %1 
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Figure 4.3: Adjustment of asset prices on a change in the fundamental' long-lived 
vs. short-lived investors 
will remember their private signal in the second trading period. Also given that 
second period private signal is realized late, before trading period 1 the conditional 
variance of the returns between different trading periods and liquidation date i 
independent of (32' 
Figure 4.3 compares the reaction of asset prices to the change in the funda-
mental in the model with long-lived investors to the one with short-lived investors. 
Both models assume two trading periods and the same research costs. The e two 
settings are comparable, because investors in both settings have one private signal 
in every trading period. 
The reason why expected prices change between period 1 and 2 in long-lived 
agent's setting is that period 1 price signal increases the information available in 
period 2, if variance in noise trading is not too high. This creates incentive for 
long-lived investors not to demand the full amount of risky as et they want already 
in the first trading period. 
As' t price~ ar tilted toward the public ignal al 0 when inve tor ~ ar long-
lived, b can' it r al' information about the fundamental. How vel', th eff t of 
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higher order expectations as well as low research efforts in earlier trading periods 
diminishes compared to the setting with myopic investors. 
Finally, Appendix C.g reports the numerical results on sensitivity of optimal 
precision and prices to parameters of the model (a, 8, T and K 1), when investors 
are long-lived. The direction of effects is the same as in other settings analyzed. 
4.4.2 Public signal and policy maker 
Policy makers make public statements that could have an effect on the public 
signal. When the precision of public signal increases, it also imply a average 
smaller error in the public signal. It is clear from (4.6) and (4.21) that mis-pricing 
would disappear in the public signal was perfect (i.e. y = 8). Asset prices in such 
case would equal to the present discounted value of the fundamental and noise 
trading, even though no investors has incentives to acquire private information. 
While, better quality public signal (higher a) reduces the error in the public 
signal, it also increases the weight on public signal in investors' expectations and 
reduces the incentives to acquire private information as shown in the previous 
sections. As long as the policy maker is unable to issue perfect signals, the effect 
of improving the quality of public information can have an ambiguous effect. This 
section gives a simple example of this in one trading period setting.15 
First, the extent of mis-pricing (Xmp) can be specified as the absolute value of 
the difference between the asset price (integrating out the supply shocks) and true 
value of asset, that is 
IXmpl = 1(1 - z*)y + z*8 - 91· 
The public signal can be written as y = 9 + c1l' where error in the public signal is 
15The same mechanism is valid in other settings. 
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Cy rv N(O, 1/ CY.). 
Consider the case that the error in the public signal is one tandard deviation 
and above its mean; Cy = 1/ va. Using (4.18) , Ve, the extent of mi -pricing 
becomes 
Xmp= Veh. 
If the precision of private information does not change (i.e. f3* is exogenous) 
The extent of mis-pricing is ambiguous due higher weight investors put on the 
public ignal when forming their expectations. Therefore unles CY. i high. it can 
increase the extent of mis-pricing. 
If (3* i endogenous 
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AI:, ~!3Q < 0 (see Appendix C.4), it becomes even more likely that improving 
the quality of public signal increases the extent of mis-pricing, because errors in 
the public signal become magnified. Figure 4.416 illustrates this by plotting the 
relationship between a and Xmp for one standard deviation error in the public 
signal. The value of the a where higher precision of public signal implies less 
mis-pricing is higher with endogenous information costs. 
4.5 Concluding remarks 
This chapter presented a model where investors choose the precision of their private 
information and make their trading decisions according to both public and private 
information and. This leads to following the conclusions. 
When the quality of public signal is higher, the incentives to invest in private 
information are lower. Public signal affects asset prices more if its precision is 
higher, because of two reasons. First, all investors assign higher weight on the 
common public signal when forming their expectations about the fundamental or 
next period asset prices. Second, as incentives to acquire lower variance private 
signals are lower they, assign lower weight on their private signal. This implies 
that policies that increase the quality on public information can have an ambiguous 
effect on potential mis-pricing. On the one hand, higher quality public signals are 
on average closer to the fundamental and therefore reduce potential mis-pricing. 
On the other hand, as private information becomes endogenously more noisy, the 
error in public signal becomes magnified. 
The model is also consistent with the findings of Grossman and Stiglitz (1976), 
that lower variance in noise trading reduces incentives to acquire better private 
16The precision of public signal is chosen equal to the optimal precision in the case when there 
is no public signal; Q = O. Other parameters are the same as in Appendix C.7. 
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signals. This also increases the potential mis-pricing of assets as long as public 
signal is available. 
As already shown by Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006) in a similar setting with 
short-lived investors, the existence of a public signal makes asset prices biased 
towards it. Furthermore, this bias is larger if investors trade assets that have 
more time left to maturity. Allowing investors to choose the precision of their 
private signal magnifies this bias in earlier trading periods. Given that investors 
care more about the price that they will get for their assets in the market when 
exiting, rather than the underlying fundamentals, their incentive to research is 
lower the earlier they trade compared to the maturity date of their assets. 
FUrthermore, for a fixed time until maturity, a longer price history reduces 
incentives to invest in private signal, as investors have an incentive to free-ride on 
the research effort made by the earlier trading periods' investors. This implies that 
longer price history does not necessarily imply less mis-pricing and depends on the 
curvature of research cost function. If marginal research cost is constant, assets 
with longer price history are even more mis-priced. This implies that mis-pricing 
is potentially important also in more mature assets markets. Clearly, this effect 
would be smaller or even reversed when in more mature asset are associated with 
lower research costs. 
The model also predicts that higher current and future risk-free rates reduce 
the incentives to obtain information about risky assets. Therefore, the demand for 
the risky asset falls not only because of the substitution effect, but also because 
investors endogenously face higher variance of risky asset. If the increase of risk-
free rate is temporary, then later periods' investors would be more willing to 
research, in order to compensate for the worse signals coming from historical asset 
prices. 
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Finally, the predictions of the model are sensitive to the assumption that short-
lived investors. If investors are long-lived, they have incentives to obtain higher 
quality private information as early as possible. Also, with long-lived investors, the 
reaction to changes in the fundamentals is faster than with short-lived investors. 
It would probably be more realistic to assume that both myopic and long-lived 
investors participate in the market. In this case the adjustment dynamics to shocks 
in fundamentals are likely to be in between the these two cases. The existence 
of myopic investors can be justified by agents' that foresee their future liquidity 
shocks. Furthermore, when the agent is an asset management firm, the short 
horizon can be rationalized, because the performance of these firms and their staff 
tends to be judged by the short term performance of their portfolio. 
The assumption in this chapter is that the short-lived investors do not inherit 
historical private signals and the long-lived investors decide research effort in all 
periods before the first trading period is rather restrictive. Both cases overlook 
the dynamics that would arise if investors have heterogeneous information when 
deciding about research costs. It is likely that investors who inherit private signal 
that is further from the signal emerging from other channels, have higher incentives 
to research more. This is likely to make the degree of mis-pricing smaller, but 
would not eliminate the main dynamics. 
The assumptions about the information structure could be extended as well. 
The chapter treats private and public signals as distinct and uncorrelated. More 
realistic assumption might be that some private agents can also have an impact 
of public information (e.g. financial institutions making their research available). 
Analyzing the incentives of these agents to issue truthful signals and the market 
for information in a dynamic setting. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
In chapters 2-4, this thesis addressed the impact of imperfect information in equity 
markets and endogenous choice of the quality of private information on technology 
adoption and thereby aggregate economic performance. There are two important 
channels through which equity market affects innovation and technology adoption. 
First, equity is an important source of funding for technology sector and affects 
its ability to invest. Second, well developed equity markets facilitate talented 
entrepreneurs to sell their firms and affect their willingness to invest. At the same 
time, equity prices are subject to uncertainty and potential mis-pricing arising 
from the commonly available public information and investors' lack of willingness 
to invest in private information. 
Chapter 2 analyzed a setting where R&D is financed by issuing equity in an 
environment where equity market participants are imperfectly informed. This 
chapter showed that imperfect information implies under-reaction to the changes 
of fundamentals compared to the environment where equity market participants 
are perfectly informed. This would be the case, because an improvement in the 
fundamentals is not necessarily reflected in the public signal and equity market is 
pessimistic. However, when equity market is optimistic {i.e. public signal about 
121 
the fundamental is higher than the fundamental), there are potential gains in long-
term consumption, because higher equity prices imply more investments in R&D 
and therefore higher productivity and output, despite the fact that in the short 
run investors get losses in the equity market. 
Chapter 3 addressed the importance of equity markets in facilitating the exit 
of initial owners. It assumed that the initial owner of a technology adopting firm 
has superior information about the fundamental value of his firm and sells his firm 
in equity market. If an average potential buyer of the firm is less informed, two 
forces emerge that affect initial owners' willingness to invest in technology. First, 
there is a negative "fear of unstable markets" force that arises from the uncertainty 
about the future market value of the technology adopting firm. Second, there is a 
positive "adoption to signal" force that arises from the fact that fast technology 
adoption decision becomes a positive signal that increases the market value of the 
technology adopting firm. Other imperfections in the equity market, such as lack 
of liquidity, further reduce incentives to invest in new technologies. 
Finally, Chapter 4 analyzed the endogenous choice of precision of private infor-
mation in an environment where public information is available. It showed that the 
slow reaction to changes in fundamentals becomes magnified as long as investors 
have short-horizons. This is due to investors' reluctance to spend resources in 
order to analyze events that are far in the future and expected to have only a 
limited effect on next periods' asset prices. Also, existence of longer price history 
does not guarantee that the potential mis-pricing of assets is smaller. This arises 
from investors incentives to free-ride on research done by investors that traded on 
earlier periods. 
The policy implications that are drawn from the above listed finding are the 
following: 
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• The existence of liquid equity markets is beneficial for aggregate economy. 
Furthermore, policy actions that are likely to reduce liquidity (such as for-
bidding foreign portfolio investments) can be harmful, even if the equity 
prices involve high uncertainty. 
• The presence of imperfect information in equity markets has an impact on 
aggregate economic performance. If these imperfections become an obstacle 
for growth (e.g. information about the firms in a country is too hard to 
obtain), policy makers should aim to reduce information imperfections, by 
improving the relevant institutions. 
• If policy makers would have the ability to eliminate information imperfec-
tions in the asset market, they may lack incentives to do so. Market optimism 
is beneficial for growth because it allows the technology sector to raise more 
equity funds and make larger investments. Some degree of uncertainty is 
beneficial, because it allows firms to signal their high profitability by invest-
ing in new technologies. As higher level of technology implies higher future 
output and wages, policy makers' incentives would depend on how much they 
value these gains compared to the losses that the current investors receive 
in the equity market. Furthermore, the findings in Chapter 2 indicate that 
policy makers could have an incentive to issue only positive signals, which 
can make such signals not credible. 
• Policies that improve the quality of publicly available information have an 
ambiguous effect on the extent of mis-pricing in the asset market. While, 
better quality public information implies a smaller error in public signal, 
this error has a larger effect on asset prices. This is driven by the fact 
that improvements in public signal make investors' expectations more biased 
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towards the public signal and reduce their incentives to acquire better quality 
private information. 
As several policy dilemmas arise from these findings, optimal and feasible pol-
icy to address the presence of imperfect is information in equity markets is one 
interesting direction of future research. 
The analytical frameworks developed in the main chapters bears some impor-
tant simplifying assumptions and their mechanisms could be analyzed further in 
more general settings. The following discussion aims to identify the importance of 
these assumptions and potential links among the different mechanisms developed 
in this thesis. Through this analysis, it points out additional directions of future 
research. 
Both Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 are stylized in their assumptions regarding the 
source of funding available for the innovative firms. There is a lack of endogenous 
choice of funding among the different sources available: equity, venture capital 
and own funds. While this assumption is unlikely to be important for the validity 
of main predictions of the models, it could affect the magnitude of different forces 
and introduce new mechanisms. It would also have important implications for 
policy decisions regarding, for example, the regulation of venture capital. 
Chapters 2 and 3 also lack the choice of timing the terms of exit and/or issue 
of new equity to fund investment in technology. It is likely that owners of the 
firms would have incentives to delay (rush into) doing so when equity markets are 
pessimistic (optimistic). Given that in this thesis there is no heterogeneity among 
firms that invest in technology, the choice of timing is unlikely to add further 
insights. However, when there is heterogeneity in entrepreneurial talent or quality 
of innovation project, the choice of timing could generate important additional 
effects. For example, it would give further insights about the characteristics and 
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quality of firms that decide to go for an initial public offering or raise equity funds 
in "hot markets", such as during the "dot-coms" boom. 
Furthermore, introducing a degree of optimism in the setting of Chapter 3 
would affect the magnitude of the present mechanisms. First, if entrepreneurs 
expect the equity market to be optimistic in the future due to a public signal that 
is expected to fade out slowly, their incentives to invest in technology would be 
higher, and not only ability as in Chapter 2. This would introduce new forces 
in the setting of Chapter 3. Second, if entrepreneurs would be optimistic (over-
confident) about their firm, the magnitude of "adoption to signal" force would 
be smaller, because technology adoption decision would become a less informative 
signal. 
The uncertainty about the profits in technology sector in Chapters 2 and 3 
arises purely from the demand side. A more realistic assumption would be to 
incorporate uncertainty regarding the success of a technology project. This is 
likely to reduce the magnitude of the gains from market optimism addressed in 
Chapter 2. However, the gains would not be eliminated. The main mechanisms 
in Chapter 3 would not be altered as well, since fast technology adoption would 
remain a positive signal about a particular firm and uncertainty about the market 
value of the firm would remain a discouraging force. 
In addition to information imperfections, equity markets can also be imperfect 
because they lack liquidity. Lower liquidity necessarily reduces equilibrium equity 
prices, because there is too little demand for equity. The negative impact arising 
from the lack of liquidity when firms are sold in equity markets is addressed in 
Section 3.4 (see also Bencivenga, Smith, and Starr 1995). In Chapter 2, it is 
straightforward to see that allowing for the equity markets to lack of liquidity 
would also have a negative effect on purely equity financed R&D investment. All 
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this relies on the assumption that information imperfections and liquidity can be 
addressed separately. The potential interactions between equity market liquidity 
and the ease of obtaining information gives rise to further scope for research. 
One can conjecture that in a multiple country/asset setting, investors would be 
reluctant to invest in countries where information about listed firms is hard to 
obtain and this can make the equity market endogenously less liquid. This can 
result in less liquid equity markets and therefore smaller benefits arising from the 
presence of imperfect information in equity markets. 
Chapter 4 showed that allowing for endogenous choice of the precision of pri-
vate signals and different investment horizon is important for the degree of asset 
mis-pricing. While modelling equity markets in Chapter 2 and 4 is not directly 
comparable, these finding suggest the following. Given that short-lived investors 
lack incentives to invest in information about events that are far in the future, 
the magnitude of mechanisms analyzed in Chapter 2 are likely to be higher with 
endogenous private information acquisition. However, when allowing for at least 
some investors to have long investment horizons in Chapter 2, the benefits of mar-
ket optimism would be smaller, because public signal shocks would become less 
persistent. 
To summarize, this thesis argued that well functioning and liquid equity mar-
kets are likely to be important for growth. It showed that endogenous precision 
of private signals is likely to magnify asset mis-pricing. It highlighted the impor-
tance of funding and exit as channels through which uncertainty and mis-pricing 
in equity markets can have an important, potentially positive impact on aggre-
gate economy. The robustness of these findings to alternative set-ups, and the 
empirical quantification of these mechanisms is left for future research. 
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Appendix A 
Appendix for Chapter 2 
A.1 Market clearing in three-period model 
In the three-period economy, the final goods' production takes places only in 
periods 1 and 2. Therefore R&D production occurs onl~' in period 1. f\Iarkct 
dearing conditions for different periods are as follows. 
Yi + Y1 
Y2 + 12 
Y3 
C 1 + J{ 1 + J 1 + .\11 
C2 + 1\2 + 1\12 
C3 
The market dearing in the first period is identical to Section 2.2.3. Intermedi-
ate firms will be liquidated in period 2. Therefore, the investors who invested in it 
will receive just the dividend and P2 = O. This means that C2 = 71:2.-b + Rjl1· Us-
ing (2.1), (2.2). (2..1), (2.8), (2.10), the market dearing condition can be simplified 
to 7r2 = rq>2' which holds true by (2.3). 
There is no other produ('tin) activity' is taking place in period 3 apart from the 
risk-free technology. Given that there is no equity market in period 2. COnSllIll()rS 
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born in period 2 can only invest in the risk-free asset. Hence, C3 = Y3 = Rlvf2 . 
A.2 Equilibrium equity price for three-period 
model 
The starting point is the pricing equation (2.12). To find the average conditional 
expectations and variance of <P2' assume that prices follow a linear rule 
(A.l) 
Given that prices reveal information, we can rewrite this and define the price signal 
as 
To summarize, the signals that rational consumer i has are: 
• Private signal v(i)I<p2 '" N(<P2' 1/f3J 
Using Bayesian updating, the distribution of <P2 based on all the information 
investor i has is 
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This implies that that the variance is the same from the point of view of every 
investor. The average conditional expectation is 
Replacing this into (2.12), one can solve for coefficients J-Ll' J-L2 and J-L3' by equating 
coefficients in (2.12) and (A.l), as 
R(f3¢ + (~)2f3s + f3J 
f3¢ 
This gives the equilibrium equity price equation as in (2.13). 
A.3 Comparative statics for three-period model 
Price Rule 
From the price rule ((2.13) and (2.14)), we can find the dependence of price 
on the underlying parameters: 
8PI r 
- -(1- Zl) > 0 
8¢2 R 
8P1 r 
8¢2 RZ1 > 0 
8PI 1 
--PI < 0 
8R R 
8P1 r 
- --ZI<O 8s1 R 8, 
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Provided that Zl = zl(f3v, f3¢,/3s, r; f) and Zs,l = Zs,l(f3v, f3¢, f3 s' r; f), then by 
applying the chain rule one may recover the effect of the precision parameters and 
risk aversion. For example: 8PI = 8PI 8ZI + 8PI 8zl •S • When the noise tradmg· shock 
8T 8ZI 8T 8ZI.s 8T 
is set equal to its unconditional mean (81 = 0), the second effect becomes zero. 
Given that the for weight on public signal (Zl) it is true that: 
f3V+(~)2f3s 
------'----'---------2 > 0 
[!3¢+ (~)' !3,+!3v] 
_ (~)' !3¢ < a 
[!3¢ + U~)' !3. +f3vr 
f3¢ [~~rf1 + 1] 
- 2<0 
[!3¢ + (~)' !3. +f3v] 
2 f3sf3¢ (~ ) 2 
- 2 >0 
T3 [!3¢ + U~)' !3, +f3v] 
It then follows that: a.::: > 0 iff ~2 - </>2 > O. In all cases that that consider the 
effect of risk aversion below, the noise trading shock is kept at zero; 8 1 = O. 
R&D and output growth 
R&D growth is descried by (2.15). It depends positively on the equity price: 
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~ - ...L!lA 0 Th £ 8P1 - I-p P1 >. ere ore: 
Moreover, from (2.16) and given that the growth in R&D has a positive effect on 
output growth: 8gy = ~ > 0 it follows: 
8gA 4>1 ' 
ogy 
O¢2 
ogy 
O¢2 
ogy 
oR 
ogy 
OT 
Note that when there is actual productivity growth ¢2 > ¢1 the effect of different 
parameters on gy increases in magnitude. 
Benchmark Model 
Regarding the pricing equation in the Benchmark economy: 
OpB r 1 
- >0 
O¢2 R 
opt opt =0 
O¢2 OT 
oPt pB 
oR - - ~ <0. 
Moreover, :;~ = ~~ > O. Comparing the implied R&D growth under the 
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Benchmark and the Model economy: 
For 81 = 0 and given the congestion parameter p, it follows that ~ > 1 iff 4>2 > 4>2. 
i.e., when the public signal is pessimistic. This goes through also when comparing 
9~ with 9y· 
Consumption Levels 
The consumption in the last period: C3 = RW2L = R~7r2 (1 + 9A), depends 
positively on the second-period profits, ~~3 = Qa. > 0, and R&D growth, 88C3 = 
U7f2 71"2 9A 
R~7r2 > o. Also, there is a positive direct effect of the alternative asset return, 
~c;: = q;. > O. Therefore: 
8C3 
8¢2 
8C3 
84>2 
8C3 
8R 
8C3 
8T 
Comparing with the Benchmark model's last-period consumption: 
Regarding the second-period consumption C2 = RAI7rl [( 7I"2R!P ) (1 + 9A) + *], 
it depends positively on profits, ~~ = ~1 > 0 and ~: = Al (1 + 9A) > 0, 
negatively on equity price, ~ = -AIR (1 + 9A) < 0, and the effect of the R&D 
growth depends on whether there are realized excess gains or losses in the equity 
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market, ~~! = Al (7r2 - RP1) > 0 iff 7r2 - RP1 > o. The direction of the effect 
from risk-free asset return is ambiguous, ~c;: = A~7rl - A1P1 (1 + 9.4). In effect, all 
of the following effects become ambiguous: 
aC2 
a4>2 
aC2 
a¢>2 
aC2 
aR 
aC2 
aT 
Comparing with the Benchmark model second-period consumption: 
It is noteworthy that when noise trading is at its mean (81 = 0), the second 
period consumers never get excess gains or losses in the asset market (7r2 = RPf). 
Therefore, it this case Cr - C2 = -AI [(7r2 - RP1 ) (1 + 9A)]. This implies that 
consumers in the model economy get losses (gains), if the market is optimistic 
(pessimistic), i.e. when 4>2 - 4>2 > 0 « 0) and Cr > C2 (Cr < C2 ). 
Finally, consumption in the first period is C1 = (7rl + PI) Al + RMo. It depends 
positively on first-period profits, ~~: = Al > 0, and equity price, ~~ = Al > o. 
Therefore: 
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Comparing the Model with the Benchmark model for the first-period consumption: 
A.4 Welfare 
Welfare in the three-period model is defined as W = Cl + !jt + *. Wintl is the 
welfare corresponding to the initial scenario of both productivity and noise trading 
shock always equal to their unconditional means (1)1 = 1>2 = 1>2' 81 = 0). Note that 
in this case there are no excess asset market gains or losses (7r~ntl = 11"1 = RPrtl ) 
and that the initial scenario coincides for the Benchmark and Model economy: 
W - wintl = 
C Cm + 2 + 3_ ( . tl) (C2_Cintl) (Ca_Cintl) 1- 1 R R2-
[AI (PI - p;ntl)] + [~Al (11"2 - RPl ) (1 + gA)] + 
+ [~~11"2 (gA - g;rtl) + ~~ (11"2 - 11"1) (1 + g;rtl)] 
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and 
w B _ wintl 
(CB _ CintZ) (cr-qntl) (Cf-c~ntl)_ 1 1 + R + R2 -
Welfare implications for the shocks considered in Section 2.3.3 are the following. 
Increase of ¢2' 
The Benchmark economy model is not affected by a pure public signal shock. 
Therefore, W B - wintl = 0, while: 
w - wintl = W - WB = 
There are welfare gains from a false yet positive public signal, if the technology 
growth caused by it is fast enough, so that the following condition is met: 
Since the congestion parameter p E (0,1) and given that Zl E (0,1) and ~ > 1, 
it follows that the LHS of the inequality is decreasing in p. Hence, this condition 
is more likely to hold, the higher is p. The nonlinearity of the inequality does not 
allow for a simple condition on the parameter values. This can be demonstrated 
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in the simple case of p = ~ (numerical exercises in Section 2.4.2 use p = 0.9). In 
this case the inequality simplifies to: 
Therefore, we get an "upper bound" on the percentage deviation of the public 
signal from the actual productivity, for the Model economy to deliver gains com-
pared to the initial scenario/Benchmark economy: ¢2:;cJ>2 < 1-01... For a value 
'1'2 0 %1 
of a around 0.3 and the extreme case of ZI = 1, there would be welfare gains, 
even if the public signal exceeds the true productivity by a factor of 3.3 (that 
however seems unlikely given the underlying distribution). Lower weight on the 
public signal increases that upper bound. Therefore, as long as the public signal 
is not too high and the congestion parameter is not too low, the optimistic market 
sentiment improves the welfare. 
Increase of rP2. 
The consumption will be higher compared to the initial scenario for all genera-
tions in both the Model and the Benchmark, delivering higher welfare (W > wintl, 
W B > Wintl). The difference in welfare gains between the Model and the Bench-
mark simplifies to: 
and there will be welfare gains in the Model economy compared to the Benchmark 
one, if: 
( ~ ) r-. < 1 _ O!ZI ~2 + O!ZI 1 + Zl~ - Zl ~2 g~ -= gA 
Given that now 4>2 < 4>2' the LHS fraction is greater than 1 and thus it is' now 
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increasing in p. Therefore, the Benchmark model will result in the higher welfare, 
as long as the congestion is not too low and the public signal is not very extremely 
pessimistic. 
Increase of both, ¢2 = ¢2 
The welfare will be higher and the same in both economies compared to the 
initial scenario (W = W B > Wintl). 
Decrease of 81 
Both economies can be compared to the initial scenario as follows: 
A r ( 1 A. ( intl)) 1 R Z1,s819A + a 1f'2 9A - 9A , 
wB _ wintl A r ( B 1 A. (B intl)) 1 R 819A + a 1f'2 9A - 9A . 
There are welfare gains in the Model economy and Benchmark economy if 
9~tl 
9A 
9~tl 
9:1 
respectively. What follows, assumes that f3 ¢ + f3 /I > T r, in which case Z1,s < 1. 
In either case of the above inequalities, the fraction in the LHS expression is less 
than one, and thus decreasing in p. Therefore, if p is high and 1811 is not too high 
compared to 4>2' there will be welfare gains in the model economy and benchmark 
economy compared to the initial scenario. Comparison between the Model and 
Benchmark economy, gives the following condition: 
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and the Benchmark model will give higher utility for higher values of p provided 
the noise trading shock is not too large. 
A.5 Equilibrium equity prices in infinite horizon 
model. 
Similarly to the three-period model, the solution method :-;tarb from (2.1 i) and 
assumes that the price equation will be in the form of (2.18). 
IS 
Conditional on the public signals only, the "prior" distribution of <P t (2T x 1) 
1 
{3if, 
o 
o 
o 
1 
r 2 j, 
o 
I 
r 2 3, 
For the price signals, the adjusted prices (that can be interpreted as price 
signals) are defined as 
_ -..__ k ( St-r-k-rl) 
Pt - k Pt - k - IZ¢ - r Z'<P t - r L: zI9 t -k-r1 - :.d r . 
1=1 
for k [0. T - 1] 
The vector of observables for investor i trading in period t is defined as At{i) = 
(Pt, ... ,Pt-T+1,Vt-T+l(i), ... ,Vt(i))', At(i) is (2T x 1). Then 
where et = (O, ... ,O,Ct(i), ... ,Ct-T+l(i))' 
Zl 
Z2 
Z= 
ZT 
l/f 
0 
° 
0 0 
This implies: 
ZT-l 
ZT 
0 
0 
0 
0 
l/f 
° 
o 
o 
o 
o 
ZT 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
l/f 
-Zs,l 
-Zs,2 
-Zs,T 
0 
0 
0 
o 0 
o 0 
o 1 
f3v 
o 0 
0 
0 
-Zs,T-l 
-Zs,T 
o 
o 
o 
1 
f3v 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-Zs,T 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Using the projection theorem, one can find the updated distribution of the 
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unobservables, conditional on the observables for each of the consumer i 
E[4>tIAt(i)] 
Var[4>tI At(i)] 
~O,t + r~epzl(r2z~epZ' + ~A)-l(At(i) - rZ~O,t) 
~ep - r2~epz'(r2 Z~epZ' + ~A)-l Z~ep = Vep 
Notation Vep indicates that the conditional variance of unobservables is constant 
over time and the same from the point of view of every consumer. Aggregating 
over all rational investors, we get the average expectations of the unobservables 
Using this, derive 
where Z~ = (1, Zl, .. , ZT-l, 0, -Zs,l, ... , -Zs,T-l) and Z~ = (0, Zb .. , ZT-b 0, 0, ... ,0). 
Also 
The variance is verified to be constant over time and depends on the coefficients 
and precision of shocks and E[Pt+l + r¢t+llnt] is linear in future productivities, 
historical noise trading and public signals, while St enters into price equation 
from (2.17) directly. Therefore, the prices take the form of the conjectured price 
equation and we can find Zl and Z numerically by replacing the above results into 
(2.17) and equating coefficients with (2.18). 
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A.6 Benchmark price equation in infinite hori-
zon model 
For the infinite horizon Benchmark model, assume that investors get a perfect 
private signal about cPt+T in t and are aware also of the private signals about cPt+l to 
cPt+T-l' This means that the public signal (cP) will be useful only from period t+ T + 
1 onward, because there is no agents with better about this than the information 
than the public signal (Le. the prior distribution cPt+T+k rv N(cP, IIf3qJ, for k > 1). 
Thus, the information set available in t is Of = Of (i) = {cPt+l, ... ,cPt+T}' The 
uncertainty in prices also comes from the noise trading in every period, St+k rv 
N(O, II f3s )' 
Note that all rational consumers have the same expectations (E[ .. \Of(i)] = 
E[ .. \Of] = E[ .. \Of] and Var [ .. \Of(i)] = Var [ .. \Of] and the law of iterated ex-
pectations holds in this case. Therefore, 
which is the present discounted value of the expected future profits. The variance: 
There are two points to notice here. First, prices in t + 1 are a function of 
cPt+T+l' which is not known in t. Therefore, we have to consider its variance 
as well (investors know that the price will move due to additional perfect signal 
being issued). Second, the quality of information is the same over time. Hence, 
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The Benchmark pricing equation is : 
Only the period t noise trading affects the equity price. The term RT(1-1)r¢ 
reflects the lack of knowledge about the long term productivity. 
A.7 Parameters used in numerical solution for 
infinite horizon model 
parameters 1 T a P 'fJ L R A T f3,p f3v f3¢ f3s 
values 
1
6 0.3 0.9 1 13.46 1.33 0.14 2 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
In the initial scenario SHk = 0, ¢Hk = 1, ¢ = 1, ¢t-T+k = 1, ¢t-T+k = 1 for 
all k E (-00,00). 
The results are for T = 61. The choice for the capital share (a) is standard. 
The congestion parameter (p) is from Comin and Gertler (2004). The gross interest 
rate (R) corresponds to yearly interest rate of approximately 6.6 per cent and is 
chosen such that Mt = 0 (for all t) for the initial scenario. The labour force (L) 
is chosen to normalize r = 1. The productivity or R&D (A) is chosen to give 
R&D growth (gA,t) of 0.1 (corresponds to ~ 2 per cent yearly growth rate). The 
coefficient of risk aversion (T) is the same as in Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006). 
1 The length of one time period can be viewed to be 5 years. Thus, given the setting, consumers 
receive public and private signals about the productivity around 30 years ahead 
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The precisions f3¢, f3v, f3,¢, and f3s are chosen to be equal. This that around 30% 
of the weight in the investors' expectations is put on the public signal. 
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Appendix B 
Appendix for Chapter 3 
B.1 Labor, stock market and institutions. 
Data for 1996-2004, medians 
Labor with Stock Turnover Rule Regul. 
sec. educ.* mrk. cap. ratio of law qual. 
Asia 28.2 44.5 80.3 0.30 0.35 
Latin America 33.3 24.5 15.3 -0.29 0.26 
Transition (EU) 62.9 13.4 38.4 0.60 0.74 
Other transition 56.6 10.-1 8.9 -0.07 0.28 
EU (excl. new) 45.0 66.8 72.8 1.74 1.39 
United States na 133.9 141.4 1.73 1.46 
* no data available after 2001 
Table B.1: Labor force, stock markets and institutions 
Indicators: 
Labor with sec. educ. - Percentage of labor force with at least secondary education 
out of total labor force. Source: World Bank Development Indicators 
Stock mrk. cap. - Ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP. Source: Financial 
Sector Development Indicators. World Bank 
Turnol'cr ratio - Stock market turnover ratio equals to stocks traded di\"ided by 
stock market capitalization. Source: Financial Sector Den>lopment Indicators. 
1-l-l 
World Bank 
Rule of law. - Index is in scale -2.5 to 2.5 and measures the extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality 
of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence. Source: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2006) 
Regul. qual. - Regulatory quality index. Index is in scale -2.5 to 2.5 and measures 
the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regu-
lations that permit and promote private sector development. Source: Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2006) 
Country groups: 
Asia - China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singa-
pore, Thailand 
Latin America - Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela 
Transition (EU) - transition countries that joined European Union in 2004, i.e. 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia 
Other transition - other transition countries that have initial PPP adjusted GDP 
per capita above 3.0 thousand USD in 1991, i.e. Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, FYR Macedonia, Romania, Russian Federation, Ukraine. 
European Union (excl. new) - European Union members excluding "Transition 
(EU)" and Luxembourg, i.e. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom 
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B.2 Income per capita and R&D expenditure 
Figures B.1 and B.2 present data on transition countries that are comparable in 
various characteristics. These countries are similar in high share of educated labour 
force, institutions and lack of securities markets at the time when Soviet Union 
dissolved and initial level of GDP. The figures exclude five transition countries 
that had substantially lower initial PPP adjusted GDP per capita (below 3.0 
thousand USD) in 1991. The remaining countries have mean 6.6 thousand USD 
and standard deviation 2.0 thousand USD. 
Figure B.1 shows the relationship between development of equity markets and 
PPP adjusted GDP per capita in US dollars (World Bank Development Indica-
tors). Figure B.2 shows similar relationship with R&D expenditures per capita in 
PPP adjusted US dollars (World Bank Development Indicators). The measure of 
equity markets' development is "Securities market & non-bank financial institu-
tions index" (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development). The index 
evaluates countries on a scale 1-4.5, where 1: little progress; 2: Formation of se-
curity exchanges, market-makers and brokers, some trading in government paper 
andj or securities; rudimentary legal and regulatory framework for the issuance and 
trading securities; 3: substantial issuance of securities by private enterprises, se-
cure clearance and settlement procedures, and some protection of minority share-
holders, emergence of non-bank financial institutions and associated regulatory 
environment; 4: securities laws and regulation approaching the IOSeO standards, 
substantial market liquidity and capitalization, well functioning non-bank finan-
cial institutions and effective regulation; 4.5 standards and performance norms 
of advanced industrial economies, full coverage or securities laws and regulations 
with the roseo standards, fully developed non-bank intermediation. In 1989 all 
transition countries had index "1". The value of index for the EU average and 
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the United States is taken to be equal to 4.5 (the maximum index value). which 
is consistent with the definition. 
Figure B.3 shows similar patterns for R&D expenditures in high and upper-
middle income countries as classified by World Banle The measure of equity mar-
kets development used is the "Equity Size Index" (Financial Sector Development 
Indicators, World Bank). The index is an average of scaled market capitalization 
to GDP, value traded to GDP and turnover ratio: value traded to market capi-
talization. Scaling is done according to the median and standard deviation of the 
variables such that most scaled values are in the interval [2.5, 7.5]. 
Figure BA. shows that the patterns for more general investments and the 
"Equity Size Index" in high and upper-middle income countries is similar than for 
R&D expenditures, but weaker. 
Figures show a concave and possibly non-monotonic relationship that would be 
consistent with the predictions of the model in Chapter 3. The patterns are similar 
if using other available measures of equity market development (e.g. number of 
IOSCO principles implemented, realized equity return volatility) or technology 
adoption (e.g. number of personal computers or internet users per 1000 people 
and GDP growth). 
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B.3 Equity market equilibrium 
The optimal demand of informed traders is specified in (3.21) and (3.22). Un-
informed investors obtain information from their public signal (3.8), adoption 
decision made by the initial owners in period t and the stock price. Replacing the 
optimal demand of informed agents into the asset market clearing condition (3.2). 
This implies, 
(B.1) 
Uniformed investors are all identical and they know their demand (hf+ 1). This 
means that they also know the demand of all other uninformed investors. There-
fore, the price signal can be found from rearranging the equation into observable 
(the price signal, Pt+1 ) and unobservable part from the point of view of any unin-
formed investor. As a result 
which is the same as (3.23). Given that St+l rv N(O, 1/f2 A;+2) , the conditional 
distribution Pt+lI0t+2 rv N (Ot+2' (./ 1 )2 -2). This implies that fJa p.t+1fJu T 
Defining coefficients Zt+l and Zv,t+l as in (3.25) 
Uninformed investors also get information from knowing the adoption decision 
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of local informed investors. We can conjecture that if in previous period the speed 
of technology adoption was chosen to be fast (1ft = 1), it implies (}t+2 > (}H2. If 
it was slow (lIt = 0) then (}H2 < (}H2. This conjecture is verifies in Appendix 
BA. Following Green (2000), pp. 899 the moments of truncated normal can be 
expressed as 
E [(}H2Inf+l] 
Var( (}H2Inf-rl) 
( ZH10H2 + (1 - zHdPt+1 + y'Zv,t+IAllt (bHd) (B.2) 
zv,HI (1 - Aflt (bt+l ) + bt+1Allt (bH1 )) , 
where bH1 f"V N(O, 1) defined as in (3.25) and Alit is inverse Mills ratio; Allt=l (bt+l ) = 
¢(bttl) d \ (b) - ¢(bttl ) h ,J,.( ) d;r.,.( ) t d d al l-~(bttl) an Allt=o HI - - ~(bt+t)' were If'. an '¥. are s an ar norm 
p.d.f. and c.dJ respectively. Using the (3.4) and the independence of Ut+l from 
the public signal and noise trading shocks, the expectation of profits is (3.24) for 
uninformed investors. 
Plugging the demand of uninformed investors (3.21) and (3.24) in (B.l) equi-
librium equity price 
As the number of foreign uninformed investors J.Lf+1 ~ 00, which also implies 
fJ-f+1 ~ 00, the price becomes equal to the discounted expected profits by unin-
formed investors. 
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Using then (3.24) and (3.23) 
B.4 Proof of Proposition 1 
Assume that there exists a threshold level of productivity OH2 above which fast 
technology adoption is optimal. Assume also that this threshold is observable for 
uninformed investors trading in the next period. 
The approximation of Mills ratio with a linear function around 0 is AlIt (bt+l ) ~ 
Tl2bH 1 + TIl ( -1) 1-lit. Mills ratios for right and left truncation is a reflection from 
origin. Therefore, the absolute value of intercept is the same for right and left 
truncation. For example estimated in the range [-1,1] Tl2 = 0.6247 and TIl = 
0.8377 or in the range [-3,3] Tl2 = 0.5701, TIl = 1.1101. For the left truncation 
the ratio is effectively 0 below -3 and close to linear above 3. In the linear area 
of Mills ratio function, the slope is below 1 and the function is convex in between. 
Therefore, in any symmetric range around 0 the slope must be below Tl2 < 1. For 
left (right) truncation Mills ratio is an increasing and convex (concave) function 
above (below) 0, which implies TIl' Tl2 > O. 
Using this, the equity prices can be expressed as 
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Expanding the price by replacing in bt+1, Bt+2 and Pt+2, the price becomes 
(1 - 7]2) (}t+2 + (1 - 7]2) Zt+1E8,t+2+ 
+ (1 - 7]2) Zs,t+1r At+2 St+ 1 + 
7]2(}t+2 + J Zv,t+1 (-1 )l-ilt 7]1) 
From here we can find the conditional moments as 
(B.3) 
By definition, if lIt = 1, then At+2 = A;+2 and if lIt = 0, then At+2 = A;+l. 
Investors, will choose to adopt the technology fast if Ut(iIt = 1) > Ut(iIt = 
0) + Rlt . Using the moments just derived and the adoption cost function (3.6), 
the condition for fast technology adoption is 
This can be simplified by expressing it in terms of growth rate of frontier g. = 
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If the productivity is at the threshold (}H2 = OH2, initial owner is indifferent 
between adopting fast or slow. This implies 
Replacing OH2 into the condition for adoption above and simplifying, the condition 
for fast adoption becomes 
Ot+2 depends on R, ((.), f, g*, zv,Hb fi8 and fis that are all known to uninformed 
investors in period t + 1. This proves that there exists and observable threshold 
for fast technology adoption. This also confirms the guess in Chapter 3.2.3 (and 
Appendix B.3) 
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B.5 Independence of adoption and trading deci-
• Slons 
In period t+ 1 some investors trading in the financial markets are also initial owners 
of monopolistic firms that produce profits in period t + 3 (investment lI
t
+
1
l t+1 will 
produce profits 7rt+3 = fAt+3((}t+3+Ut+3)). Assume that such agent is an investor 
of type i E {I, U} in his trading decision. The information set that is relevant 
for his trading decision is n~+l (that is nf-t-1 = {Ot+2, ?t+b lIt} or n{+l = {(}t+2}). 
The information that is relevant for his technology adoption decision is (}t+3' He 
solves 
C~+2 = (f((}t+2 + ut+2)At+2 - RPt+1)h~ + RWti+1 
C~+2 = lIt+1 Pt+2(ilt+l = 1) + (1 - llt+1)Pt+2(llt+1 = 0) - lIt+lRlt+1, 
where C;~2 is total consumption, C~+2 is consumption from trading, ~+2 is con-
sumption from the adoption decision, W:+ 1 is the wealth of such agent (equals 
to wage income if the agent is a local entrepreneur alone) and h~ his risky eq-
uity demand. Notation Pt+2(lIt+1 = 1) and Pt+2(lrHl = 0) is to point out that 
equity price will be different, depending on the adoption decision (as profit and 
equity price depends on the quality of technology, i.e. the profits depend on A;+3 
if 1It+1 = 1 or A;+2 if 1It+1 = 0). 
With the linear approximation of Mills ratio specified in Appendix B.4, the 
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equilibrium equity price (B.3) depends of three uncertainty terms, 
This implies that 
because by assumption there is no correlation between the shocks and no serial 
correlation. Using this, the moments of C;~l can be expresses as 
E[C!+lln!+I] + E[c:+I IOt+3] 
Var (c~+lln~+l) + Var (c:+IIOt+3) . 
The utility function used implies that optimal equity demand does not depend 
on wealth. Therefore utility from equity trading and developing can be solved 
separately as (3.20) and 
gJ.axE[C~+IIOt+3] - ~ Var (c:+ I I0t+3) , 
IIt+l 
which is equivalent to (3.29) and (3.30) for t + 1. 
B.6 Local goods market clearing 
Case 1. Consider the case when initial owners are local entrepreneurs alone. The 
aggregate budget constraint for all young local agents in period t. 
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where M t is aggregate risk-free foreign asset demand by local agents and H
t 
= 
IAI I AU (J.1t ht + (J.1 - J.1t )ht + St) and is the aggregate equity demand by local agents. 
Due to the lack of wealth effects with CARA utility, local and foreign informed 
and uninformed investors' equity demand is the same, i.e. ht = h;I = h{ and 
ht = h;I = h{. The aggregate consumption of these agents during next period will 
be 
The asset market clearing condition (3.2) can be rewritten as J.1{ h{ + (J.1-J.1{)hf + 
J.1;.i-l h{ + J.1;f.l hf + SH 1 = 1 or H t + H: = 1, where total risky asset demand by 
foreigners is H: = J.1;il h{ + J.1;f.l hf. Replacing this in aggregate consumption, it 
becomes 
From the first period of life budget constraint, the aggregate holdings of risk-
free asset are 
It is clear that if a country invests in technology adoption in period t, it's foreign 
asset holdings will be smaller (or foreign debt higher). 
The net foreign asset position of the country (FH1 ) has following components: 
1. i It H t·+I PHI (i It = 1) + (1- i It )H:+I PHI (i It = 0) inflow if foreign investment 
to local asset; 
2. H;1(t+I outflow of profits from previous period investments; 
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3. MHI outflow of locals' investment to the world asset (or inflow of debt): 
4. RMt inflow of previous period world asset revenues (or outflow of debt re-
payment). 
Using that Ilt+l (j) = lIt+! and It+I (j) = It+I from Section 3.2.2, domestic 
good's market clearing (3.9) becomes 
It can be shown to hold. Replacing FHb CHI and MHIin the goods' market 
clearing condition and simplifying we obtain 
Using (3.11), (3.13) and (3.14) this simplifies to 
and holds by (3.12). The goods' market clears. 
Case £. As analyzed in Section 2.4.3, if initial owners include a foreign investor, the 
speed of technology adoption must be fast, 11t_ 1 = 1. IT fast technology adoption 
is possible only with the participation of foreign investor 
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There will be an additional capital inflow, because the foreign participant will bear 
all the technology adoption cost IHI = ((A;+3 - A;+2) and an additional outflow 
of foreigners' earnings from exiting Pt+I(lIt = 1) - Pt+I(lIt = 0). The resulting 
net foreign asset position 
PHI =H:+IPt+I(lIt = 1) - H;7rt+I - Mt+I + RMt 
+ It+I - Pt+I (lIt = 1) + Pt+I (lIt = 0). 
Replacing these in the goods' market clearing condition, simplifies to the same 
condition as Case 1. 
ff foreign investors participate for reducing the fast adoption cost, then capital 
additional capital inflow and outflow are ((A;+2 - A;+I) and R((·)(A;+2 - A;+l)' 
Consumption, risk-free asset holdings and net foreign asset position are 
PHI = H:+IPH1 (lIt = 1) - H:7rHI - Mt+I + RMt 
+((A;+3 - A;+2) - R((·)(A;+2 - A;+I)' 
Using It+l = ((A;+3 - A;+2) market clears similarly to the above. As the foreign 
participation always compensates the opportunity cost for local agents, forming a 
joint venture does not have an impact on aggregate consumption in t + 1. It can 
also be seen from the relations above that the net foreign asset position is always 
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lower if the country adopts fast technology. Local good's market clears in period 
t if a foreigner participates in the project. 
B.7 Proof of Proposition 5. 
The demand of uninformed investors with wealth (or wage income), Wl~.l' is given 
by (3.21) and (3.24). They know this demand with certainty. The utility from 
staying uninformed is given by 
This simplifies to 
It they decide to become informed their demand is given by (3.21) and (3.22). 
However, they do not know what productivity they will observe after becoming 
informed and therefore their demand as informed. Replacing the demand as in-
formed in the utility function, the utility can be expressed as 
Taking expectations of this conditional on the information the uninformed investor 
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has 
Given that the number of uninformed investors is infinite, asset prices correspond 
to the expectations of uninformed investors. This means E [7rt+2Inf-t.I] - RPt+I = 
O. An investor will decide to become informed if E [U{+lln{+I] - RDt+I > 
E [Ut~llnf-t.I]' This implies the following condition 
The conditional variance of the productivity has to be high enough, such that 
the cost of becoming more informed is compensated by better expected arbitrage 
opportunities as an informed investor. Using Dt+I = ()t+I'!9t+b Var (Ot+2Inf+I) = 
Zv,t+I '!9t+I from (B.2) and '!9t+I = (1 - A~lt (bt+I) + bt+IAilt (bt+I)) ' this becomes 
() < f3u zv,t+I = ~ t+I - R27 - t+I 
Investors find it optimal to invest adoption as long as ()t+I is small enough. 
However, Zv,t+I = (AI 1)2 -2 is a decreasing function of the number of 
f31J+ J.tt+ 1 f3u f3sT 
informed investors. This is because with the higher number of informed in-
vestors makes asset price more revealing, thereby reducing the gains from be-
ing informed. If the number of local investors is large enough, such that ()t+I > 
R2f3u ( 1 )'J holds, no uninformed investor will decide to become informed. T f3i+ j.&[+1 f3u f3aT- 2 
If this is not the case, investors will become informed until the gains from becom-
ing informed are driven to O. This means that in equilibrium, the number of 
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uninformed investors is 
This root is always real, it being negative implies that 5t+1 > ~ which is fl(J-rR2. ' 
satisfied as long as there is at least one investor who decides to become informed 
in addition to those who are informed for a zero cost. 
The dependence of equilibrium number of informed investors on R, 5t+1 , /39 
and /38 is straightforward. Sufficient condition for 8~:1 
5t+1 < fl:~2 (the condition for a real root). 
B.8 Proof of Proposition 6 
> 0 and 8Mt l < 0 is 8flu 
This is a simple optimization problem. Define constants Q1 = ~2 ((.) > 0; 
Q = 2+g* J R2-r 'I'l > o· Q = :[ r(2+g*)..1* (1 - 'I'l )2 R2.-r > 0 Then 50pt 2 - g* flu 'II ,3 - 2 R L.I.f+1 '12 flu . t+1 
arg min (Q1 - Q25f+1 + Q35t+1)' First order condition of this gives 5~1 = (2'1]3) 2. 
Ottl 
1 
82 QI -Q20[tl +Q30ttl 
Second order condition, 8 0 = ~ > 0 confirms it as minimum. 
ttl 40ttl ~ 
Replacing the constants back in 5~t1 gives the proposition. 
B.9 Policy maker's choice of precision of public 
signal 
Assume that instead of information cost, the local policy issues the public signal 
and chooses the precision of it. The policy maker chooses in period t how precise 
signal he would get about 8t+2 in period t + 1 and commits to issuing his observed 
signal in t + 1. For example, the local policy maker could establish an independent 
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research department and choose the size of it. 1 The policy maker solves 
opt . (- ) f3{} t+1 = arg mm (}t+2 , 
, f31J 
where Ot+2 is given by (3.31).As the chosen precision can chance over time, consider 
f3lJ,t+1 instead of f3{), which means that Zv,t+1 = ?I 2. The solution of 
f31J,t+l+C't+;/jU) f3 s 
this problem is 
f3
0pt 
{ lJ,t+1 -
It is clear that f3OP()-tt 1 is finite. Perfect public signal would require f3OP()-t --+ 
,+ ,t+l 
00. Therefore, similarly to Section 3.3.2, local policy maker does not choose full 
transparency. Here, if the number of informed investors is sufficiently high, the 
policy maker would issue no public signal f3OP()-t 1 = 0, in such case there is no reason 
,t+ 
to aim to offset the "fear of unstable markets" force and more precise public signal 
would only limit the gains from "adopting to signal". 
B.lO Restrictions on foreigners portfolio equity 
investments 
Case 1. All noise traders are local. Let as assume that there exits a threshold 
O~2 < Bt+2' such that adoption is more likely in the case of restricting foreign 
capital. 
1 The approach with the choice of information cost is preferred, because local policy maker 
could have incentives to declare higher productivity to encourage faster technology adoption. 
This can make the public signal he issues not credible. The assumed independent research 
department that would avoid such problem may be less realistic than facilitating investors to 
access information directly. 
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Using the equilibrium price in the case of J.1;f.1 = J.1;il = 0 and J.1{+1 = J.1 
E[P£~.IIOt+2] 
Var (p£!IIOt+2) 
It is optimal to pursue fast adoption if Ut(lIt = 1) > Ut(lIt = 0). At the 
- -R - -
threshold Ot+2 = 0t+2 ===} Ut (l It = 1) > Ut (l It = 0). Using the moments above, 
the threshold can be expressed as 
Using Zv t+1 = ( ~ t ' after simplification B~+2 < Bt+2 implies. 
, R_+!!t::..JJ,.. R 
I-'() T 1-'8 
+(~)(38R) (B.4) 
As all variables and constants in this inequality are positive and (1 - "'2)2 < 1, 
this implies LHS > 0 and RHS < O. This contradicts existence of threshold where 
adoption is more likely with restricting foreign portfolio equity investments. 
Case 2. None of the noise traders are local. As before, assume that there exits 
a threshold B~2 < Bt+2' such that adoption is more likely in the case of restricting 
foreign capital. 
In the absence of noise traders E[Pt~IIOt+2] is as above and Var (Pt~IIOt+2) = O. 
The threshold for fast adoption becomes 
First, from (3.32) it is clear that 0~2 > 0;':2. This implies that potential 
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LHS and RHS 
number of informed investors (local) 
- LHS- RHS 
Figure B.5: Possibility of faster technology adoption when forbidding foreign port-
folio investments 
gains from closing the access to foreign uninformed investors could arise only if 
the number of local informed investors is sufficiently small. In uch case the IIfear 
of unstable markets II force is stronger than II adopting to signal II force (area B in 
Figure 3.3 in Section 3.2.4). Using 3.33, we can find the following condition, where 
IIfear of unstable markets ll force is stronger 
Comparing the thresholds, with imperfect equity markets, 8~2 < 8t+2 implies 
that 
(B.5) 
Thi condition cannot al 0 be met in very small number of local inform d inve "'tor 
(p, --? 0 impli contradiction). 
It can hold for "om 11 E (0. p). Thi reqUlre that th variance in for ign noi 
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\ 
• 
trading is high and/or unexplainable component of productivity, (1/ Ps) and/or 
(1/ fi11.) is high. Furthermore, low risk-free interest rate and higher growth and level 
of technology make the condition to hold more easily. The graph below provides an 
illustration for this for values: R = 1, T = 6, {311. = 2, {3s = 0.25, {38 = 0.25, r = 1, 
g* = 0.1, A;+l = 100, g* = 0.1 and 171 = 0.8377, 172 = 0.6247 (approximation 
of Mills ratio between -1 and 1). Closing the access to foreign investors implies 
lower threshold for fast adoption for the values of J-L, where LH S > RH S line in 
(B.5) on Figure B.5. 
Case 3. Some noise traders are local. The results are in between Case 1 and 
Case 2 
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Appendix C 
Appendix for Chapter 4 
e.l Equilibrium asset prices 
Consider an investor of generation T. His demand for the risky' asset is 
Replacing in the conditional expectations and variance, we can rewrite this as 
Aggregating this across investors. and noting that in the symmetric equilibrium 
i3i ,T = i3T , the aggregate demand is 
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Equating supply and demand, replacing in PT = e - HT / JiT and rearranging will 
make the equilibrium price 
Equating the initially assumed coefficients with the results of market clearing, 
gIves 
The equilibrium price can also be expressed as 
1- ZT ZT ZsT 
PT = YT + -8 - -' St, 
Tt Tt Tt 
where 
Next, it can be shown that for any trading period t, where in the next trading 
period equilibrium price can be expressed as 
1 - ZH1 ZH1 Zs,H1 
Pt+1 = Rt YH1 + -0---8 - ~SH1 
+1 ~~+1 ~~+1 
there are Zt and Zs,t such that a similar pricing equation for period t can be formed. 
Investors trading in t know the value of YH1 as it incorporates the price signals 
for periods 1 to t. The expected value and variance of the next period price of 
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asset are 
Replacing in the conditional expectations, variance and the public signal and 
aggregating it across investors, result in the aggregate demand equation 
HT 
Equating this to supply and rearranging, there will be Zt and Zs (equations (4.7) 
and (4.8) respectively), such that the pricing equation (4.6) can be formed. The 
coefficients 'fJt, At and J-Lt solve 
Zs,t+l 
'fJt+l = D ' 
.L Lt+l 
\ _ (1 - Zt+l) 
"t+l - , 
Zs,t+l 
Zt+l 
J-Lt+l = -z-· 
s,t+l 
Explicit expressions for 'fJt, At and J-Lt cannot be derived for t < T - 1. 
It is easy to see that replacing in the terminal conditions ZT+l = 1, Zs,T+l = 0 
and rT+l = 1, (4.7) and (4.8) also simplify to the expressions ZT and Zs,T derived. 
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C.2 Derivation of the variance of excess returns 
from risky asset 
Using the pricing equation (4.6) and conditional expectations of the true value, 
the expected return of the risky asset for investor i can be expressed as 
The public signal is Pt = 8 - st/ J-Lt and the private signallli,t = 8 + Ci,t. Defining 
Zi,t = (1 - Zt+I) ~~1 + Zt+I (f3i,t + J-L;8)Vi,e,t and Zi,s,t = ~~1 - Zt+I ~~J3i,t Vi,e,t, 
R
1 [(Zi,t - Zt) 8 + (-Zi,s,t + Zs,t)St + Zt+I,Bi,t Vi,e,tCi,t 
t+I 
+Zt+If3i,t Vi,e,tCi,t + a non stochastic term wrt. O-t] . 
Since Var[ci,tIO-t] = 1/ ,Bi,t, Var[stIO-t] = 1/8 and Var[810 -t] = l/at, the variance 
of the expected return, Var[E[Pt+II0i,t] - rtPtIO-t] is 
1 [ 2 1 - )2 1 2,B V? ] 1.12 (Zi,t - Zt) - + (Zi,s,t - Zs,t "8 + Zt+I i,t i,e,t . 
~~+I at 
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C.3 Proof of Proposition 8 
Replacing (4.14) and (4.15) in expected utility at the research decision stage (4.13) 
gives 
An individual investor takes the market variables Zt and Zs,t as given and the 
first order condition of his optimization problem is 
8K((3i t) 
27Tt 8(3.' = 
~,t 
[( )2 1 (- )2 1 2 2] Zt,i - Zt - + -Zs,i,t + Zs,t 8 + zHI(3i,t Va,i,t 8-V: . 
_ at P,t,t + 
Vfi,i,t 8(3i,t 
1 [ 1 8Zt,i (_ ) 18Zs'i,t] +~ 2 (Zt,i - Zt) ;- 8(3. - 2 -Zs,i,t + Zs,t 8 8(3. 
P,~,t t t,t t,t 
1 [ 2 2 2 8Va'i,t] +~ +ZHI Va,i,t + 2zHI.Bi,tVa,i,t 8(3. ' 
P,t,t t,t 
h 8zt i 0 d fi·t 8Ve i t V;2 8Vp,i,t - Z2 8Ve,i,t - - Z2 V;2 were at::; > an ill e, ~ = - a,i,t' 8(3i,t - HI 8(3i,t - HI a,i,t 
d 8zs i t ~V;2 an att::: = -ZHIJ.LtU a,i,t· 
In a symmetric equilibrium all investors choose the same precision (3i,t = (3t· 
This implies that Zt,i = Zt, Va,i,t = Va,t, Vp,i,t = VP,t and Zs,i,t = Zs,t, where 
z =..&!. - Z ..&!..B. Yo s,t - Qt+l t+I Qt+l ",t ',a,t· Using (4.7) and (4.8) Zs,t = Zs,t + R;+1 Vp,t and the 
first order condition becomes 
(C.1) 
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This can be simplified further. Using (4.7), (4.8) and (4.12) 
Inserting (4.7) into the above equation again an simplifying 
(C.2) 
and (C.1) becomes (4.16). Given the precision in each period {.BI' ... ,PT }, coef-
ficients {t-tI'" . ,t-tT} can be solved as specified in Section 4.2.2. Full symmetric 
equilibrium solves for {.BI' ... ,.BT} and {t-tI' ... ,t-tT} simultaneously. 
Finally, it can be shown that there exists at least one equilibrium for positive 
and finite parameters (a, T, 8, TI, .. , TT) of the model and a cost function "'(.Bi,t), 
where .Bt > 0 for any t. 
First, it is clear from (4.16), that MBt > 0 for any feasible parameter values. 
Second, using (C.2) marginal benefit (4.16) can be written as 
Notice that Vp,t = Z;+I Va,t + z;,t+d8 = Z;+I (Va,t + t-t~+d8).1 Using this in (4.16) 
can be written as 
From here 
1 For this replacement to be valid also in period T, define J.'T+l = 0 
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because .8~~OVe,t = .8~~OQ+IL~6+ .. ~+IL~6+.8t > 0 and finite (at least Q > 0). and 
Zt+l E [0,1]. At the same time 
lim MBt = 
.8t -+oo 
because lim Ve,t = lim + 26+ 1+ 26+.8 = o . 
.8t -+oo .8t -+OO Q ILl··· ILt t 
These limits together with marginal cost and marginal benefit being continu-
ous functions and the fact that marginal cost is either constant or increasing in 
{3i,t implies that there exists a solution, where f3t > 0 for any t. If marginal cost 
is increasing in f3it and does not have a fixed component, there exists an inte-, 
rior solution. If marginal cost has a constant component, there may be a corner 
solution; f3t = o. 
C.4 Sensitivity of optimal precision to parame-
ters in one trading period model. 
Marginal benefit of research in a one trading period model is given by (4.17). 
Noticing that ~~~ = - Ve2(1 + 2~8), the derivative of marginal benefit of research 
(M B·) with respect to precision {3. is 
8MB· 
8f3· - -Ve+-Ve+- ~+--.!L= (
r {3. 1 ) 8~· ~.2 
8 r 2r 8{3· 2r 
IT.2( 8- r) (r IT. {3. IT. 1) {3·Ve28 0 
- Ve 1 + 2:;:ru 8 Ve + -;- Ve + 2r - r3 <. 
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The marginal benefit of research is decreasing in (3*. Also by assumption marginal 
cost of research is either increasing in (3* or constant (82",((3*)/(8(3*)2 > 0) and 
r"82 ,,(J3") 8MB" 
(8J3")2 - ar > O. 
Taking total derivatives of (4.16), when MBt = MB* (4.17) and noticing that 
8MB* 
dO! 
8MB* 
d8 
8",((3*) 
8(3* 
- (7 11.* + (3* 11.* + ~) 11.*2 < 0 8 a 7 a 27 a 
( 
(3* 1 ) (3*2 T 1'*2 7 * * *2 7va 
- -Va + -Va + - --Va - -- < 0 8 7 27 72 282 
> 0 by definition, 
we can express the sensitivity of optimal precision (3* to parameters of the model 
as follows: 
df3* 
da 
df3* 
d8 
df3* 
dr* 
df3* 
d7 
The direction of impact of risk aversion on marginal benefit is given determined 
by the sign of 
7 T 1'* + T 1'* + \,1;*2 + a a 8M B* ( f3* 1 ) f3*28 11.*2 11.* dr = 8 Va -:;:- Va 27 --:;:a a 28 - 272 
that is affected by three forces described in Section 4.3.1. Replacing in Va, and 
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simplifying 
( 
a}v! B * ) (4 2 ) 
sgn d7 = sgn q17 + q27 + q3 , 
positive or negative. As 7 > 0, q174 + q272 + q3 > ° implies that there are at most 
3 possibilities given the other parameters of the model and the sign restriction 
on all parameters: 
• (3* is increasing in 7 
• (3* is increasing in 7 for high values of 7 and decreasing otherwise. 
• (3* is increasing in 7 for high values of 7 decreasing in intermediate value 
of 7 and increasing again for low values of 7. 
Figure C.1 illustrates how the direction of impact of 7 on (3" can depend on th 
valu of a. (th as umptions about other parameter are the arne in AppendLx 
C.7) 
175 
C.5 Proof of Lemma 9 
The proof follows two steps. First, it shows that Zt is increasing over time. Second, 
it shows that benefit of research is increasing in Zt+l. 
1) From (4.7) 
Positive optimal precision f3t > 0 implies that Ot 26 > 0, Furthermore, O'+J't Ot+/3t+J'~6' 
as 0 < +;'+ 26 < ~t 26 < 1, it is clear that Ot t J't Ot J't 
8zt 
0<8 <1. 
ZHI 
Together with the terminal condition ZT+l = 1, this implies that Zt < ZHI for any 
t and Zt is increasing over time. 
2) The only future variable in (4.16) is Zt+l and marginal benefit of research is 
increasing in zH 1 as 
8MBt TVJ,t 3 VJ,t VJ,t 8 = ZHI ~ R2 + 2zHlf3t'"T72 + ZHl--;r- > O. 
Zt+ 1 U.I. '1+ 1 T v P,t T v P,t 
In equilibrium marginal cost equals to marginal benefit. Therefore, if ZHI is higher, 
investors choose higher precision of private signal. Given that ZHI is increasing 
over time, f3t is increasing over time as well. 
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C.6 Proof of Proposition 10 
From (4.16) and (4.17) the research cost of one-period asset must satisfy 
(C.3) 
Similarly from (4.16), the research cost of T trading period asset must satisfy 
7 2 f3T 2 1 
= -VaT + -VaT + -VaT 28' 27 ' 27 ' /3T 
(C.4) 
If the extent of mis-pricing is the same, i.e. Va = Va,T = Va, the marginal cost of 
multi-period asset problem can be written as 
(C.5) 
This suggest a marginal cost function that is linear in f3T • Assuming a general 
cost function K,(f3i,t) = K1f3~,t + K2f3i,t' a relationship between threshold values 1<1 
and 1<2 that imply the same extent of mis-pricing can be found. From (C.5) and 
assumed cost function at K1 = 1<1 and K2 = 1<2 
Va 
Replacing this in (C.3) implies (4.19) 
(f3T - f3*) 2~ Va2 => 
V4rT K 17. 
For deviation of K2 and K1 from threshold values, consider first a small devi-
ation of K1 = 1<1 + 6.K1 when K2 = 1<2 and 6.K1 > O. From (C.3), (C.4), (4.19) 
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- v. 2 
and Kl = ~4 we obtain 
TTT 
7(VJ T - VJ) (VJ T - f~) (~e T - fe) 
, + ' +. -
28(3T 27 2TST -
7(11,*2 - V;2) (1/,,2 - V;2) (' ~" - f ) e e e e e e 
28(3* + 27 + 27(3* 
As better quality public information (higher at by definition) impliE'~ less incentin's 
to research, (3* > (3T' Given this, the above equality holds if' '8 - f'e > \ 8.T- C.-=> => 
Ve > Ve,T and the extent of mis-pricing is higher for the one-period asset. 
Next, consider Kl = Kl when 1\2 = ]\2 + ~K2 and ~1\~2 > O. Similarly from 
- v.2 (C.3), (C.4), (4.19) and Kl = ~4 we obtain 
TTT 
Given that (3* > (3T, it must hold that \ 8 - fe < 'e.T - fe => \ 8 < 'e,T and 
the extent of mis-pricing is higher for the one-period asset. 
C.7 Dependence of optimal precision on the ex-
ogenous parameters of the model in multi-
period setting. 
The assumptions of the baseline case are the following: Q = 2.5. 8 = 2.5. 7 = 6. 
1\~1 = 0.00225 and rt = 1 for any t. The value of fundamental e = 1.2 and mean 
of public signal y = 1. In the graph about asset prices, all noise trading shocks 
are zero. 
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c.s Equilibrium prices in a model with long-
lived agents 
Assume prices follow linear rules PI = 'Th (>\lY + J.L18 - 81) and P2 = rl2(>.'2Y2 + 
J.L28 - 82). 
Second period. The solution remains similar to the short-lived agents prob-
lem with the only difference being the fact that investors have an additional private 
signal from the first trading period. Therefore, Vi,e,2 = (Q2 + J.L~t5 + (3i,2 + (3,,1) and 
E [810i,2] = (a2Y2 + J.L~t5P2 + (3i,2vi,2 + (3i,lVi,1)Vi,e,2' As before, the in research 
decision stage all investors are identical: (3i,l = (31 and (3i,2 = (32 for every i. 
The solution procedure as in Appendix A (for the period T) gives P2, Z2, Zs,2 
as in (4.21) and (4.22). The assumed coefficients are J.L2 = {31 !(32, A2 = T2+6(~~ +(32) 
and 'T} = T(T2+6~1 +(32» . 
2 Q2+(131+132) 6+(;). +(;). 7"2 ""0,2 ""0,1 
First period. Demand is given by (4.20) and depends on the joint distribution 
of P2 and E [810i,2]' The coefficients Gi and Qi are from Brown and Jennings 
(1989). 
Gi 
Q, 
M, 
L, 
-
-
Mi Ve,I,2 + Var(P210 i,1) 
Var(P210i,1) - Cov(P2 , E [810 i,2] 10i,1) 
(Mi Ve,I,2 + Var(P210 i,1)) Ve,i,2 
Var(P210 i,1) Var(E [810,,2] 10i,1) - [Cov(P2 , E [810i,2] 10,,1)]2 
(Var(P210"d + Var(E [810i,2] 10i,1) - 2 Cov(P2 , E [810,,2] 10i,1)) 
In first trading period Vi,e,l = (a + J.L~c5 + 13,,1) -1 and 
E [810,,1] = (ay + J1.~t5P1 + 13"lV"l) Vi,e,l' Using this, expressions for P2, E [910,,2] 
and Zs 2 = .!a., we obtain the following expressions for the variance and covariance 
, 1-'2 
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structure of P2 and E [810i,2] 
Var(P2In",) = z~ (Vi,s" + JL~.5) 
Var(E [810 i,2] IOi,l) = "'i,8,2"'i,8,1 (Jl~6 + (3i,2) 
Cov(P2, E [810 i,2] IOi,l) = Z2"'i,8,1 
From this Mi = z~ ~~'~ "'i,e,2"'i,8,1. It implies that if no research is done in period 
2 (f3 i ,2 = 0), P2 and E [810i,2] are perfectly correlated conditional on investor's 
information in period 1. Otherwise, they are positively correlated. Using this, we 
can simplify 
(C.6) 
With symmetric equilibrium conditions ({3i 2 = (32 and f3i 2 = (32), it must hold 
.' , 
that "'i,e,l = Ve,l and the subscript "i" can be dropped from coefficients G and 
Q. To derive the equilibrium prices, we also need investor i's expected value of P2 
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and expected value of E [810i,2] 
E [E [81 0 i,2] IOi,l] = 
E [(a2Y2 + J1~8P2 + i32l/i,2 + ,81l/i,1)Ve ,210i,1] = 
(ay + J1I8P1 + (J1~8 + ,82) E[810 i,1] + ,81l/i,1) Ve,2 
(ay + J1I8P1 + (J1~8 + ,82) (ay + J1I8P1 + ,81l/i,1) Ve,l + ,81l/i ,1) Ve ,2 = 
(ay + J1I88 - J11 881 + i31l/i,1)Ve,1 
Using these, aggregating, equating demand with supply and simplifying, we obtain 
P1 Y (GGQ ((1 - Z2) o:+:~c) + Z2aVe,1) + gaVe,l) + 
+ 8 (GGQ ((1 - Z2) a~~c) + Z2 (J1I8 + ,81) Ve,l) + g(J1I8 + ,81 8)Ve,1) + 
81 (GGQ ((1 - Z2) a~~c) + Z2J118Ve,1) + gJ11 8Ve,1 + ~) . 
From here, we can Zl and Zs,l can be presented as functions of Z2 and Z8,2 as in 
(4 22) C ffi · t I ' \ (1-%1) .iL . . oe c1en s so ve 'TJ1 = Zs,l, A1 = % ' J11 = % • 
• ,1 8,1 
e.9 Proof of Proposition 11 
In the spirit of Brown and Jennings (1989), the utility in period 1 can be repre-
sented as 
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where Gi, Qi and Li are given by (C.6). Using Li from that, replacing in the 
demand in period 1 (4.20) and taking expectations, the research cost decision 
problem becomes 
max 
(3i,l,(3i,2 
E[U .10_ ] = E[(E[P210 i,1] - Pl)210_l] G· l,~ 1 27 ' + 
+ E[(E[P210 i,1] - PI) (E[E[810 i,2]] - E[P210 i,1])10-l] Qi + 
7 
+ E[(E[E[810i,2]] - E[P210i,1])210-l] (Q~ + 1 ) 
27 Gi (\'i,9,1 (1 - Z2)2 + z~~) , 
First, it is easy to show that as in short-lived agents' case 
therefore the benefit from research depends on the variance and covariance of 
expected returns between trading periods and liquidation date. 
2 -
Expected value of period 2 prices in period 1 is E[P210i,1] = (1- Z2) Ot~-+:JJ1:l + 
, ( 2 - ) Z2 ay + J-l18Pl + f3i,llli,l \'i,9,1 = 
(1 ' )OtY+J.I.~8e-J.l.l8sl ' ( 288 8 + f3 e + f3 ) V. d = - Z2 Ot+J.I.~8 + Z2 ay + J-ll - J-ll 81 i,l i,l ci,l i,9,1 an 
expected value in period 1 of expected fundamental value is 
E [E [810i,2] 10i,1] = (ay + J-l~8Pl + f3i,llli,l)\'i,e,l = 
= (ay + J.1~88 - J-l188l + f3i,18 + f3i,lCi,1)\'i,9,1.Using these and PI from (4.21). 
After calculating these variances and covariance and plugging it back to the 
utility function and simplifying, we obtain 
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Wh ' - Gi-Qi [(1 ') p}5 , (f3 2.r)Tl"] Q ({3 2.r)Tl" ere Zi,l = Gi - Z2 et+Jl.?6 + Z2 i,l + JLlu Vi,e,l + G: i,l + JLlu Vi,e,l' 
Research in period 2. Given that "'i,e,l does not depend on (3i,2' from (C.6), 
it is clear that also Gi , Qi and ii,l do not depend on f3 i ,2' Therefore marginal 
benefit on research (8) in period 2 is zero for a long-lived investor before first 
trading period. The first order condition 
implies that optimal f3 i ,2 = 0 as long as marginal cost a~~:~» is a function of f3 i ,2' 
Research in period 1. From (C.6) :/3Gi = :§' = 1. Given this and 
.,1 .,1 
a~iJ~'l Investor i's marginal benefit of research in period 1 is 
.,1 
where 
1 
27" 
aZ'.1 (1' ) (({3 + 2~)v. ~) Gi - Qi 
ap'.1 - Z2 i,l J1l i,e,l - G1 
+ (i2 + (1 - i2)*) aVi,e,1 (1 - J.t~~Vi,e,l) . 
In symmetric equilibrium {3i,l = PI for every i. This implies Vi,e,l = Ve,l, 
Gi = G, Qi = Q, Zi,l = Zl and (1 - ~,1)17! - Zs,l = - b. Also, From (C.6) 
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GZ2 + (1 - Z2)Q = V8,~' and G - Q = J-1~o(l~r). \\'e can simplif~' the equilibrium 
marginal benefit. 
1 
2T 
Q+,,26+ 1-'~6(1-i2)2 
"'I "2 Given that using (C.6) ~ - /31 d2 = G2 -:; > 0 and all other variables 
in the expression for 1H B1 are positive .II Bl > O. If marginal research cost is an 
increasing function of /3.i,l, this necessarily implies that optimal /3i,l = /3 1 > 0, if 
K, (/3i,t) = K 1/3;,t as assumed. 
C.I0 Responsiveness of optimal precision and as-
set prices to parameters of the long-lived 
agents extension 
The assumptions about baseline parameters of the model are the same as in A po. 
pendix C.7. Prices are reported assuming supply shocks at their zero mean in 
both periods. As before the fundamental e = 1.2 and public signal y = 1 
/3 PI P2 
baseline 5.33 l.132 l.149 
n = 5 ·-L07 1.080 l.102 
0=5 -1.27 1.120 l.1-16 
T = 10 6.25 l.1-11 l.149 
/\-1 = 0.003 
-1.69 l.126 1.143 
Table C.1: Impact of parameters on the model in long-lin)d agents' setup 
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